Abstract
Joseph Schmid has proposed an account of existential inertia which says (among other things) that each existentially inert object is not ontologically dependent on anything that is not a part of itself. Using this account, I propose an argument that existential inertia cannot be enjoyed by external relations nor by their relata. I first draw from Arianna Betti’s case for relata-specific relations to argue that external relations cannot have existential inertia. Building on this conclusion, I then propose an argument that the relata of external relations also cannot have existential inertia.
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For example, Paul Audi (2019, p. 2–4) characterizes existential inertia such that “whatever exists is poised to continue to exist if undisturbed and inactive,” and he goes on to clarify that “[b]y ‘undisturbed’, I mean not being causally influenced by anything else.” For Steven Nemes (2020), “the existence of a thing is ‘inertial’ if and only if it continues to exist over time, in the absence of annihilating factors, without the assistance of anything outside of it.” And John Beaudoin (2007, p. 86) proposes that “[a]n object enjoying existential inertia will continue to exist, without being sustained in existence by any external agent, until something else comes along and destroys it.”
As Schmid (July 2021, no. 3.4) says, “The inertial theses of Schmid and Audi only deny the concurrent efficient causal dependence of inertially persistent objects on other things. But this seems too weak. Suppose all temporal concrete objects have a sustaining explanation not in terms of an efficient cause but instead in terms of a ground. In that case, every temporal concrete object is concurrently dependent on some ground. And surely no temporal objects in this scenario enjoy existential inertia. Consequently, inertial theses should deny more than (concurrent) efficient causal dependence.”
This formulation is made in terms of an endurantist theory of time. Schmid (July 2021, no. 4) also gives parallel accounts of existential inertia for perdurantist theories of time.
Socrates and the chair can exist with or without their sitting-on relation; and so it seems reasonable to say that this sitting-on relation is not identical to Socrates and the chair, rather, it is something in addition to them.
In saying that an external relation exists over and above its relata, I am not committing to any view that the word “being” is applied univocally to the external relation and its relata. My own view is that of Thomas Aquinas, namely that relations are called “beings” analogously (rather than univocally) with how their relata are called “beings.” But this does not change the fact that these relations exist over and above their relata. Of course, the argument of this paper does not hinge on Aquinas’s view, and it would work equally well if the word “being” is applied univocally to external relations and their relata.
Vallicella (2000, p. 164–165) argues as follows: “A fact both irreducible to its constituents and independently real is a contradictory structure and hence necessarily nonexistent. . . . To put it bluntly and schematically, a fact taken by itself as an independent real both is and is not a whole of parts. A fact is a whole of parts in that there is nothing ‘in’ it and nothing ‘to’ it but its parts. Analysis of aRb can yield nothing beyond a, R, and b. A fact is not a whole of parts in that the existence of the parts does not entail the existence of the whole. It does no good to say, with Armstrong, that facts are special unmereological wholes, for translated into plain English, that amounts to ‘un-wholly wholes’. . . . Thus we get a contradiction: A fact both is and is not a whole of parts.”
Note that, although Vallicella rejects Armstrong’s theory of facts, he does nevertheless hold to a different theory of facts, namely, facts that are unified by an external unifier (i.e., God). I will not consider here whether or not such an account of facts is coherent.
Betti points out that “the notion of relata-specificity . . . is similar to the notion of bearer-specificity or nontransferability in the literature on tropes” (2015, p. 90). She also compares relata-specificity to a modified version of Frege’s unsaturated relations (2015, p. 93). Although she doesn’t make this additional comparison, it seems that her view is also similar to that of Aristotle, in which relations (as accidents) are by nature in their subjects (Categories, 1a25) and they are also by nature of their objects (Categories, 6a35–6b14).
Another analysis of relata-specificity is given by Anna-Sofia Maurin (2010, p. 321–323), although she doesn’t explicitly use the words “relata-specific.”
Here is an example from Betti (2015, p. 90): “Suppose, again, that the relation of standing two feet away (R) holds between a and b. Then, if R is relata-specific, it relates a and b as soon as it exists, and consequently R could not have existed while failing to relate a and b.”
To help clarify these distinctions, Betti (2015, p. 90) suggests that relata-specificity is in some sense the opposite of internality: “If a relation is internal, it is in the nature of the relata to hold the relation (or better: to be in that relation – as there is actually no such thing as that relation, but just a predicate in language or thought). But if the relation is relata-specific, it is in the nature of the relation to have specific relata.” She goes on to say that “an external relation may still be relata-specific. In such a case, it is not in the nature of the relata to be related, but it is in the nature of the relation itself to relate specific relata. Exactly this combination of features proves useful for proposing a fact-free scenario.”
Betti (2015, p. 92) puts it like this, “if R is relata-specific, and thus it is in the nature of R to relate a and b, then aRb exists as soon as R exists. So, there is simply no difference between a + R + b and aRb. . . . The unity problem . . . is dissolved.” She also asks (2015, p. 97), “Under what conditions do relations relate, that is, attach to (form a unity with) their relata?” to which her preferred answer is, “As soon as they exist.”
As Maurin (2010, p. 324) says, “relations conceived of as dependent upon, yet distinct from some specific relata . . . can solve the Bradleyan problem and can (thereby) provide adequate truthmakers for propositions.”
Since the sitting-on relation has automatic relata-specificity toward Socrates and the chair (and it assumes their existence), it seems to me that the sitting-on relation can be a sufficient truthmaker for the sentence “Socrates is sitting on the chair.” However it could also be held that the conjunction of Socrates, the chair, and the relata-specific sitting-on relation constitute the truthmaker for the sentence “Socrates is sitting on the chair.”
Of course, the truthmaker argument is only one of several arguments for relata-specificity. Other arguments for relata-specificity do not require adherence to a truthmaker theory.
Moreover, it seems that that objections against relata-specificity do not succeed. For example Vallicella (2016, p. 238) proposes the following objection to relata-specificity: “[I]f it is the nature of R to relate exactly these relata, then it is intrinsic to R that it do so. But then R is intrinsically relational, relational in and of itself. If this is neither contradictory nor magical, then it involves importing mind (intentionality) into the bowels of R.” In response to Vallicella, we can say that R is indeed intrinsically relational, but this is not contradictory, nor magical, nor mental. Rather, it is simply the nature of a relation that it is in itself relational (rather than non-relational) since it is the business of a relation to relate.
As Betti (2015, p. 90) says, “R could not have existed while failing to relate a and b.” Maurin (2010, p. 323–324) makes a similar point when she speaks of “relations, conceived of as dependent upon, yet distinct from some specific relata” and says that “compresence1 depends essentially for its existence on the existence of tropes white1, hard1, and sweet1.”
However, Socrates and the chair could exist without the sitting-on relation existing. As Betti (2015, p. 106) says, “having relations R of this kind in the universe does not mean that objects are necessarily related in just the way they are. Objects may exist without being related by R, although R relates its relata once it exists. It is in the nature of R to relate specific objects as soon as it exists, but not in the nature of these specific objects to be related.”
I will not consider here whether external relations across time (e.g., “Socrates was born before the chair was constructed”) are an exception to this rule. If they are, my thesis can easily be modified to say that “no external relations between entities which are (absolutely or relatively) simultaneous with one another can have existential inertia.”
It seems that the instantiation relations cannot be a universals; otherwise, they would need to be instantiated, thus leading to an infinite regress of instantiation relations.
If, on the other hand, it turns out that the existence of Socrates is ontologically dependent on the existence of the chair (or on the existence of an external relation between himself and the chair), then it follows (from our aforementioned definition of existential inertia) that Socrates does not have existential inertia. In that case, the thesis of Sect. 3 is at least half true with respect to Socrates and the chair.
For the remainder of this paper, I will occasionally use the word “dependent” as shorthand for “ontologically dependent,” and I will occasionally use the word “independent” as shorthand for “not ontologically dependent.”
If Socrates and the chair (or the two chunks of matter out of which they are each composed) were related to each other from past eternity, then we can simply let t* stand for the infinite duration of time prior to t. In that case, the conclusion of this argument still follows, i.e., we have not explained how Socrates and the chair (existing independently of one another at t and t*) are able to have anything to do with one another at t and t*.
Indeed, we often speak of relations as “between” their relata. This is significant because it means that the relation pertains not just to one relata or the other; but it pertains to both. The relation is one reality that pertains to two other realities, and thus, it is a kind of bridge that joins these two realities together. The relation is a way in which one thing is connected to another thing; and so it is also a principle of unity between them.
Here is another formulation of the argument. Socrates and the chair, insofar as they both merely exist, have nothing to do with one another. But Socrates and the chair, insofar as they are related through R, do have something to do with one another. Thus, the possibility of R existing cannot be explained only by the mere existences of Socrates and the chair, otherwise, Socrates and the chair would be able to have something to do with one another only because they have nothing to do with one another. Rather, it seems that the full explanation of the possibility of R should include something common to Socrates and the chair (i.e., U), since then they have a foundation upon which they can have something to do with one another.
The problem of how to cross this abyss is perhaps implicit within Michael Della Rocca’s defense of Leibnitz’s doctrine that two relata cannot “wear pants,” i.e., they cannot each ground the same relation (Della Rocca, 2012, 148). Although I disagree with Della Rocca’s solution that a relation cannot depend on both relata (and I have argued in Sect. 2 that a relation does depend on both relata), nevertheless, I think Della Rocca is right to draw attention to the problem of how a relation can be supported by both relata.
For U to be ontologically “on par” with Socrates and the chair means that U is not ontologically dependent on Socrates and the chair, nor are Socrates and the chair ontologically dependent on U.
I will now make a suggestion that might not be necessary for the argument of this paper. I propose that the external relation R between Socrates and the chair is dependent directly on U. In other words, R’s dependence on U is not merely due to the fact that R depends on Socrates and the chair which also depend on U. Rather, Socrates, the chair, and R each depend directly on U. Moreover, R depends directly on Socrates, directly on the chair, and directly on U.
R’s need for U can perhaps be analyzed in terms of what is sometimes called “the principle of proportionate causality,” i.e., nothing can give what it does not have (cf. Feser, 2017, p. 37 and p. 208). R is an ontologically dependent reality, and so everything about R must be explained by the entities on which R depends, and so everything about R (including R’s “being between Socrates and the chair”) must be from the entities on which R depends. But nothing can give what it does not have. Thus, R’s “being between Socrates and the chair” must be provided by something that is at least in some way between Socrates and the chair, i.e., U.
The principle of proportionate causality is itself the subject of some debate. I think this principle can be defended successfully, but I do not have the space to do so in this paper. Fortunately, it may be possible to bypass this principle if we simply think in terms of explanation. The mere existences of Socrates and the chair contain nothing that is between them, and so it seems that the possibility of R’s “being between Socrates and the chair” cannot be explained only by the mere existences of Socrates and the chair; rather, it should be explained by something that is already between Socrates and the chair (i.e., U). If this argument seems plausible by itself, then we can bypass the principle of proportionate causality altogether. In that case, perhaps we can know that U is necessary for the possibility of R’s “being between Socrates and the chair” even though we might not know the manner of this ontological dependence with any more precision. I do not deny that R’s dependence on U is mysterious.
I am not claiming that past states do not contribute to a full explanation of present states. Past states are a large part of the explanation for why Socrates is currently related to the chair in one way rather than in another way (e.g., why he is sitting on the chair rather than standing next to the chair). But past states cannot explain the following: how there can be any relations between Socrates and the chair at t in spite of the fact that the mere existence of Socrates at t has nothing to do with the mere existence of the chair at t.
These two arguments against the deist proposal have been formulated in terms of presentist-endurantism which holds (among other things) that the “Socrates” who first exists at t* is numerically the same “Socrates” who then exists at t. However, we can also consider this situation from the perspective of eternalist-perdurantism, i.e., the view which holds (among other things) that Socrates’s temporal part at t* is distinct from Socrates’s temporal part at t. According to presentism, only present objects are real, and so a and b are concurrent if and only if a and b are both real. But according to eternalism, all times are equally real, and so the eternalist must construct a different account of concurrence, e.g., a is concurrent with b if and only if they both exist on a certain spatial slice of the four-dimensional block universe. But even if eternalism is true, it seems that the presentist definition of “concurrence” (i.e., a and b are concurrent if and only if they are both real) is still the better definition of “concurrence.” Or, at least when we characterize “ontological dependence” (such that the dependent entity must be “concurrent” with that on which it depends) we should only use the presentist definition of “concurrence,” since this makes ontological dependence interesting and useful. Now, if we apply the presentist definition of “concurrence” to an eternalist universe (in which all times are equally real), then all times are in fact concurrent with one another. All times exist “now” ontologically, even if not at the same temporal location (cf. Emery, 2020, no. 6). Indeed, the de facto concurrence of all times with one another is implicit in the eternalist expression, “four-dimensional block universe.” But if all times are concurrent with one another, this leads to some interesting conclusions. For example, the deist may use the theory of eternalism to propose that the t*-temporal parts of Socrates, the chair, and their relatedness depend upon U at time t*, and then these t*-temporal parts of Socrates, the chair, and their relatedness cause (through trans-temporal causation) the t-temporal parts of Socrates, the chair, and their relatedness. In this way, the deist may argue that there is no need for the t-temporal parts to maintain their dependency on U since they are adequately explained by the t*-temporal parts. However, given the above analysis of eternalism, the past is “concurrent” with the present. Thus, the t-temporal parts are concurrently dependent upon the t*-temporal parts, and these t*-temporal parts are concurrently dependent upon U. From this it follows that the t-temporal parts of Socrates, the chair, and their relatedness are concurrently dependent on U. Thus, even on the theory of eternalism, Socrates and the chair must be ontologically dependent on U throughout their history (including at t), and not merely at some time in the past.
Similar relational situations include those pertaining to (1) chemical bonds (e.g., the external relation(s) undergirding the chemical union between sodium and chloride), and (2) location (e.g., the external relation between Socrates and the location A in which he exists, as well as the external relation between location A and location B). For, in each of these external relations, it seems that the relata exist independently of one another. However, if it turns out that one relatum is ontologically dependent on the other relatum, then it follows that at least one relatum (i.e., the dependent one) cannot have existential inertia.
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Rooney, P. On Whether External Relations or Their Relata can have Existential Inertia. Philosophia 51, 1907–1922 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-023-00653-w
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-023-00653-w