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A Perfect Prosecution: The People of the State of New York Versus Dominique Strauss-Kahn

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Abstract

People v. Strauss-Kahn is an ideal lens through which to examine the operation of a criminal justice system that privileges the presumption of guilt, or, to use the words of the US Supreme Court in the 2012 decisions Lafler v. Cooper and Missouri v. Frye, has become “a system of pleas, not a system of trials.” It is both an excellent example of a transparent and objective invocation of the criminal sanction, and a sharp counterpoint to the vast majority of cases where law enforcement conclusions are privileged and rarely second-guessed. As analyses of wrongful convictions have sadly but inevitably demonstrated, the screening methods of police and prosecutors are fallible. Moreover, the prevalence of “tunnel vision” once the decision to charge has been made means that few cases experience the kind of post-indictment investigation and reevaluation seen in the prosecution of Dominique Strauss-Kahn. Stage by stage, the Strauss-Kahn case illustrates how to counterbalance the presumption of guilt and give expression to the presumption of innocence in the pretrial period through vigilantly-invoked and enforced due process protections. Drawing from this examination, the paper will then explore how to approach this model process in the more standard cases, which typically see a fraction of the judicial, law enforcement, and defense resources afforded Dominique Strauss-Kahn. The Strauss-Kahn prosecution offers several insights, three of which will be sketched at the paper’s conclusion: a requirement that prosecutorial decision-making be subject to a reasonable doubt standard; vigilant and early enforcement of the prosecutor’s obligation to disclose information that is favorable to the accused; and finally, a requirement that a prosecutor explain in writing any decision to dismiss the felony charges in indicted felony cases, so that the factual, legal and policy bases of these decisions (numbering almost one quarter of New York’s superior court felony cases annually) can be analyzed and publicized.

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Notes

  1. Gregory Viscusi & Helene Fouquet, Strauss-Kahn Says There Was No Violence in His Encounter with Hotel Maid, Bloomberg (Sep. 18, 2011, 9:01 a.m.) http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-09-18/strauss-kahn-says-there-was-no-violence-in-his-encounter-with-hotel-maid.html (Accessed: Nov. 5, 2013).

  2. See Recommendation for Dismissal of Strauss-Kahn Case, N.Y.Times, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/08/22/nyregion/dsk-recommendation-to-dismiss-case.html?_r=1&, 2 (Accessed: Oct. 20, 2013) [hereinafter Recommendation].

  3. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S.Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012); Missouri v. Frye, 132 S.Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012).

  4. Herbert Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. Penn. L. Rev. 1 (1964) reprinted in Herbert Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction 150 (1968), [hereinafter Criminal Sanction].

  5. Criminal Sanction at 149.

  6. See, e.g., Charles Weissberg, Mourning Miranda, 96 Cal. L. Rev. 1519 (2008); James Tomkovicz, Davis v. United States: The Exclusion Revolution Continues, 9 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 381 (2011).

  7. See Frye, 132 S.Ct. at 1399 (97 % of federal cases and 94 % of state cases end in a guilty plea); Press Release Bureau of Justice Statistics, (Nov. 29 2012) 2, http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/press/cpus11ppus11pr.cfm (Accessed: Nov. 5, 2013) (1 in 34 U.S. adults under correctional supervision in 2011) [hereinafter BJS Press Release].

  8. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n of New York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).

  9. See generally Frank Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. Legal Stud. 289 (1983); but see Kyle Graham, Crimes, Widgets, and Plea Bargaining: An Analysis of Charge Content, Pleas, and Trials, 100 Cal. L. Rev. 1573, 1579-84 (2012) (trial outcomes but one factor in complex interacting set of variables influencing the plea bargain in any individual case); Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 2464, 2468 (2004).

  10. Criminal Sanction at 161.

  11. See Frye, 132 S.Ct at 1407; see also supra note 10.

  12. See New York State Felony Processing Final Report Indictment through Disposition January–December 2011, New York Division of Criminal Justice Statistics (DCJS) 1, 18 (May 2012) http://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/crimnet/ojsa/nys-felony-process-report2011.pdf (Accessed: Nov. 5, 2013) [hereinafter Felony Processing].

  13. Lafler, 132 S.Ct. at 1398.

  14. See supra note 5.

  15. Criminal Sanction at 160–161.

  16. Id. at 165–166.

  17. Id. at 153.

  18. See, e.g., Abraham Blumberg, Review of The Limits of the Criminal Sanction, by Herbert L. Packer, 117 U. Penn. L. Rev., 790 (1969).

  19. See, e.g., Doreen McBarnet, Conviction: Law, the State and the Construction of Justice 156 (1981).

  20. The population of the United States in 1960 was 179,323,175. See U.S. Census Report 1, 5(1961), http://www2.census.gov/prod2/statcomp/documents/1961-02.pdf (Accessed: Nov. 5, 2013). Today, the US population is approximately 316,915,000. See U.S. Population Clock, United States Census Bureau http://www.census.gov/popclock/ (Accessed: Oct. 20, 2013). In 1960, there were 373,916 individuals behind bars in state and federal prisons and local jails. See Margaret Werner Cahalan, Historical Corrections Statistics in the United States, 1850-1984, Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1, 35, 76 (1986) http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/pr/102529.pdf (Accessed: Nov. 5, 2013). At year-end 2011, this population had increased to 2,239,800. See BJS Press Release, supra note 8.

  21. See Spreadsheets prepared by DCJS for author.

  22. Felony Processing at 18, 20 (5.1 % dismissed and 18.3 % reduced to misdemeanors or non-criminal violations).

  23. Felony Processing at 28 (median/mean days to disposition for guilty plea: 164/284; median/mean days to disposition for conviction by trial: 370/535).

  24. Gerard Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 Fordham L. Rev. 2117, 2123, 2129 (1998).

  25. Frye, 132 S.Ct. at 1404; see also Lafler, 132 S.Ct. at 1392.

  26. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407 (quoting Robert Scott and William Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 Yale L. J. 1909, 1912 (1992)).

  27. Id. Notably, as Justice Scalia concedes, the consequence of this shadow criminal justice system is highly inconsistent and arbitrary outcomes. Lafler, 132 S. Ct at 1398; see also Bibas, supra note.10, at 2468.

  28. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361–363 (1970).

  29. See supra note 10.

  30. See infra notes 51, 52, 68.

  31. Criminal Sanction at 161.

  32. Keith Findley and Michael Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal Cases, 2006 Wis. L. Rev. 291, 292 (2006).

  33. Id.

  34. See, e.g., Philip E. Tetlock, Accountability and the Perseverance of First Impressions, 46 Soc. Psychol. Q. 285, 289 (1983).

  35. Recommendation at 6; John Solomon, DSK: The Scandal that Brought Down Dominique Strauss Kahn 4(2012) [hereinafter DSK].

  36. Recommendation at 6–7.

  37. DSK at 5.

  38. DSK at 58.

  39. DSK at 5–8; 19–20.

  40. Recommendation at 7.

  41. See People v. Carrasquillo, 54 N.Y.2d 248 (1981).

  42. See People v. Hicks, 38 N.Y.2d 94 (1975).

  43. Recommendation at 7.

  44. DSK at 3.

  45. See Criminal Sanction at 156.

  46. Scott Sayare, et. al., French Shocked by IMF Chief’s “Perp Walk,” NY Times, (May 16 2011) http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/05/16/french-shocked-by-i-m-f-chiefs-perp-walk/ (Accessed: Nov. 5, 2013); see generally Palma Paciocco, Pilloried in the Press: Rethinking the Constitutional Status of the American Perp Walk, New Criminal L. Rev. (2013).

  47. John Tierney, The Big City: Walking the Walk, NY Times Magazine, (Oct. 30, 1994) http://www.nytimes.com/1994/10/30/magazine/the-big-city-walking-the-walk.html (Accessed: Nov. 5, 2013).

  48. DSK at 21; See generally Diplomatic and Consular Immunity Guidance for Law Enforcement, U.S. Dept. of State Bureau of Diplomatic Security (July 2011) www.state.gov/documents/organization/150546.pdf (Accessed: Nov. 5, 2013).

  49. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 398–399 (1993) (right to counsel “ensure[s] against the risk of convicting an innocent person” and “make[s] it more difficult for the State to rebut and finally overturn the presumption of innocence”); Ross v. Moffitt, 417 US 600, 610–611 (1974) (Sixth Amendment right to counsel is “a shield to protect a [defendant] against being ‘haled into court’ by the State and stripped of his presumption of innocence”); Murphy v. Waterfront Com’n of New York Harbor, 378 U.S. at 52 (privilege against self-incrimination “reflects … our preference for an accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system of criminal justice” in which the government “shoulder[s] the entire load”).

  50. See, e.g., Saul Kassin, et. al., “I'd Know a False Confession If I Saw One”: A Comparative Study of College Students and Police Investigators, 29 Law & Hum. Behav. 211 (2005); Kassin & Wrightsman, Prior Confessions and Mock Juror Verdicts, 10 J. Applied Soc. Psychol. 133 (1980). (noting that confessions exert this power even in the face of strong evidence that the confession is unreliable or a judicial instruction to disregard it).

  51. James Anderson and Paul Heaton, How Much Difference Does the Lawyer Make? The Effect of Defense Counsel on Murder Case Outcomes, 122 Yale L.J. 154, 159 (2012).

  52. See Frye, Lafler supra note 4; Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010).

  53. See, e.g., Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 311, 331 (2004).

  54. Robert Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 31 J. Am. Inst. Crim. L. & Criminology 3, 5 (1940).

  55. See supra note 22.

  56. Strauss-Kahn’s arraignment was delayed to permit the prosecutors obtain a search warrant. See DSK at 21–22.

  57. See Keith Melilli, Prosecutorial Discretion in an Adversary System, 1992 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 669, 676, 689 (1992).

  58. Recommendation at 7.

  59. Id.

  60. Id. at 8.

  61. Id. at 8.

  62. DSK at 22.

  63. Recommendation at 9.

  64. DSK at 27–28.

  65. See William Rashbaum, Evidence Said to Tie Ex-I.M.F. Chief to Housekeeper, N.Y. Times (May 23, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/24/nyregion/evidence-said-to-tie-imf-chief-to-housekeeper.html?_r=0 (Accessed: Nov. 5, 2013).

  66. People ex rel. McManus v. Horn, 18 N.Y.3d 660, 665 (2012) (purpose of New York’s bail statute was to “provid[e] flexible bail alternatives to pretrial detainees—who are presumptively innocent”).

  67. See, e.g., Mary Phillips, Pretrial Detention and Case Outcomes, Part 2: Felony Cases, New York Criminal Justice Agency(2008), http://www.cjareports.org/reports/felonydetention.pdf (Accessed: Nov. 5, 2013); Richard Klein, Judicial Misconduct in Criminal Cases: It’s Not Just the Counsel Who May Be Ineffective and Unprofessional, 4 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 195 (2006).

  68. See Mary Phillips, Factors Influencing Release and Bail Decisions in New York City, New York Criminal Justice Agency 39(2004) http://www.cjareports.org/reports/bail3.pdf (Accessed: Nov. 5, 2013) (prosecutor’s bail recommendation is the most significant predictor of release and bail amount).

  69. DSK at 23, 27.

  70. Id. at 31–34.

  71. Id. at 35.

  72. Id. at 34.

  73. Id.

  74. New York law, in fact, permits the defendant to veto television cameras at his arraignment. N.Y. Jud. L § 218.5.

  75. See supra note 69, at 19–20.

  76. DSK at 34.

  77. DSK at 43.

  78. N.Y. CPL § 180.80.

  79. See Bennett Gershman, A Moral Standard for the Prosecutor’s Exercise of the Charging Discretion, 20 Fordham Urb. L.J. 513, 520 (1993).

  80. See N.Y. C.P.L. §210.40; see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 48(a); United States Attorney’s Manual, Chapter 9-2.050.

  81. Melilli, supra note 58, at 688.

  82. Recommendation at 8.

  83. Id. at. 5.

  84. N.Y. C.P.L. §70.02(3)(a).

  85. DSK at 24, 27.

  86. Id. at 44–45.

  87. Basil Katz and Michelle Nichols, Strauss-Kahn Lawyers Complain About Police Leaks, Reuters (May 26, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/26/us-strausskahn-leaks-idUSTRE74P57T20110526 (Accessed: Nov. 5, 2013).

  88. DSK at 81-82; Recommendation at 2 (describing Diallo’s account given to prosecutors on two separate occasions as “vivid, highly-detailed and convincing”).

  89. Recommendation at 9 (emphasis added).

  90. Id. at. 9–10; see, e.g., United States v. Navarro, 737 F.2d 625 (7th Cir. 1984) (affirming trial court’s denial of defense motion—opposed by government—for production of cooperating witness’s immigration file); United States v. Tucker, 249 F.R.D. 58 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (granting defendant’s subpoena for prison calls of cooperating witnesses over government’s objection).

  91. DSK, at 83-87; 97-100; 102; 117-119.

  92. Diallo’s lawyer protested that the prosecutors treated her like a defendant too. See N. Y. Times (Aug. 21, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/22/nyregion/housekeepers-lawyer-says-he-will-seek-a-special-prosecutor.html (Accessed: Nov. 5, 2013).

  93. Recommendation at 9–11.

  94. See Letter from District Attorney to Defense in Strauss-Kahn Case, N.Y. Times (June, 30, 2011) http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/07/01/nyregion/20110701-Strauss-Kahn-letter.html?gwh=6012FFE1E9AAFD225F77FE2BAF689149 (Accessed: Nov. 5, 2013).

  95. N.Y. CPL §240.45.

  96. Joseph Ax, New York's Vance well-positioned, despite setbacks, Reuters (Jan. 4, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/04/us-newyork-vance-idUSTRE8031X320120104 (Accessed: Nov. 5, 2013).

  97. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

  98. See Herrera, 506 U.S. at 399.

  99. Joel Rudin, Disciplining Errant Prosecutors, Fordham L. Rev., 80 Fordham L. Rev. 537 (2011); James S. Liebman et al., Capital Attrition: Error Rates in Capital Cases, 1973–1995, 78 Tex. L. Rev. 1839, 1846, 1850 (2000) (16 % of reversals of capital convictions in the U.S. from 1973 to 1995 due to prosecutorial suppression of favorable evidence).

  100. See, e.g., United States v. Canniff, 521 F.3d 565, 573 (2d Cir. 1975).

  101. See United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002).

  102. See United States v. Rodriguez, 496 F.3d 221, 228, n.6 (2d Cir. 2007).

  103. See Ruiz supra note 102. Notably, the decision was issued in the context of fast-track plea-bargaining. In many cases, trial preparation occurs in tandem with plea bargaining.

  104. DSK at 231.

  105. Recommendation at 6.

  106. The origins of these dismissals are not readily available, according to representatives of the DCIS.

  107. See Melilli supra note 58, at 701.

  108. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 Science 1124, 1128-29 (1974).

  109. DSK at 206-21.

  110. DSK at 181.

  111. New York Rules of Prof’l Conduct, ¶ 3.8(a) (2013); see also Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct, ¶ 3.8(a) (2002); ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Prosecution Function and Defense Function 3-3.9(a)-(d) (3d ed. 1993) (prosecutor should only institute and maintain criminal charges where there is “sufficient admissible evidence to support a conviction” but adding that even where that requirement is met, prosecutor “may” dismiss if prosecutor has reasonable doubt as to defendant’s guilt).

  112. Recommendation at 4 (emphasis added).

  113. See People v. Jones, 44 NY 2d 76 (1978) (holding that the prosecutor was not required to disclose to defense during plea negotiations that a key witness had died). The prosecutors could have waited, for example, to see if the publicity surrounding the case caused another potential victim to emerge.

  114. Felony Processing at 28 (median/mean days-to-disposition of dismissed cases: 272/545; median/mean days of diverted and dismissed cases: 570/639).

  115. DSK at 226–227.

  116. Recommendation at 8.

  117. Id. at 17 (noting that the physical, medical and other evidence did not corroborate that the encounter was forcible or non-consensual).

  118. Lafler, 132 S.Ct. at 1397.

  119. See, e.g., Mary Phillips, Bail, Detention, and Felony Case Outcomes, New York City Criminal Justice Agency, Inc.) (2008), http://www.cjareports.org/reports/felonydetention.pdf (Accessed: Nov. 5, 2013).

  120. See, e.g., Mary Backus and Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, A National Crisis, 57 Hastings L.J. 1031 (2006); Phillips supra note 120.

  121. United States v. Brody, 808 F.2d 944, 948 (2d Cir. 1986); Norman Reimer & Lisa Wayne, From the Practitioner’s Perch: How Mandatory Minimum Sentences and the Prosecution’s Unfettered Control Over Sentence Reductions for Cooperation Subvert Justice and Exacerbate Racial Disparity, 160 U. Pa. L. Rev. PENNumbra 159 (2011).

  122. Recommendation at 2.

  123. United States v. Shamsideen, 511 F.3d 340, 347 (2d Cir. 2008).

  124. See Winship, 397 U.S. at 363 (reasonable doubt provides “concrete substance” to the presumption of innocence).

  125. See, e.g., Rory K. Little, The ABA’s Project to Revise the Criminal Justice Standards for the Prosecution and Defense Functions, 62 Hastings L.J. 1111, 1120 (2011).

  126. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(b)(3).

  127. See JaneAnne Murray, The Brady Battle, 37 Champion 72 (May 2013).

  128. See Steven Perry & Duren Banks, Prosecutors in State Courts, 2007 Statistical Tables U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics, (Dec. 2011), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/psc07st.pdf (Accessed: 5 Nov. 2013) (2.9 M felony cases closed by state prosecutors in 2007).

  129. See Bruce Green, Prosecutors and Professional Regulation, 25 Geo. L. J. L. E. 873 (2012).

  130. See Joseph Bellacosa, Pre-trial Discovery of Prosecutor’s Materials, Atticus (2010), pp. 9–11. Brady is distinct from open-file discovery; it is at once broader and more targeted. It requires the disclosure of information that may never have been memorialized, and searches beyond the prosecutor’s file, including personnel files and those of other government agencies connected to the investigation.

  131. See supra note 128.

  132. See People v. Beckman, 38 Misc.3d 878 (N.Y. Col. Co. 2012) (court has inherent power to dismiss indictment absent any motion, where prosecutor declines to prosecute).

  133. The Strauss-Kahn motion is available because it was disseminated by the media when it was filed.

  134. New York’s requirement that a defendant’s detention may not continue past six says, absent an indictment, contributes to the potential for indictments to be obtained precipitously, necessitating a later dismissal of felony charges. See supra note 79.

  135. Appropriate redactions can be made of identifying information in sealed cases.

  136. See http://www.innocenceproject.org/know/ (Accessed: Nov. 5, 2013).

  137. Criminal Sanction at 161.

Acknowledgments

The author would like to thank Stephen Cribari, Antony Duff, Barry Feld, Howard Lavine, Cynthia Monaco, Douglas Morris, Michael Murray, Daniel Richman, Richard Willstatter, and all the participants in the Presumption of Innocence conference of the Robina Institute held at the University of Minnesota Law School in May 2012, in particular the discussants of this paper, Josh Bowers and Michelle Dempsey.

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    JaneAnne Murray

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Murray, J. A Perfect Prosecution: The People of the State of New York Versus Dominique Strauss-Kahn. Criminal Law, Philosophy 8, 371–390 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11572-013-9280-3

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