Abstract
What distinguishes theology (in specific Christian theology) from the other uses of language? Is theology a specific language, or is it a specific situation of language, a specific way to consider language? I start with the issue of language’s inadequacy before (and because of) divine revelation. By analyzing the variety of answers to this inopia verborum, I show that the theological inadequacy of language is not conceptual, but formal: it concerns the metalinguistic definition of inadequacy. Then, I formalize the relationship between metalanguage and object language, and I argue that theology applies precisely to this formal relationship. From this, I deduce that the function of theology is to question the need for metalinguistic foundation and validation—given that this need characterizes human language, that is, what is not divine revelation. I end with two applications: on one hand, to the axiomatization of theology; on the other hand, to the methodology for inter-religious dialogue.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
“Gott ist tot” [19, §§108 and 125] is not a metaphysical statement. Rather, it is the affirmation of the “inactuality” (I would say: Unzeitgemässigkeit) of metaphysics. From the perspective of this inactuality, “God is dead” metaphysically interpreted is identical with “God exists”: both statements are equally rejected, being both metaphysical. This confirms that what matters in the sentence “God is dead” is not what the sentence says, but that the sentence can be said (and it has been said): the possibility to affirm the death of God shows that what is considered metaphysically incontrovertible about God can be negated, and that the foundation and validation of any supposedly metaphysical sentence about God (e.g. “God exists” or even “God does not exist”) can be questioned. Saying “God is dead” means that “God” in quotation marks, i.e. the metaphysical language saying God, is already dead.
Askani in [2] presents a rigorous analysis and assumption of the radicalism of the Word of the Cross. The paper investigates not only the aporia of language before this Word, but, more importantly, it underlines that the Word of the Cross is language itself declaring its own aporia whether facing this unique “object” called “God”.
It seems to me that dialectical theology is an elegant form of negative theology.
The only way to describe to someone a music we have in mind is by singing it; this is a basic example of the fact that music transcends conceptualisation [24, 25]. The verbalisation of mathematic formalisations implies the loss of such formalisations: geometrical and algebraic realities can be grasped only in their “language”, so that speaking of them is a mere operation of vulgarisation. Logic has the task to formalise the principles of language and present a method (an organon) for it, i.e. present the conditions of its foundation and validation; therefore, applying language to what applies to language means downgrading a step back. I will take back the issue of logic and its affinity, and difference, with theology in Sect. 5.
The inadequacy of language before music, mathematics, and logic, applies simultaneously the other way around: music, mathematics, and logic are unable to exhaust and to adequately translate by their means what is uttered by natural language.
A terminological note. In this paper I use the term “level” (in expressions like “first-level”, “second-level”, “higher-level”, “lower-level”) to differentiate between languages that are objects of another language, and languages which object is another language (those languages are also called metalanguages). So, the language that speaks of something but a language is “first-level”, the language which object is a first level language is “second-level”, and so on. The terms “higher-level” and “lower-level” are the abstract terminology for, respectively, any metalanguage (regardless of the level > 1) and any object language (regardless of the level \(\ge \) 1). I avoid using the term “order” (“first-order”, “second-order”, “higher-order”...) for its semantic ambiguity.
This is true even in case the “new adequacy” of language is silence. The silence of language implies a second-level language prescribing this silence; as such, this prescription refers only to the first level, and not to the metalanguage. In other words, the silence of language before divine revelation corresponds to the “voice” of language about this silence. This is indirectly confirmed in [15, p. 347]: if language falls silent because something else is speaking (for Jüngel this is divine revelation), then this “something else” is indeed a language, and thus it is implicitly considered an element of the set “human language”. In sum, the metalinguistic prescription of language’s silence coincides with the application of language’s own standard to that before which language falls silent.
These two functions are co-related, because the adequacy on the vertical function implies the horizontal exclusivity of the metalanguage that performs this function.
This mutual invalidation is the evidence of a mutual irreducibility: given that each metalanguage plays the same function (the same two functions), no metalanguage can be absolutely invalidated. It is the same situation between the different codes of meaning. In both situations we have a formal identity between elements. The formal identity of metalanguages is deepened in Sect. 4.
This requirement can have different contents: it can concern the grammatical aspect (i.e. the adequacy to the rules of grammar); it can concern the epistemological foundation and validation; it can concern the axiomatic foundation and validation (where, by axiomatic, I mean the definition of rules of inference), etc. It does not matter which of these contents is assumed, since here the question concerns only the function, i.e. the requirement itself.
The relation between metalanguage and object language is a function because to any possible element of the domain (OL) corresponds one and only one element of the codomain (ML). Of course, empirically speaking more than one metalanguage can be produced for the same object language, but this is irrelevant: these metalanguages are formally identical, they play the same function of definition of the rules of an object language. In other words, the codomain is constituted by the second level of language in general, which includes all possible metalanguages. By the way, as seen, this formal identity of metalanguages is the reason why there is a horizontal function amongst metalanguages.
This use of the word “axiomatic” might appear unorthodox, because I am applying it for every condition of foundation and validation of a (lower-level) language, thus beyond the case of hypothetical-deductive systems. Yet, I justify this terminology by referring to the transcendental aspect of every hypothetical-deductive system: an axiom does not need to be formulated in order to be valid. For instance, hyperbolic geometry is not based on an axiom built on the negation of Euclid’s fifth postulate. Rather, the negation of the fifth postulate (and thus the axiom that is the negative of the fifth postulate) is the consequence of the constitution of such geometry [21, pp. 17–18]. This would open to a discussion on the relationship between mathematical and transcendental postulates. But all this surpasses the limits of my discussion.
It is formally irrelevant whether the specific foundation is adequate or not (or whether a specific higher-level language performs its function in a good or a bad way); what is relevant formally is that it is always possible to say this adequacy/inadequacy, it is always possible to produce a language considering and evaluating the adequacy/inadequacy of that specific foundation itself.
This solution was already implicit in Eq. 4.7: the relationship between OL and ML being a function, OL and ML are two distinct sets (domain and codomain of the function). What might create confusion is that an element of the codomain (MLn: English grammar) can pass to the domain (OLn+1: English grammar as object of study). But in this case the element is different: it is no longer a dependent variable but an independent one, to which corresponds a new dependent variable (MLn+1: the study of English grammar, or a “metagrammar”). The object is the same (English grammar) but its position in the function is completely different: in the first case it is the output, in the second case it is the input. The distinction between the two sets (domain and codomain) is always maintained: no regressio.
The same for the paradox of Achilles and the tortoise (in this case the condition is the level of approximation of the measurability of space), and for the paradox of the sorites (here the condition is enumerability, or vagueness).
This is similar and different from Quine’s position: “The argument that sustains a paradox may expose the absurdity of a buried premise or of some preconception previously reckoned as central to physical theory, to mathematics, or to the thinking process” [22, p. 1]. Considering only the last case (“thinking process”) I would say that this paradoxical “exposition” is not a possibility (“may”) but a necessity (it is intrinsic to the qualification of the argument as “paradox”), and it does not concern the negation of some conditions of meaningfulness (“absurdity”), but these conditions themselves.
In sum, the difference is this: in the case of the logical paradox the system collapses by itself (the paradox exists because language might be, and actually should be, founded and validated); in the case of the theological paradox the system is made collapsing by divine revelation. Hence, theological paradox is not intrinsic, but extrinsic.
On theological paradox, see [5, pp. 142–149].
Each time we consider the relationship between language and divine revelation, we can only end with the same conclusion: the latter has the priority over the former, the former is dependent on the latter. Again, this is what divine revelation reveals: language’s need of divine revelation because of language’s self-foundation and self-validation.
I owe this metaphor to Dr. Trepczynski, although he used it in another way.
There are many answers indeed: divine revelation, differently from human language, creates what it says; divine revelation, differently from human language, does not come in a sequence of elements (letters, words, propositions...) but it is all in all, it conveys meaning in an immediate way; in divine revelation truth is present, that is, truth is beyond any process of truth-verification; divine revelation is not a conjunct of words nor a language, but God himself, the second Person, Jesus Christ; divine revelation is an infinitary language; etc.
The eccentricity concerns language, not divine revelation. This is the only way to respect the inversion of priority between divine revelation and language’s forms. Divine revelation does not introduce new coordinates, but a new center of gravity, a new way of conceiving the center of language: the center does not lie any longer on the point zero of the coordinates. As such, from a theological perspective, it is not divine revelation to be eccentric from language, but it is language to be eccentric from divine revelation—as what-is-not-divine-revelation. This eccentricity mirrors the theological eccentricity of human before God [12, pp. 12–13], [13, pp. 237, 249] . In fact, we can think our theological eccentricity only in the light of the theological eccentricity of our coordinates.
Abbott was a theologian.
This does not mean that theology cannot be object of a metalanguage—this paper of mine is already the counterproof of that. Rather, any metalanguage formulated on theology shall consider itself as theology, for it shares theology’s same assumption: divine revelation, i.e. a hyper-language.
Both God’s logic and the logic on God are one and the same thing: our definition of how God thinks, our metalanguage on God’s language. As such, in both cases it is implied that God’s logic is part of our logic. Would this logic still be God’s?
References
Abbott, E.A.: Flatland. A Romance on Many Dimensions. Seeley & Co, London (1884)
Askani, H.-C.: The paradox of faith. In: Askani, H.-C., Chalamet, C. (eds.) The Wisdom and Foolishness of God: First Corinthians 1–2 in Theological Exploration, pp. 341–358. Fortress Press, Minneapolis (2016)
Augustine: Contra Iulianum haeresis pelagianae defensorem libri sex [421–422]. In: S. Aureli Augustini Hipponiensis Episcopi Opera Omnia vol. 10.1 [Patrologiae cursus completus. Series latina vol. 44]. Edited by J.-P. Migne. J.-P. Migne, Paris (1865)
Bader, G.: Assertio. Drei fortlaufende Lektüren zu Skepsis, Narrheit und Sünde bei Erasmus und Luther. Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen (1985)
Bader, G.: Luther’s theologica paradoxa in Erasmus and Cusanus. In: Askani, H.-C., Chalamet, C. (eds.) The Wisdom and Foolishness of God: First Corinthians 1–2 in Theological Exploration, pp. 139–165. Fortress Press, Minneapolis (2016)
Bielfeldt, D.: Luther, metaphor, and theological language. Mod. Theol. 6(2), 121–135 (1990)
Bielfeldt, D.: Luther on language. Lutheran Q. 16, 195–220 (2002)
Bonhoeffer, D.: Akt und Sein. Transzendentalphilosophie und Ontologie in der systematischen Theologie. Dietrich Bonhoeffer Werke, vol. 2. Kaiser, Gütersloh (2008)
Büttgen, P.: Enslaved judgment. In: Cassin, B. (ed) Dictionary of Untranslatables: A Philosophical Lexicon. Translated by S. Rendall et al. Translation edited by E. Apter, J. Lerza and M. Wood. Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford, p 256 (2014)
Chalamet, C.: Dialectical Theologians: Wilhelm Herrmann, Karl Barth and Rudolf Bultmann. Theologischer Verlag, Zürich (2005)
Erasmus, D.: De libero arbitrio diatribē sive collatio. In: Lesowsky, W. (ed) Id.: Ausgewählte Schriften, vol. 4. Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt, pp. 1–195 (1969)
Hampson, D.: Christian Contradictions: The Structure of Lutheran and Catholic Thought. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (2001)
Joest, W.: Ontologie der Person bei Luther. Vandenhöck & Ruprecht, Göttingen (1967)
Jüngel, E.: Metaphorische Wahrheit. Erwägungen zur theologischen Relevanz der Metapher als Beitrag zur Hermeneutik einer narrativen Theologie. In: Id.: Entsprechungen: Gott – Wahrheit – Mensch. Theologische Erörtungen. Kaiser, München, pp. 103–157 (2002)
Jüngel, E.: Gott als Geheimnis der Welt. Zur Begründung der Theologie der Gekreuzigten im Streit zwischen Theismus und Atheismus. Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen (2010)
Luther, M.: De servo arbitrio (1525). In: Id.: Werke. Kritische Gesamtausgabe. Weimar, pp. 600–787 (1998–2009)
Martin, W.: Ought but Cannot. Proc. Aristot. Soc. 109, 103–128 (2009)
Milz, B.: Der gesuchte Widerstreit. Die Antinomie in Kants Kritik der Praktischer Venunft. Kant-Studien, vol. 39. De Gruyter, Berlin (2002)
Nietzsche, F.: Die fröhliche Wissenschaft. In: Colli, G., Montinari, M. (eds.) Id.: Kritische Studienausgabe, vol. 5. De Gruyter, Berlin (1988)
Oppy, G.: Ontological Arguments and Belief in God. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (1995)
Pettoello, R.: Un nuovo mondo dal nulla. In: Pettoello, R. (ed.) Bolyai, J.: La scienza assoluta dello spazio, pp. 7–22. Melquiades, Milan (2009)
Quine, W.V.: The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays, Revised and Enlarged Edition. Harvard University Press, Cambridge (1966)
Tarski, A.: Truth and proof. Sci. Am. 220/6(63–70), 75–77 (1969)
Vestrucci, A.: Music, analogy, and the beauty of everydayness. On music’s sense: first movement. Knowl. Cult. 3/3, 42–70 (2015)
Vestrucci, A.: Music, wandering, and the limit of any method. On music’s sense: second movement. Knowl. Cult. 3(3), 71–92 (2015)
Vestrucci, A.: Theology as Freedom: On Martin Luther’s “De servo arbitrio”. Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen (2019)
White, G.G.: Luther’s view on language. J. Lit. Theol. 3, 188–218 (1989)
White, G.G.: Luther as Nominalist: A Study of the Logical Methods used in Martin Luther’s Disputations in the Light of their Medieval Background. Luther-Agricola-Gesellschaft, Helsinki (1994)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Additional information
Publisher's Note
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Vestrucci, A. Metalanguage and Revelation: Rethinking Theology’s Language and Relevance. Log. Univers. 13, 551–575 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11787-019-00236-y
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11787-019-00236-y