Abstract
Leibniz was a Lutheran. Yet, upon consideration of certain aspects of his philosophical theology, one might suspect that he was a Lutheran more in name than in intellectual practice. Clearly Leibniz was influenced by the Catholic tradition; this is beyond doubt. However, the extent to which Leibniz was influenced by his own Lutheran tradition—indeed, by Martin Luther himself—has yet to be satisfactorily explored. In this essay, the views of Luther and Leibniz on the non-cognitive component of faith are considered in some detail. According to Luther, the only non-cognitive aspect of faith worth favoring is trust (fiducia), since it is trust in God’s promise of mercy that warrants justification for the sinner. Leibniz, for his part, sides with the Thomistic tradition in emphasizing love (caritas) as the non-cognitive element of faith par excellence. I argue that Leibniz falls into a trap forewarned by Luther himself, even if Leibniz had systematic metaphysical reasons for his disagreement.
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Notes
LW 31:367. All citations for Martin Luther, unless otherwise noted, originate in LW = Luther’s Works, American Edition, 55 Volumes (Fortress Press, 1955), cited by volume and page.)
The following standard abbreviations are used in citations from Leibniz (cited by page, unless otherwise noted): A = Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe (Darmstadt and Berlin: Berlin Academy, 1923); cited by series, volume and page. AG = G. W. Leibniz: Philosophical Essays, ed. and trans. R. Ariew and D. Garber (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1989). CWR = A System of Theology [a.k.a., Examination of the Christian Religion], ed. and trans. Charles William Russell (London: Burns and Lambert, 1850). G = Die philosophischen Schriften von Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, ed. C. I. Gerhardt (Berlin: Weidman, 1875–90; Reprinted Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1965); cited by volume and page. Grua = Textes inédits, ed. Gaston Grua (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1948). H = Theodicy, ed. Austin Farrer and trans. E.M. Huggard (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1985). L = Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: Philosophical Papers & Letters, ed. and trans. L. E. Loemker, 2nd ed. (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1969). P = Leibniz: Philosophical Writings, ed. G.H.R. Parkinson and trans. M. Morris & G.H.R. Parkinson (Totowa: Rowman & Littlefield, 1975). PD = Preliminary Dissertation Concerning the Conformity of Faith with Reason, cited by section numbers as in G 6.21-471, translated in H. R = Political Writings 2nd Edition, ed. and trans. Patrick Riley (Cambridge University Press, 1988). RB = New Essays on Human Understanding, ed. and trans. Peter Remnant and Jonathan Bennett (Cambridge University Press, 1996). T = Essais De Théodicée, cited by section number as in G 6.21-471, translated in H.
For a brief history of Leibniz’s Lutheranism, see her ‘Leibniz as a Lutheran’ in Leibniz, Mysticism & Religion, eds. Allison Coudert, Richard Popkin & Gordon Weiner (Springer: 2009), 169-92.
In the Preface to his Theodicy Leibniz writes that, in his studies, he did not ‘neglect the teachings of our theologians: and the study of their opponents, far from disturbing me, served to strengthen me in the moderate opinions of the Churches of the Augsburg Confession’ (H 69).
For more on Leibniz’s ecumenism, see especially §1 of Robert M. Adams, ‘Leibniz’s Examination of the Christian Religion,’ Faith & Philosophy 11(4): October 1994, 517-47. See also Maria Rosa Antognazza’s brilliant biography, Leibniz: An Intellectual Biography (Cambridge University Press, 2009), esp. 46-50, 118-23.
For the ways in which God’s justice played a central role in the background to his considered thought, see in particular Luther’s Preface to The Complete Edition of Luther’s Latin Writings (LW 34: 327-38).
Leibniz’s views on faith have until recently received scant attention. Among the best of recent contributions, see R.C. Sleigh, Jr., ‘Faith and Reason in the Philosophy of Leibniz,’ Proceedings of the 20 th World Congress of Philosophy Vol. VII: Modern Philosophy, ed. Mark Gedney (Philosophy Documentation Center, 2000), 71-78; Maria Rosa Antognazza, ‘The Defense of the Mysteries of the Trinity and the Incarnation: An Example of Leibniz’s “Other Reason”,’ British Journal for the History of Philosophy 9(2): 2001, 283-309; Adrian Bardon, ‘Leibniz on the Epistemic Status of the Mysteries,’ Philosophy & Theology 13(1): 2001, 143-58; and Paul Lodge & Benjamin Grove, ‘Leibniz, Bayle, and Locke on Faith and Reason,’ American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 76(4): 2002, 575-600.
Scott MacDonald, ‘Christian Faith’ in Reasoned Faith, ed. Eleonore Stump (Cornell University Press, 1993), 45.
Although we focus here on the PD, Leibniz’s New Essays Concerning Human Understanding also details his agreements and disagreements with John Locke concerning the relationship between faith and reason (cf. RB 491-511). As in the PD, Leibniz’s discussion focuses centrally on faith as a species of belief. But see note 17 below.
During the late seventeenth century, Socinianism represented a rather broad, and oftentimes loosely defined, set of doctrinal theses at odds with orthodox Christianity, both Protestant and Roman Catholic. Perhaps most notable for their dual rejection of the Trinity and the Incarnation as inherently self-contradictory, Socinians were also criticized for their denial of original sin, their dismissal of divine foreknowledge of future contingents, as well as their acceptance of a ‘moral influence’ theory of atonement. Unlike other non-conformist groups such as the Deists, who championed the virtues of natural theology while dismissing revealed theology as false, Socinians did recognize the legitimacy of a certain species of divine revelation, albeit one largely divorced from tradition or church authority. Divine revelation is deemed authentic in virtue of its conformity with reason and understanding. For an in-depth discussion of Leibniz’s protracted disputes with Socinianim, see Maria Rosa Antognazza, Leibniz on the Trinity and the Incarnation: Reason and Revelation in the Seventeenth Century, trans. Gerald Parks (Yale University Press, 2007). Yet another rewarding discussion can be found in Chapter 2 of Nicholas Jolley, Leibniz and Locke (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1984).
One might object: if a certain revelatory truth is indeed ‘above reason,’ then the intellect cannot comprehend that proposition; and, if the intellect cannot comprehend that proposition, then it cannot assent to it. Leibniz was well aware of this objection, and his response depends to a large measure on his own curiously Cartesian epistemology. As Maria Rosa Antognazza argues on Leibniz’s behalf, although one cannot have knowledge of the mystery of the Incarnation in virtue of a clear and distinct perception, one can have what Leibniz refers to as an inadequate knowledge of that mystery, a sort of confused knowledge of how the meanings of the constituent terms of the proposition fit together. That is, one may still possess a cognitive sort of faith with respect to the mysteries of Christianity so long as (a) one has at least a confused knowledge of their meaning and (b) one can be certain that they are not contradictory. See Antognazza, ‘The Defense of the Mysteries of the Trinity and the Incarnation: An Example of Leibniz’s “Other Reason”,’ British Journal for the History of Philosophy 9(2): 2001, 283-309. What, then, is an example of ‘confused knowledge’? One might suggest, as Leibniz does, a species of analogical understanding. For instance, we may understand the Trinity by an analogy with our own unitary psychology, made up of intellect, will, and power to act. Or, we might understand the Incarnation by an analogy with the unity of the person, made up of dual substances mind and body. Cf. PD §45. As Leibniz says, ‘A certain what it is is enough for us, but the how is beyond us…’ (PD §56: H 104).
Our reconstruction of the primary line of argument in the PD owes much to the work of Maria Rosa Antognazza; see her ‘The Defense of the Mysteries of the Trinity and the Incarnation: An Example of Leibniz’s “Other Reason”,’ British Journal for the History of Philosophy 9(2): 2001, 283-309; also, see her Leibniz on the Trinity and the Incarnation, trans. Gerald Parks (Yale University Press, 2007).
For more on this positive role, see R.C. Sleigh, Jr., ‘Faith and Reason in the Philosophy of Leibniz,’ Proceedings of the 20th World Congress of Philosophy Vol. VII: Modern Philosophy, ed. Mark Gedney (Philosophy Documentation Center, 2000), 71-78; see also Adrian Bardon, ‘Leibniz on the Epistemic Status of the Mysteries,’ Philosophy & Theology 13(1): 2001, 143-58.
‘I agree that many people, with the singular benevolence of God adapting itself to the capacity of all, possess a true faith without having any convincing reasons for it, and these people can be saved. But our religion would be wretched if it lacked persuasive arguments…’ (A VI.4, 2214-5). The latter passage was translated by Lloyd Strickland on his website Leibniz Translations: http://www.leibniz-translations.com/misosophist.htm
Leibniz provides an analogy to reason’s role in determining the authority of some claim to revelation in his Examination of the Christian Religion: ‘…[consider] a governor who commands in a province or garrison as the representative of his prince; he will not lightly, nor without cautious scrutiny of his credentials, yield up his authority to the successor who may be sent to replace him, lest an enemy steal in under this guise. But the moment he recognizes his master’s will, he will at once, without dispute, submit himself and the entire garrison to the new authority’ (CWR 11).
Cf. RB 497. In an earlier text, Leibniz recommends, ‘For one way is the human analysis of faith, inasmuch as there is a motive of credibility, which occurs according to history and according to reason, which examines and confirms the histories; the other is the divine analysis of faith, which occurs according to the effective operation of the holy spirit in our hearts…’ (A VI.4, 2214-5). The latter passage was translated by Lloyd Strickland on his website Leibniz Translations: http://www.leibniz-translations.com/misosophist.htm
To be precise, we should note that neither in the PD nor in the New Essays does Leibniz entirely ignore the contributions of the will (even if its role is decidedly minimized in these texts). From the PD §29: ‘…faith itself, when it is kindled in the soul, is something more than an opinion, and depends not upon the occasions or the motives that have given it birth; it advances beyond the intellect, and takes possession of the will and of the heart, to make us act with zeal and joyfully as the law of God commands’ (H 93). From the New Essays: ‘What is so good and comforting for mankind is the fact that to be in the state of God’s grace one needs only to have…a good will’ (RB 510).
Martin Luther refers to this type of faith as historical faith (fides historica); and, for our purposes below, we shall focus on his remarks. Article 20 of the Augsburg Confession also cautions against faith that signifies ‘merely knowledge of the history…but [instead] it signifies faith which believes not only the history but also the effect of the history, namely, this article of the forgiveness of sins—that is, that we have grace, righteousness, and forgiveness of sins through Christ.’ Translated by Leif Grane in his The Augsburg Confession: A Commentary (Fortress Press, 1987), 196. For a discussion of the Catholic account of historical faith—what Aquinas refers to as ‘lifeless’ or ‘unformed’ faith—see the next section as well as St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 1-6.
James 2:19.
Translated by Lloyd Strickland at his website Leibniz Translations: http://www.leibniz-translations.com/suppositions.htm. Cf. CWR 4, Grua 161. For further commentary on the concept of love in Leibniz and how it plays a role in his philosophical theology, see Robert M. Adams, ‘Leibniz’s Conception of Religion,’ Proceedings of the 20 th World Congress of Philosophy Vol. VII: Modern Philosophy, ed. Mark Gedney (Philosophy Documentation Center, 2000), 57-70; also see his ‘Leibniz’s Examination of the Christian Religion,’ Faith & Philosophy 11(4): October 1994, 517-47.
Martin Luther, ‘A Sermon on Christian Love’ in The Sermons of Martin Luther Vol. VII (Baker Book House, 1983), 130 (emphasis added).
Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae II-II.4.1-8.
The Canons and Decrees of the Sacred and Oecumenical Council of Trent, trans. J. Waterworth (Doleman, 1848), 35 (emphasis added).
Unformed Faith is that which, in §I, we referred to as Historical Faith.
Bernd Wannenwetsch, reflecting on the relationship between faith and love in Luther’s corpus, comments: ‘…one can paraphrase the reformer’s view as an exact reversal of the scholastic formula: Caritas fide formata; love is in need of being oriented and formed by faith’ (128). ‘Luther’s Moral Theology’ in Cambridge Companion to Martin Luther, ed. Donald McKim (Cambridge University Press, 2003), 120-135.
‘The sophists apply this passage (i.e., Galatians 5:6) in support of their doctrine that we are justified by love or by works. For they say that even when faith has been divinely infused…it does not justify unless it has been formed by love…In this manner they completely transfer justification from faith and attribute it solely to love…[Paul] speaks of “faith working through love.” He says that works are done on the basis of faith through love, not that a man is justified through love. And who is such an uneducated grammarian that he cannot understand from the force of the words that being justified is one thing and working is another?’ (LW 27:28).
On Luther’s reading of St. Thomas’s construal of Faith Formed by Love, faith loses significance in justification of the sinner just as love gains significance. As one commentator puts it, ‘As an intellectual act faith directs itself toward God as the first truth (prima veritas), but the act of the will, led by love, directs itself toward God himself. It is love, therefore, which is decisive in one’s relationship to God’ (85, emphasis added). Leif Grane, The Augsburg Confession: A Commentary (Fortress Press, 1987).
Translated by Robert M. Adams in his ‘Leibniz’s Examination of the Christian Religion,’ Faith & Philosophy 11(4): October 1994, 528.
Adams remarks, ‘That justifying faith is a matter of trust [fiducia], and hence a function of the will, was a commonplace of Lutheran thought. But it is no part of Lutheran theology that faith, as an act of the will, includes charity’ (528-29). Robert M. Adams, ‘Leibniz’s Examination of the Christian Religion,’ Faith & Philosophy 11(4): October 1994.
Although, it is worth noting that Leibniz need not deny that a genuine trust in God is without merit. Indeed, in a letter to Electress Sophie (1697), he asserts that such trust at least serves as evidence for one’s self-confidant love of God: ‘One of the strongest indications of a love of God which is sincere…is being satisfied with what [God] has already done, in the assurance that it is always the best…’ (LS 162). One trusts that God has arranged affairs for the best, and in virtue of this, we can have assurance that any evils are part of a larger plan.
Indeed, from the very teachings of Christ, Leibniz suggests, we come to see that love is required for salvation: ‘Let us return to what is more certain. This is that we must love God above all things and our neighbors as ourselves. It is in this that the law consists; it is in this that true active faith also consists, in conformity to the teachings of Jesus Christ’ (L 216).
Translated by Lloyd Strickland on his website, Leibniz Translations: http://www.leibniz-translations.com/morell1696.htm
We do not pretend to have exhausted the evidence for Leibniz’s views on faith or justification here. For instance, there are places wherein Leibniz appears to endorse the view that faith and love are separate, and that both are required for salvation (e.g., CWR 25). However, we do believe that the greater number of texts favor the position advocated here. Robert M. Adams has recommended that over the bulk of Leibniz’s career the latter was of a view that even non-Christians could achieve salvation so long as they sincerely love God above and beyond all else. See Adams, ‘Leibniz’s Conception of Religion,’ Proceedings of the 20 th World Congress of Philosophy Vol. VII: Modern Philosophy, ed. Mark Gedney (Philosophy Documentation Center, 2000), 62.
For an account of Leibniz’s ultra-strong reading of the imago dei doctrine, see T. Allan Hillman, ‘Leibniz on the Imago Dei,’ Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy Vol. 5 eds. Daniel Garber & Steven Nadler (Oxford University Press, 2010), Chapter 7. For other commentators on the image of God theme in Leibniz’s work, see Nicholas Jolley, Leibniz (New York: Routledge, 2005), especially the ‘Introduction’; see also Christia Mercer, Leibniz’s Metaphysics (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2001).
Translated by Lloyd Strickland at his website Leibniz Translations: http://www.leibniz-translations.com/brinon1699.htm. Cf. L 367-69, H 53, R 83.
Notice that, perhaps, Leibniz was in some manner influenced by Luther’s account of love (if not faith). According to Luther, our faith is all the more active by means of our love; that is, we demonstrate our faith in God by loving our neighbor: ‘Man,’ Luther says, ‘should be guided in all his works by this thought and contemplate this one thing alone, that he may serve and benefit others in all that he does, considering nothing except the need and the advantage of his neighbor…This is a truly Christian life. Here faith is truly active through love (Galatians 5:6), that is, it finds expression in works of the freest service, cheerfully and lovingly done, with which a man willing serves another without hope of reward; and for himself he is satisfied with the fullness and wealth of his faith’ (LW 31:365). Our faith is revealed by those activities in which we put the interest of our neighbor before ourselves, without thought of gratitude or reward.
See his Meditation on the Common Concept of Justice (R 45-63) and Opinion on the Principles of Pufendorf (R 64-76). See also R 82-4.
Cf. AG 42, H 51.
In his Principles on Nature and Grace, Based on Reason (1714) Leibniz says of the relationship between God and his creatures, ‘This simple primitive substance (i.e., God) must include the perfections contained in the derivative substances which are its effects. Thus it will have perfect power, knowledge, and will, that is, it will have omnipotence, omniscience, and supreme goodness’ (G VI.602: AG 210). For the metaphysical aspects of Leibniz’s commitment to the imago dei doctrine, see especially T. Allan Hillman, ‘Leibniz on the Imago Dei,’ Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy Vol. 5 eds. Daniel Garber & Steven Nadler (Oxford University Press, 2010), Chapter 7.
Translated by Jack D. Davidson in his ‘Video Meliora Proboque, Deteriora Sequor: Leibniz on the Intellectual Source of Sin,’ in Leibniz: Nature & Freedom (eds.) Jan Cover & Donald Rutherford (Oxford University Press, 2005), 240.
‘The mind not only has a perception of the works of God, but is even capable of producing something like them, though on a small scale . . . it imitates in its own sphere, and in the little world in which it is allowed to act, what God performs in the great world.’ (G VI.604: P 202). In Necessary & Contingent Truths (c. 1686), Leibniz remarks that, ‘Free or Intelligent Substances have something greater and more remarkable, in a certain imitation of God: that they are not bound to any subordinate Laws of the universe, but act spontaneously from their own power alone, as if by a sort of private miracle’ (C 19: P 100, our emphasis). Cf. G IV.434: AG 42.
‘And as a consequence, one must conclude that the author of things, who is so inclined to order, will have had particular care for it with respect to those creatures who are naturally sources of order, in proportion to their perfection, and who alone are capable of imitating his craftsmanship’ (R 51, emphasis added). Cf. CWR 30: ‘That charity, or love, which is a divine virtue, consists in our loving God above all things, and seeking in Him our sovereign good; and, therefore, we are to love Him, not only for the benefits which He bestows on us, but also for Himself, and as our last end.’
LW 1:55-68.
LW 1:61. Before the Fall, however, Adam ‘was something far more distinguished and excellent, since obviously no leprosy of sin adhered either to his reason or to his will’ (LW 1:62).
LW 1:63.
Patricia Wilson-Kastner, ‘On Partaking of the Divine Nature: Luther’s Dependence on Augustine,’ Andrews University Seminary Studies 22(1); 1984, 123. Remarking further on Luther’s understanding of our restoration in the present life, Prof. Wilson-Kastner also inadvertently captures the divergence between the former and Leibniz: any ‘redemption is not by love (a divine quality that is mirrored only imperfectly in our love), but by faith, a human need which has no counterpart in God. To make faith rather than love the link between human beings and the divine nature only underscores the discontinuity in this present life between the divine and the human’ (122).
My sincere gratitude to Alex Whalen and Tully Borland for their aid in editing, criticizing, and commenting on earlier drafts of this paper. All errors are, of course, my own.