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Russell on Spinoza’s Substance Monism

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Metaphysica

Abstract

Russell’s critique of substance monism is an ideal starting point from which to understand some main concepts in Spinoza’s difficult metaphysics. This paper provides an in-depth examination of Spinoza’s proof that only one substance exists. On this basis, it rejects Russell’s interpretation of Spinoza’s theory of reality as founded upon the logical doctrine that all propositions consist of a predicate and a subject. An alternative interpretation is offered: Spinoza’s substance is not a bearer of properties, as Russell implied, but an eternally active, self-actualizing creative power. Eventually, Spinoza the Monist and Russell the Pluralist are at one in holding that process and activity rather than enduring things are the most fundamental realities.

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Notes

  1. In what follows, the five books of the Ethics are numbered I to V. The abbreviations “p”, “a”, “d”, “c” and “s” stand for “Proposition,” “Axiom,” “Demonstration,” “Corollary” and “Scholium.”

  2. Spinoza’s claim is stronger than this: Ip14 says that it is necessary that only one substance exists. The point is irrelevant for the purposes of the present article.

  3. One important question remains open: how could the revisionary metaphysician ever hope to transcend the limitations of ordinary language without talking nonsense? This is a real difficulty, but it cannot be dealt with here at any length; cf. Simons (1998) for an insightful treatment of this issue.

  4. It would closely resemble Leibniz’s universe, but the two worlds would not be identical: Leibniz’s spiritual monads are all of the same ontological type.

  5. The one philosopher who has made the most to vindicate the process point of view in recent years is Nicholas Rescher, especially in Process Metaphysics (Rescher 1996). In this book Rescher provides a survey of great process thinkers of the past from Heraclitus to Whitehead, yet he does not mention either Russell or Spinoza. Quite different is his estimate of Leibniz (cf. also Rescher 2003).

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Acknowledgments

Thanks to Leemon McHenry for comments on a previous version of this paper.

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Correspondence to Pierfrancesco Basile.

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Basile, P. Russell on Spinoza’s Substance Monism. Int Ontology Metaphysics 13, 27–41 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12133-011-0090-6

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