Abstract
Given recent discussions of personal privacy, or more particularly, its invasion via the internet, it is not surprising to find the issue of personal privacy emerging regarding God’s relation to our private lives. Two different and opposing views of this God-person relation have surfaced in the literature: (A) ‘God and Privacy’ by Falls-Corbitt and Michael McLain, and (B) ‘Privacy and Control’ by Scott Davison. I discuss key elements in both sides of this debate. Even though I will register my sympathy with both sides, I claim that both fail to grasp what I call the existential depth of the God-person relationship.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
‘In its important moral sense, “privacy” refers to our ability to control access to information about us…’ (FCM, p. 370, my emphasis). ‘In this paper, I will focus on just one concept of privacy, albeit a central one (in my view) …[to wit] when the word ‘private’ occurs as an adjective and modifies nouns signifying information of some kind’ (SD, p. 137, my emphasis).
‘My thoughts do not become someone else’s thoughts just because someone else knows about them.’ SD p.149.
An intense focus on the importance of separateness threatens to eclipse the importance of intimate connections, that is, the importance of communion and hence the importance of community. The threat of this eclipse is especially strong in the West, and in America in particular, where the self-sufficiency of the individual is a core value.
I have always thought that the hyphen in Buber’s I-Thou relation was vital in in expressing both the connection and the separation of the ‘I’ and the ‘thou’. Martin Buber, I and Thou [1923], translated by R. Gregor Smith. (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1937), passim.
FCM, p.144. They go on to say: ‘And if perfect goodness dictates that there are things such a being could know if it were appropriate, but necessarily will not know if it is wrong to do so, then the scope of omniscience will be consistent with divine goodness’ (p.382)
SD, p.146
FCM, p.377
FCM, p.379
I am relying on Wittgenstein concept of ‘seeing as,’ which he understands as a kind of conceptual interpretation and not confined to perception. He thinks that we can see a human being as a soul, or fail to see this. His famous discussion of this concept elaborates the implications of the ‘duck-rabbit’ drawing. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations by translated by G.E. M. Anscombe, P.M.S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte; Revised Fourth Edition by P.M.S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte; First published in 2009, Blackwell Publishing, Ltd. (§118, part II))
Speaking about God knowing Israel, the prophet says: ‘I knew you before I formed you in your mother’s womb’ Jeremiah 1:5
See H. Richard Niebuhr, Radical Monotheism and Western Culture (Harper Torch books, 1960). On Niebuhr’s account of Moses and the burning bush, God is revealed as both the principle of being (fundamental ontology) and as an ‘I’. God’s name is ‘I am’ (Yahweh). This interpretation accords well with the classical doctrine of imago dei.
See Brian Davies’ discussion of divine simplicity. He notes that the bible speaks of God as if he were a human person. However, he cautions that we should not be misled by this. Since God is a mystery, we really do not know what God is. Yet we do know what persons are and on this basis (what other basis do we have?) we understand by analogy something of what God is like; after all, we were created in his likeness. As Davies says: ‘When we speak of God, although we know how to use our words, there is an important sense in which we do not know what they mean [when applied to God]. Fundamentally, this is because of our special ignorance of God. We know how to talk about shoes and ships because of our understanding of shoes and ships. We know how to talk about God, not because of any understanding of God, but because we know about creatures. That, in a nutshell, is the drift of the famous discussion of analogy…’ ‘A Modern Defense of Divine Simplicity’ in Philosophy of Religion: A Guide and Anthology (Oxford University Press, 2000), p.559.
In discussing images of intimacy in marriage and friendship, Stanley Cavell notes that the ambition of such an intimacy, the mutual pleasure of simply being together, is sometimes achieved in the wake of pain, misunderstanding, and antagonism. However, sometimes it is not. When it is not, when intimacy is imagined as doomed to irritation, condescension or suffocation, solitude or unknownness is found to be more desirable. I might call this the threat and the allure of solipsism. See, Contesting Tears: The Hollywood Melodrama of the Unknown Woman (The University of Chicago Press, 1996), p.11.
As Heidegger writes: ‘Dasein’s absorption in the “they” and its absorption into the “world” of its concern, make manifest something like a fleeing of Dasein in the face of itself…’ Being and Time, translated by John Macquarie & Edward Robinson (Harper and Row,1962), p. 229. I take it that this flight is in part a fleeing from an authentic being with others.
Jean Paul Sartre, No Exit ‘I’m looking at this thing on the mantelpiece, and I understand that I’m in hell. I tell you, everything’s been thought out beforehand. They knew I’d stand at the fire-place stroking this thing of bronze, with all those eyes intent on me. Devouring me. [He swings round abruptly.] What? Only two of you? I thought there were more; many more. [Laughs.] So this is hell. I’d never have believed it. You re-member all we were told about the torture-chambers, the fire and brimstone, the “burning marl.” Old wives’ tales! There’s no need for red-hot pokers. Hell is—other people!’
I think of what Jesus groaned from the cross: ‘My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?’ This poignantly represents the deep humanness of Jesus. His cry of suffering was not generated simply by his pain, but by the agony of his momentary sense of abandonment and failure, call this his descent into hell. Mark 15:34.
As Kierkegaard writes, the one who is in despair does not hope for help from others. ‘…no, for all the world that he does not want. Rather than to seek help [especially from God] he prefers, if necessary, to be himself [alone] with all the agonies of hell’. Kierkegaard, Soren, The sickness unto death: a christian psychological exposition for upbuilding and awakening, edited and translated by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, with introduction and notes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), p. 71
I am relying on Martha Nussbaum’s interpretation of the Symposium and the Phaedrus. In her account of the former, she claims that the central role of Alcibiades shows that Plato does not succeed in keeping passion at bay, even though the Socratic pretense is to advocate Diotima’s preference for ‘the intercourse of the pure mind to the pleasures of the body’ (p.177). Secondly, Nussbaum does not deny that emotions and appetites are important for Plato, but thinks that Plato wants to see them as guides in the service of reason. For him, these passions are cognitive: ‘…they give the whole person information…’ (p.215). The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy (Cambridge University Press, 1986.)
FMC are rightly repulsed by the notion that ‘…God is “listening” to our unvoiced speculations and day dreams, whether or not we consent to that divine presence’ (p. 80).
Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science: With a Prelude in Rhymes and an Appendix of Songs, translated with commentary, by Walter Kaufmann (Vintage Books, March 1974, originally published 1882), section 125
The most prominent defense of this view is found in Thomas Nagel’s recent remarks in his Last Word. Here, Nagel declares that we should want God not to exist. See, Kahane, Guy ‘Should We Want God to Exist?’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82.3 (2011) 674–96. Kahane differentiates Nagel’s position from atheism and calls it anti-theism. He says: ‘The idea is that God’s existence is logically incompatible with the full realization of certain values…Such a world seems incompatible with complete independence, or with complete privacy and genuine solitude’ (p. 682).
References
Buber, M. 1937). I and Thou [1923] (trans: Gregor Smith, R.). Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark.
Cavell, S. (1996). Contesting tears: The Hollywood melodrama of the unknown woman. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Davies, B. (2000). Philosophy of religion: A guide and anthology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Davison, S. (1997). Privacy and control. Faith and Philosophy, 14(2), 137–151.
Falls-Corbitt, M., & McLain, M. F. (1992). God and privacy. Faith and Philosophy, 9(3), 389–386.
Heidegger, M. (1962). Being and Time[1927] (trans: McQuarrie, J. and Robinson, E.). New York: Harper and Row,
Kahane, G. (2011). Should we want god to exist? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 82(3), 674–696.
Kierkegaard, S. (1980). The Sickness Unto Death: A Christian Psychological Exposition for Upbuilding and Awakening, edited and translated by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, with introduction and notes Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Niebuhr, H. R. (1960). Radical monotheism and Western culture. New York: Harper and Row.
Nietzsche, F. 1882). The gay science: With a prelude in rhymes and an appendix of songs, translated with commentary, by Walter Kaufmann (vintage books, march 1974, Originally published.
Nussbaum, M. C. (1986). The fragility of goodness, luck and ethics in Greek tragedy and philosophy. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Wittgenstein, L. 2009). Philosophical Investigations (trans: Anscombe, G.E.M., Hacker, P.M.S. and Schulte, J.) revised fourth edition by Hacker, P.M.S. and Schulte, J. Oxford: Blackwell.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Additional information
Publisher’s Note
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Hall, R.L. On Being Known: God and the Private-I. SOPHIA 59, 621–636 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-019-00738-8
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-019-00738-8