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What Are Applied Ethics?

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Abstract

This paper explores the relationships that various applied ethics bear to each other, both in particular disciplines and more generally. The introductory section lays out the challenge of coming up with such an account and, drawing a parallel with the philosophy of science, offers that applied ethics may either be unified or disunified. The second section develops one simple account through which applied ethics are unified, vis-à-vis ethical theory. However, this is not taken to be a satisfying answer, for reasons explained. In the third section, specific applied ethics are explored: biomedical ethics; business ethics; environmental ethics; and neuroethics. These are chosen not to be comprehensive, but rather for their traditions or other illustrative purposes. The final section draws together the results of the preceding analysis and defends a disunity conception of applied ethics.

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Notes

  1. When I talk about ‘applied ethics’ (plural), I will be referring to such fields as biomedical ethics, business ethics, environmental ethics, and so on. I think that this is fairly standard, though recognize that other distinctions might be drawn.

  2. In this paper, I will not have much to say about exactly what unification is, a topic that has not sufficiently been explored in ethics. For an introduction to this topic in the philosophy of science, see Cat (2007).

  3. See, for example, Dupré (1995), Galison and Stump (1996), Cartwright (1999). Note that these references are not to suggest that the arguments in favor of disunity of science—many of which are predicated upon (anti)reductionism—are isomorphic to those that we would use in applied ethics, but merely that the conclusion is one that we might profitably consider, if supported by different argumentation.

  4. See, for example, McKeever and Ridge (2006). While intutionists certainly do not have to be principlists—as the intuitions could pertain to case judgments rather than to principles—it turns out that there seems to be a general congeniality between intutionism and principlism. See, for example, Stratton-Lake (2003) for a balanced treatment of these issues.

  5. The best introduction to casuistry, particularly from in historical perspective, is Jonsen and Toulmin (1988). See also Bedau (1997).

  6. There is some issue about what the specification of the cases should be: “women should be able to exercise control over their own reproduction” could be taken to be a “mid-level” moral principle, somewhere between some general moral principle and an actual case. I do not think that anything hangs on this, though, and we could easily replace such a principle with “Ms. Jones should be able to exercise control over her own reproduction” if the former is regarded as too general in some sense. Of course, the latter follows from the former and; the former, therefore, is not “at bottom” in some sense. But, then, neither is the latter, really, for consider “Ms. Jones should be able to exercise control over her own reproduction this year”, which follows from that she could be able to exercise control over her reproduction. I take it that the cases can always be rendered more specifically such that it is virtually impossible to get to a truly basic case. For the purposes of this paper, however, I chose the formulations used in-text because those are of the degree of generality that we are most likely to see coming out of work in applied ethics.

  7. For example, consider trolley cases wherein we might redirect a trolley onto a track such that the diversion saves the lives of five, while threatening the life of one. The previous principle, which said that we cannot kill one to save five would seem to inveigh against such redirection, unless we introduce a distinction between intentional killing and unintentional (but foreseen) killing; insofar as the latter is less morally bad than the former, we might yet be justified in redirecting the trolley since the killing would be unintentional (but foreseen). Of course, this is hardly uncontroversial. See Foot (1967). See also Thomson (1976), (1985).

  8. Of course, this question has generated a substantial literature. Some places to start are Rosenberg (1978), Kitcher (1984), Sober (1999). These latter two sources are on the particular issue of whether classical Mendelian genetics reduces to molecular biology, though more general discussions are also included.

  9. For the classic treatment on this topic, see Nagel (1961). See also Boyd et al. (1991) for more contemporary literature. Kenneth Schaffner has also made important contributions to this literature, see Schaffner (1967), (1993). Chapter 9 of this latter source has a good discussion of developments since Nagel.

  10. Parts of this section are adapted from Allhoff (2007). I actually find myself having slightly changed my view since that paper and those changes are reflected in this one.

  11. See also Pellegrino (1985).

  12. For a more sustained critique of some of these ideas, see Allhoff (2006), especially pp. 395–400.

  13. See, for example, De George (1986), Larmer (1992).

  14. See for example, Werhane (1989), Machan (1996), Lippke (1993).

  15. See, for example, Hettinger (1989), Paine (1991).

  16. Many of these codes of ethics have been collected by the Center for the Study of Ethics in the Professions at the Illinois Institute of Technology. For more information, see ethics.iit.edu/codes/coe.html.

  17. See the American Bar Association Model Rules of Conduct at www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/mrpc_toc.html.

  18. See, for example, the Code of Ethics of Engineers at ethics.iit.edu/codes/coe/accreditation.board.engineering.tech.a.html.

  19. See the various codes for those in media, including journalism. See ethics.iit.edu/codes/media.html.

  20. See, for example, Shew (2008). See also Institute for Food and Agricultural Standards (2007).

  21. While no formal code has been ratified, the International Intelligence Ethics Association (IIEA) has already expressed an interest in this project. See intelligence-ethics.org for more details.

  22. For a discussion, see Baker et al. (1999).

  23. See, for example, the IIT Center for the Study of Ethics in the Professions’ discussion of how to write a code of ethics at ethics.iit.edu/codes/Writing_A_Code.html.

  24. For more on this, see Pritchard (2007). See also Allhoff and Vaidya (2008b).

  25. See, for example, Allhoff (2008).

  26. See, for example, Shrader-Frechette (1998).

  27. For a recent discussion of cost-benefit analysis in the US that contrasts its use with the “precautionary principle” of the UK, see Sunstein (2005).

  28. See, for example, John Edwards’ comments during the 2004 (US) Vice Presidential Debate. Available at http://www.debates.org/pages/trans2004b.html.

  29. Given more space, I would like to say more about what I take this to mean. It is clearly not the case that if some question Q arises in some context C1 and then is completely exported to some other context, C2, that C1 retains any privileged status in regards to Q. Rather, I take it that for C1 to retain that status, much of the important conceptual work regarding Q must be done within C1—rather than simply the initial work—and furthermore that Q continues to inspire research within C1. I think it also must be the case that Q motivate a predominant part of the research agenda in C1, and that C2 have substantially (though not exclusively) different projects; this latter condition is required just so that C1C2. At any rate, for the present paper, such details are not centrally important, though bear mentioning. Needless to say, I think that environmental ethics satisfies these conditions.

  30. See, for example, Illes and Racine (2005), Stoller and Wolpe (2007), Meegan (2008).

  31. The link between personhood, personal identity, and psychological criteria invites a long tradition which extends, at least, to John Locke. See Locke (1994). More recently, see Parfit (1984). For a dissent—one which postulates biological, as opposed to psychological criteria—see Olson (1997).

  32. See, for example, Freeman et al. (2000).

  33. There have been several studies that demonstrate that there is activity in the amygdala when viewing faces with expressions of anger or fear, with the ability to distinguish between these two emotions. See, for example, Whalen et al. (2001), (1998). Given these studies, there is at least the potential for the use of fMRI scans during interrogations.

  34. Stoller and Wolpe (2007).

  35. Despite my skepticism, I hardly think that there will be any lack of industry in neuroethics; two new journals have just appeared to support the burgeoning field: Neuroethics from Springer and AJOB Neuroscience from Taylor & Francis. Rather, I think that it must find a way to define itself such that it can deliver on its process while, at the same time, remaining (reasonably) independent of biomedical ethics.

  36. For more on this, see Walzer (2000). Also, see the classic treatment of just war theory by Aquinas (1948), Question 40, esp. Article 1. See also Orend (2005). For my own views on related issues, see Allhoff (forthcoming).

  37. See, for example, Abdolmohammadi and Nixon (2002). See also Allhoff and Vaidya (2008b), Unit 1.

  38. See, for example, Harris et al. (2005). See also Allhoff and Vaidya (2008b), Unit 2.

  39. See, for example, Borden (2007). See also Allhoff and Vaidya (2008b), Unit 3.

  40. See, for example, Luban (1983). See also Allhoff and Vaidya (2008b), Unit 4.

  41. See, for example, Allhoff et al. (2007). See also Allhoff and Lin (2008). See also Allhoff et al. (2010). I take a pretty negative line toward to autonomy of nanoethics, see Allhoff (2007), esp. pp. 193–198.

  42. This is a pretty limited literature so far but see, for example, Sparrow (2007), Sparrow and Sparrow (2006), Sparrow (2002). Also, see the Robotethics Website at www.roboethics.org (accessed March 5, 2008). There are also two journals that specifically address these and related issues: Autonomous Robots and Robotics & Autonomous Systems.

  43. For a recent discussion, see Lin (2006). In addition to Astropolotics, the journal Space Policy addresses issues related to space ethics.

  44. This argument is made in more detail with respect to nanoethics in particular in Allhoff (2007), pp. 193–198. Briefly, I appeal to a distinction made from David Luban, “The Adversary Excuse,” in Luban (1983), pp. 83–122. In seeking justification for some extant adversarial legal system as against any other sort of legal system, Luban denies that any strong moral justification is on offer insofar as there are various problems with the system; some are alluded to, for example, in Freedman (1966). Nevertheless, Luban thinks that the system has pragmatic justification insofar as it is not (substantially) worse than any other system any change from it would incur substantial costs.

    I think that this suggests—or maybe even is—a distinction between metaphysical and pragmatic justification: something could be justified in virtue of what moral features it has, or else by various pragmatic considerations it deserves. Some new applied ethics, I think, lack distinctive moral features and, therefore, metaphysical justification. Nevertheless, we should still care, for example, about how nanotechnology affects the environment, even if no new moral questions are raised through this discourse. Likewise, some new technologies deserve ethical attention, even if they do not deserve independent applied ethics.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo, MI, USA

    Fritz Allhoff

  2. Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics, The Australian National University, Canberra, Australia

    Fritz Allhoff

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This paper was developed after attending a conference, Applied Philosophy as Common Ground (Princeton, NJ, 2007); I thank those conference participants for their dialogue. I also thank six anonymous referees from this journal for their comments on an earlier draft and the journal’s editor for facilitating such extensive feedback.

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Allhoff, F. What Are Applied Ethics?. Sci Eng Ethics 17, 1–19 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11948-010-9200-z

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