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A mixed methods social network analysis of a cross-border drug network: the Fernando Sanchez organization (FSO)

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Abstract

This study is a mixed methods case study of the Fernando Sanchez Organization (FSO) better known as the Tijuana Cartel in the 2008–2010 period, aimed at better understanding internal structures and the roles of individuals in crossborder polydrug networks under pressures from rivals and state leadership targeting. In addition to historical archival data to build a qualitative case study, it uses arrest warrant data (an emergency wiretap application and a Racketeering Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act or RICO indictment) from the FSO drug network investigation in order to visualize the structure of the cross border network and to explore research questions regarding the relationship between actor centrality/network topography metrics and variables of interest including organizational role, age, gender, number of prior arrests, location of criminal activity, and location of residence using social network analysis (SNA). Findings included: narcotics distributors, drug couriers, and enforcers for the network all had higher centrality in the network, age was only slightly negatively correlated with eigenvector centrality, gender had no bearing on centrality, the number of prior arrests also had no bearing on degree or betweenness centrality, but did positively correlate with eigenvector centrality. Findings also demonstrated faction subgroup analysis had considerable overlap with both law-enforcement-reported-address and location of criminal activity (coded as actor attributes). This finding suggests it may be possible to predict the location of criminal activity and residence through faction analysis in other binational trafficking networks.

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Notes

  1. The Pacer system is the publicly available, Electronic Federal Court Record Database system.

  2. The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act of1970 (RICO)

    In order to fully understand 1) how organized crime and criminal groups, such as the FSO, are investigated, charged, and ultimately dismantled, in the U.S., and 2) how the data and methodology were utilized in the current study: it is important to discuss the legislation that allows for these types of takedowns—The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970. Created by Congress for the purpose of combating organized crime, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970 is included in Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 (U.S.C. 18 §§ 1961–1968). The RICO statute is considered to be the single-most impactful piece of legislation passed against organized crime activity (Abadinsky 2017; Roth 2017). Originally designed to dismantle New York’s infamous La Cosa Nostra, “our thing” crime group, RICO legislation has also been used to civilly and criminally prosecute legitimate businesses engaging in conspiracies such as labor unions, tobacco companies, anti-abortion protests, and police officers engaging in police misconduct (Phillips et al. 2015).

    For an individual to be convicted under the federal RICO statute, evidence must be collected that illustrates (beyond a reasonable doubt) that the defendant engaged in at least two acts of racketeering activity performed as part of an ongoing criminal enterprise. The following is a summary of the four unlawful acts mentioned in Section 1962 of the RICO statute: 1) a person receiving any income directly or indirectly derived from a pattern of racketeering activity or through the collecting an unlawful debt; 2) directly or indirectly participating in or maintaining an interest in, or control of, an enterprise that engages in, or whose activities affect, interstate and/or foreign commerce; 3) being employed by or associated with such an enterprise through direct or indirect conduct or participation in a pattern of racketeering activity or the collection of an unlawful debt; and 4) conspiring to violate the first three unlawful actions mentioned above (Organized Crime Control Act 1970).

    Section 1961 (3) defines a person as “any individual or entity capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property.” In Section 1961 (4), the statute defines an enterprise as “any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity” (Organized Crime Control Act 1970). The vague and seemingly all-inclusive language used allows for the government to apply this statute to individuals involved with criminal “enterprises” that range from drug trafficking organizations to energy companies such as Enron (Diesner & Carley, 2005).

    Racketeering activities are discussed in Section 1961 (1), some of which include an act or threat involving murder; kidnapping; gambling; arson; robbery; bribery; extortion; interstate transport of stolen property; dealing in obscene matter; manufacture, importation, receiving, concealment, buying, selling, or otherwise dealing in controlled substances or listed chemicals; counterfeiting; embezzlement; obstruction of criminal investigations and law enforcement; tampering with or retaliating against a witness, victim, or informant; forgery; and peonage, slavery, or the trafficking of persons. For a pattern of racketeering activity to be established, Section 1961 (7) “requires at least two overt acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of this chapter, and the last of which occurred within ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity” (Organized Crime Control Act 1970).

    To highlight the relevance of this act in regard to the current study and methodology used, it is important to note that the (AFO/FSO) was considered a criminal “enterprise” with numerous co-conspirators who engaged in, or conspired to, further the goals of the enterprise through at least two overt acts. More importantly for the purpose of this study is the fact that overt acts are not restricted to plans of illegal activity that are carried-out. For instance, if a wiretap transcript includes a conversation between co-conspirators detailing plans to commit a future criminal act that never develops into an actual criminal act, this is still an “overt act” despite the fact that the act never occurred. The tying of criminal actors to each other and the criminal enterprise makes the prospect of SNA data from RICO indictments tantalizing.

  3. An adjacency matrix is a common way to enter data in social network analysis. In a one mode network it consists of all actors in rows and columns with ties entered as a 1 and no tie entered as a 0.

  4. Bichler et al. (2017) argue these metrics are required of all SNA studies regardless of research questions if research is to be replicable.

  5. The authors are grateful to Dr. David Shirk for confirming our suspicions on this point.

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This study did not receive any outside funding and all PACER searches were conducted by the lead author at his expense.

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  1. College of Criminal Justice, Department of Security Studies, Sam Houston State University, Huntsville, TX, USA

    Nathan P. Jones

  2. College of Criminal Justice, Department of Criminal Justice and Criminology, Sam Houston State University, Huntsville, TX, USA

    W. Layne Dittmann & Tyler Reese

  3. Department of Security Studies and Criminal Justice, Angelo State University, San Angelo, TX, USA

    Jun Wu

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Jones, N.P., Dittmann, W.L., Wu, J. et al. A mixed methods social network analysis of a cross-border drug network: the Fernando Sanchez organization (FSO). Trends Organ Crim 23, 154–182 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12117-018-9352-9

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