Abstract
Is being virtuous good not only for others, but also for the virtuous person herself? Call the “yes” answer to this question “the eudaimonistic thesis.” In this essay, I argue that the most prominent explanation for why Confucius accepts the eudaimonistic thesis should be rejected; this explanation is that he accepts the thesis because he also accepts “naturalistic perfectionism” or that for something to be good for oneself is for it to realize one’s nature and that being a virtuous person realizes human nature. In its place, I propose two alternative explanations: the “hedonistic explanation,” which justifies the eudaimonistic thesis in terms of pleasure, and the “desirability explanation,” which provides a justification rooted in the claims that virtuous people function as normative measures and that they desire that they themselves be virtuous. Finally, I discuss what may have motivated later Confucian philosophers to adopt naturalistic perfectionism.
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For helpful comments and suggestions, I would like to thank two anonymous referees and the attendees of the International Society for Chinese Philosophy Meeting at the 2020 Eastern APA.
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Schuh, G. Why Does Confucius Think that Virtue Is Good for Oneself?. Dao 22, 193–216 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11712-023-09878-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11712-023-09878-8