Abstract
Pauline Kleingeld and Marcus Willaschek, in a co-authored article, declare that their purportedly new interpretation of Immanuel Kant's writings on autonomy reveals that his moral philosophy is neither realist nor constructivist. However, as I explain here, John Rawls already occupies the area of intellectual territory to which Kleingeld and Willaschek attempt to lay claim: Rawls interprets Kant's moral philosophy as neither realist, as Kleingeld and Willaschek evidently construe this term, nor constructivist, as they evidently construe this term. Contra Kleingeld and Willaschek, the moral constructivism attributed to Kant by Rawls is not voluntarist, and Rawls's account of Kant's concept of autonomy is not paradoxical. In order to understand autonomy, it is necessary to understand Kant's complex conception of the will, which structures his moral philosophy (as Rawls, unlike Kleingeld and Willaschek, explains). Rawls, like Kant, but unlike Kleingeld and Willaschek, clearly distinguishes between certain importantly different questions about normativity and obligation. Kant's moral philosophy, according to Rawls's insightful interpretation, is a form of objective moral constructivism.
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Notes
Allen W. Wood argues that the moral constructivism attributed to Kant by Rawls is voluntarist, subjectivist and/or relativist. See his book, Kantian Ethics (Cambridge University Press, 2008; hereinafter, “KE”). Wood makes such arguments throughout this book; see, for example, pp. 46, 51–54, 282–285. See also Wood’s book, Formulas of the Moral Law: Elements in the Philosophy of Immanuel Kant (Cambridge University Press, 2017), p. 2. I do not attempt here to reply to Wood’s arguments, since this requires too many pages; I do so in a manuscript in progress, in which I argue that although Wood misinterprets Rawls’s writings, there is a high degree of similarity between Wood’s and Rawls’s interpretations of Kant.
Disclosure: Wood was one of my warmly esteemed professors while I was an undergraduate student at Cornell University, and he has been and continues to be a highly valued mentor; Rawls was one of my warmly esteemed professors and PhD dissertation advisors while I was a graduate student at Harvard University; I worked for him as a teaching assistant and a research assistant, and he was a highly valued mentor.
I discuss Rawls's political constructivism in two forthcoming articles: "Rawls as Reader of Kant's Political and Moral Philosophy," in John Rawls, edited by Joan Vergés Gifra and Hugo Seleme (Barcelona and Buenos Aires: Katz Editores), and "Rawlsians and Other Kantians," in The Kantian Mind, edited by Sorin Baiasu and Mark Timmons (Routledge). In the latter article I discuss how Rawls interprets Kant's conception of objectivity and adapts it for purposes of his own political philosophy.
Kleingeld and Willaschek apparently belong to this group of writers, as I show below, in Part Eight. Wood also apparently belongs to this group; see, for example, KE, p. 46, 51–54.
This article is published in Philosophers’ Imprint 19(6), February 2019.
Hereinafter, by “K&W” I refer either to the co-authored article or to the authors of the article (as its co-authors).
Here I follow the practice of K&W in capitalizing the phrase “Moral Law” in order to distinguish the law expressed by the supreme principle of morality from subordinate moral laws. Similarly, I capitalize the phrase “Categorical Imperative,” which names the supreme principle of morality, in order to distinguish it from subordinate categorical imperatives.
Due to the unusual page numbering practice of the journal, Philosophers’ Imprint, I use “A” and “B” to refer respectively to the page on the left or the page on the right side of each of the cited pages of K&W’s article.
K&W attribute “the standard reading” to Rawls early in their article (K&W 1B, 5 A), but much later (K&W 15B) they write that Rawls’s constructivist interpretation “is silent on the status of the Categorical Imperative and the Moral Law itself, since it neither claims nor denies that the Moral Law is self-legislated.” In fact, it is not silent, as I show below.
Herein, “G 4:xxx” (where each “x” represents some numeral) refers to a page of Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. When quoting Kant, in general (except in certain cases pointed out below) I use the standard English-language edition: the Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, edited by Paul Guyer and Allen Wood, specifically the volume Practical Philosophy (Cambridge University Press, 1996), which presents Mary J. Gregor’s translations. When citing texts (by authors other than Kant) within the main text instead of in footnotes, I follow the practice of consolidating the page references at the end of a paragraph (if it contains references to only one text), except when it seems important to cite each paraphrased or quoted sentence separately.
K&W undertake to discredit “the standard reading” partly by pointing out that Kant does not explicitly state this or that, which one or another Kant scholar infers. In light of this, I would like to point out that, if I have inferred correctly one of K&W’s importantly relevant yet tacit thoughts (i.e., that they aim to offer only as much of their own interpretation as they think suffices for their article’s main purposes), then I have provided some support for the view that sometimes a reader infers correctly something not explicitly stated in a text. Beyond making this point, I do not engage here with K&W’s criticisms of other scholars’ readings of particular excerpts from Kant’s texts. I share K&W’s concern about interpretations creating the misleading impression that Kant’s moral philosophy is paradoxical. An especially influential interpretation of this type, which K&W do not mention, is: Johnson, Robert; Cureton, Adam, “Kant’s Moral Philosophy”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2021 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2021/entries/kant-moral/>.
Harvard University Press.
“Can Kantian Constructivism Avoid Realist Commitments?” by Michael Lyons, in Reason, Normativity and Law: New Essays in Kantian Philosophy, edited by Alice Pinheiro Walla and Mehmet Ruhi Demiray (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2020). See also, “Moral Objectivity: A Kantian Illusion?” by Carla Bagnoli, in Journal of Value Inquiry (2015) 49:31–45.
Here, quoting G 4:440, I use Gregor’s translation, interpolating the German phrases because she provided them in footnotes. Compare the translation of the same sentences by Jens Timmermann in the revised edition (Cambridge University Press, 2012): “Autonomy of the will is the characteristic of the will by which it is a law to itself (independently of any characteristic of the objects of willing). The principle of autonomy is thus: not to choose in any other way than that the maxims of one’s choice are also comprised as universal law in the same willing.” Timmermann does not attach any footnotes to these sentences.
For relevant discussion, see Immanuel Kant’s Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals: A Commentary, by Dieter Schönecker and Allen W. Wood (Harvard University Press, 2015), especially pp. 98–103.
This is Timmermann’s translation. Compare Gregor’s: “is the sole principle of morals.”
This Gregor’s translation. Compare Timmermann’s: “Our own will, in so far as it would act only under the condition of a possible universal legislation through its maxims -- this will possible for us in the idea -- is the actual object of respect, and the dignity of humanity consists in just this capability, to be universally legislating, if with the proviso of also being itself subject to precisely this legislation.”
See Kant’s discussions of virtue in G 4:407, 426, 436, 442. Notice also “our ideal of moral perfection” (G 4:408). Notice the important implications for Kant’s views about humanity and dignity; I discuss them in a manuscript in progress.
Here Kant presumably does not refer to ideas of reason such as the moral law and the realm of ends, but instead to rational-intuitionistic conceptions of an objective order of values, including that of Lebiniz, as discussed by Rawls, LHMP, p. 236.
Cambridge University Press, 2008.
Prior to Kant, the scholastic tradition of philosophy used this distinction, as Wood points out (KE 121).
Rawls uses the phrase “elective will” -- see below.
Kant, Metaphysics of Morals 6:226, quoted by Wood, KE 121.
Rawls contrasts object-dependent desires to “principle-dependent” and “conception-dependent” desires. He explains “object-dependent” desires as follows: “Think of all the desires that affect us, and that contend within our person, as object-dependent desires. These are like Kant’s inclinations and impulses generated in us by everything from our bodily wants and needs to social processes of learning and education.” (LHMP 150–151).
Kant writes that morality is the relation of actions to the autonomy of the will (G 4:439).
Rawls uses the phrase “reasonable and rational” to express the meaning of Kant’s term vernünftig, and also to mark Kant’s distinction between pure and empirical practical reason: the term “reasonable” corresponds to pure practical reason, which is expressed in the categorical imperative, and the term “rational” corresponds to empirical practical reason. (LHMP 164).
Notice that “first principles” does not refer to the Moral Law.
The four steps are presented on pp. 168–169 of LHMP.
Here Rawls cites G 4:422–423.
It is interesting to compare this interpretation to those offered by Kleingeld, in her article, “Contradiction and Kant’s Formula of Universal Law” (Kant-Studien , 2017) and Timmermann, in his article, “A Tale of Two Conflicts: On Pauline Kleingeld’s New Reading of the Formula of Universal Law” (Kant-Studien , 2018).
The following three “formulations of the moral law” are quoted from Wood’s reference list of formulas and propositions in KET, p. xx. The formula of humanity as an end in itself (FH): “So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or that of another, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means” (G 4:429; cf. 4:436; italics in Wood’s text). The formula of autonomy (FA): “…the idea of the will of every rational being as a will giving universal law” (G 4:431; cf. 4:432); or “Choose only in such a way that the maxims of your choice are also included as universal law in the same volition” (G 4:439; cf. 4:432, 434, 438). The formula of the realm of ends (FRE): “Act in accordance with the maxims of a universally legislative member of a merely possible realm of ends” (G 4:439; cf. 4:432, 437, 438).
Acknowledging that his conjecture departs from Kant’s text in a certain respect, Rawls says that he does not think it distorts Kant’s main point. (LHMP, p. 183).
Regarding publicity, Rawls says: “[P]lainly Kant assumes as a law of nature that people learn from experience and remember the past; hence once it becomes, as it were, a law of nature that everyone tries to make a false promise (in certain circumstances), the existence of the law becomes public knowledge. Everyone knows of it, and knows that others know of it, and so on. We need not suppose that all laws of nature are public knowledge; obviously they are not. But as a way of interpreting the requirements of the CI-procedure in terms of the law of nature formulation, it is not inappropriate to assume the public recognition of the as-it-were laws of nature generated by people acting from certain maxims. [paragraph break] We make this explicit by saying that in the equilibrium state of the adjusted social world, the as-it-were laws of nature at step (3) [of the CI-procedure] are publicly recognized as laws of nature, and we are to apply the CI-procedure accordingly. Let’s refer to this public recognition of the as-it-were laws of nature issuing from maxims at step (1) [of the CI-procedure] as the publicity condition on universal moral precepts. Kant views acceptable precepts of this kind as belonging to the public moral legislation, so to speak, of a moral community.” (LHMP, p. 171). Rawls also specifies a further condition, which he explains on pp. 171–172. However, discussing it would require going beyond the scope of the present article.
I have added the italics to the quoted passages in order to emphasize that here, when using the phrases “ourselves” and “our own will,” Rawls is employing the distinctions highlighted in the first paragraph of Part (3.1) above.
Other influential contemporary writers about moral constructivism say less, if anything, about the public role of moral principles in a possible realm of ends.
Kant would reject the metaphysical perfectionism of Leibniz and other variants of rational intuitionism, as well as Hume’s psychological naturalism, as forms of heteronomy, Rawls argues. (LHMP 105–140, 235).
Kant explains (in KP 5:62) that when “a determining ground of the faculty of desire precedes the maxim of the will,” the “end itself, the gratification that we seek, is in the latter case not a good but a well-being, not a concept of reason but an empirical concept of an object of feeling […].”
Rawls himself appears (on p. 235 of LHMP) to point out a third possibility; however, here he is merely arguing that Kant does not make clear why he regards rational intuitionism (e.g., Leibniz’s metaphysical perfectionism) as heteronomous despite its similarities to Kant’s own view as regards the relation between (a) the object of thought (in Leibniz’s case, this is the moral order that is fixed by the divine nature and is therefore prior to and independent of human moral persons), and (b) moral motivation.
The italics are in Kant’s text. Compare Timmermann: “Morality is thus the relation of actions to the autonomy of the will, that is, to the possible universal legislation through its maxims.”
“And the paradox lies just in this: that the mere dignity of humanity, as rational nature, without any other end or advantage to be gained by it, and hence respect for a mere idea, is still to serve as an unrelenting prescription of the will….” (Kant, Groundwork, 4:439 [Timmermann; compare Gregor]).
Notice the term “Kantian,” as used in this instance. Below, in Part Nine, I point out another instance of use of this term by K&W that is problematic because they do not clearly distinguish between what is “Kant’s” and what is “Kantian.”
See above, Part Five, and footnote #8.
See K&W, pp. 1B, 4 A, 15 A.
Regarding the autonomy of reason, see, e.g., Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason: “The supersensible nature of [rational beings in general] is their existence in accordance with laws that are independent of any empirical condition and thus belong to the autonomy of pure reason.” (5:43, italics in Kant’s text).
They also offer a single citation of an earlier book by Wood in order to support their claim that Wood defends a realist reading of Kant’s ethics. They do not cite Wood’s more recent publications, including the commentary on the Groundwork that he co-authored with Dieter Schönecker (op. cit.).
Wood’s characterization of constructivist interpretations does not accurately describe Rawls’s interpretation; as I have shown above, Rawls distinguishes between the Moral Law and moral laws, and his interpretation of Kant’s idea of the Moral Law is inconsistent with the thought that we constitute the Moral Law by a volitional act of legislation.
Wood here quotes Kant’s Lectures on Anthropology 25:438; the italics are in Wood’s text.
See above, Part (3.1).
I am grateful to Pauline Kleingeld, whose body of work on Kant I value highly, for our exchanges about his philosophy both in person and in writing. I thank Sorin Baiasu for the invitation to take part in the conference at Keele University in conjunction with Kleingeld's 2018 Rousseau Lecture, and also for his helpful comments during that conference, his work on the special journal issue, and his editing suggestions. For helpful comments during that 2018 conference I thank the other participants, in particular Mehmet Ruhi Demiray, who provided excellent written comments, also Marie Newhouse, Paola Romero, Jens Timmermann, and Mark Timmons. I thank Allen W. Wood for helpful correspondence about Kant and metaethics. For helpful conversations about Kant and metaethics I thank my colleague, Christoph Hanisch, and my student, Sebastian Johnson.
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Bernstein, A.R. Autonomy and Objective Moral Constructivism: Rawls Versus Kleingeld & Willaschek. Philosophia 51, 571–596 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-023-00620-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-023-00620-5