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Review of Why Free Will is Real, Christian List, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2019

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Notes

  1. Thanks to Randy Clarke, Shaun Nichols, Barry Loewer, and Carolina Sartorio for valuable comments and discussion.

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Pereboom, D. Review of Why Free Will is Real, Christian List, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2019. Criminal Law, Philosophy 17, 229–234 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11572-022-09634-8

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