Abstract
This paper argues that a strong thesis of divine providence, whereby God is understood as in complete control of all things, entails pantheism, the thesis that the universe is not ontologically distinct from God. In normal discourse, we distinguish a plan from, on the one hand, the state of affairs which realizes that plan—its execution or expression—and, on the other hand, the person or group whose plan it is. However, with respect to an omnipotent God who displays complete providence, neither of these two distinctions holds. We cannot separate person from plan, or plan from world, and in consequence, neither can we separate person from world, ergo pantheism. Accordingly, the argument of this paper comes in two parts maintaining, first, the impossibility of distinguishing between God’s plan and its execution and, second, the impossibility of distinguishing God himself from his plan.
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Notes
I take as equivalent here talk of God’s ‘plan’ and talk of his ‘will’—for God makes no plans which he does not will into being, nor does he will anything except in accordance with his perfect planning, i.e. without logic or purpose. Insofar as God’s will is a part or aspect of his person or being, the equivalence here is precisely that which I defend in the second half of this paper.
Think, for example, of form and matter, term and relation, or substance and property.
The objection here is structurally the same as that which can be raised against behaviourism: that if mental states are reduced to patterns of behaviour, it becomes impossible to appeal to mental states in order to explain behaviour.
By way of an aside, I might add that as an absolute idealist, I am attracted to Hegel’s version of this compromise, in particular. Purpose does indeed come only from thought, but it is nonetheless naturally intrinsic to things, because in their essence they are just thought.
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Acknowledgments
I would like to thank Sophia's anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments towards revising this paper.
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