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The Strange Implications for Bioethics of Taking Christianity Seriously

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Abstract

In this paper, I argue for two theses. First, if Christianity is true, then morality should depend on the metaphysics of the afterlife. Second, if Christianity is true, then contemporary moral theory is mistaken. The argument for the first thesis rests on two premises. If rightness depends on an act’s effects on an individual, then—at least in part—it depends on the long-term effects on him. If rightness depends—at least in part—on the long-term effects on an individual, then it depends on the metaphysics of the afterlife. The argument for the second thesis rests on how heaven or hell swamp other considerations. By changing assumptions about the nature of heaven or hell, who goes there, and standard mathematics, we end up with different ethical theories. Some of these assumptions conflict with contemporary moral theory regarding killing, letting die, and saving.

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Notes

  1. See Beauchamp and Childress (2012) and DeGrazia et al. (2010).

  2. For classic discussion of the trolley cases, see Thomson, Killing, Letting Die, and the Trolley Problem (1986) and Thomson, The Trolley Problem (1985). It is unclear if Thomson supports threshold deontology rather than deontology.

  3. How to understand averagist theories of the good is complex and controversial. See Hurka, Average Utilitarianisms (1982) and Hurka, More Average Utilitarianisms (1982). I have chosen what I think is the most plausible averagist theory.

  4. For this taxonomy, see Parfit (1984).

  5. For desert-based theories of the good, see Feldman (2012); Hurka, Virtue, Value, and Vice (2001); and Kagan (2012).

  6. For Christian support of the existence of heaven, see 2 Cor. 12:2–4 and Rev 22:5 (Book of Revelation). For the Catholic Church, see Catechism of the Catholic Church 1026. For purgatory, see Catechism 1030.

  7. ee, for example, Catholic Catechism 1035. I further assume that heaven or hell result from free choices. See, for example, Catholic Catechism 600.

  8. See Beauchamp and Childress (2012).

  9. See Williamson (2004).

  10. See Hilborn (2000).

  11. See Lewis (1946).

  12. See Feinberg, Voluntary Euthanasia and the Inalienable Right to Life (1978).

  13. For discussion of this assumption, see Nelson (1991).

  14. For an interest-based justification of rights, see Kramer (1998). For an autonomy-based justification of rights, see Steiner (2000). There is an issue as to whether rights are justified by other things being equal or all things considered interest or autonomy. For an argument that both produces strongly counterintuitive results, see [].

  15. There is an issue as to whether this is true phenomenologically as well as quantitatively. I set this issue aside as it does not affect my argument.

  16. For the notion that the fecundity of the agent’s decision affects autonomy, see Feinberg (2003).

  17. There is a problem here if, as I believe, increased or decreased risks do not have value. Rather only actual outcomes have value. Still, outcomes that are not actual, but can be, have counterfactual value. Let us set aside this issue here.

  18. See Vallentyne, Utilitarianism and Infinite Utility (1993). For an attempt to avoid this issue, see Mulgan (2002).

  19. See Vallentyne and Kagan, Infinite Value and Finitely Additive Value Theory (1997) and Lauwers and Vallentyne (2004).

  20. See []. For discussion of a Pareto-superior approach, see Vallentyne, Infinite Utility: Anonymity and Person-Centerness (1995), Cain (1995), and Van Liederkerke (1995).

  21. On some theories, one does not merit heaven. Rather he prevents himself from being ineligible for it. If this is correct, please substitute this theory where I use ‘merit’ above.

  22. Strict Kantians or natural law theorists might have such an intuition but argue that it does not cohere with more justified intuitions or arguments.

  23. For the tedium argument, see Williams (1993). For a response, see Fischer (2020).

  24. For the notion that the badness of hell involves separation from God, see Lewis (1946). For mention of the notion that hell might be an enjoyable place, see Buckareff and Plug (2005) and.

    [].

  25. For a version of this argument, see Talbott (1999) and []. For arguments discussing, see Kvanvig, Destiny and Deliberation (2011), Kvanvig, The Problem of Hell (1993), VanArragon (2010), and Walls (1992).

  26. See Parfit (1984).

  27. See ibid.

  28. For Charlesworth’s view, see (Charlesworth, Bioethics in a Liberal Society 1993) and (Charlesworth, Don't Blame the ‘Bio’ — Blame the ‘Ethics’: Varieties of (bio) ethics and the challenge of pluralism 2005). For discussion of his view, see (Wong, et al., 2019).

  29. I am very grateful to the extremely helpful comments and criticisms of this paper by Neil Feit, John Martin Fischer, David Hershenov, Philip Reed, and Travis Timmerman.

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Kershnar, S. The Strange Implications for Bioethics of Taking Christianity Seriously. SOPHIA (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-022-00945-w

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