Abstract
In contemporary social ontology, normative attitudes are often regarded as the essential element to account for the existence of the social/normative realm. However, by emphasizing their foundational explanatory role, philosophers have been led to overlook or misrepresent some aspects of their structure. The first part of this paper attempts to offer a more proportioned analysis of the structure of normative attitudes; according to it, normative attitudes are essentially sanctions that have a projective or generalizing aim, that is, sanctions that manage to point beyond the acts they directly target. The second part of the paper engages in a polemic with two prominent authors in the social-ontology/normativity debate, Brandom and Searle, and shows that, by building their views on normative attitudes with the almost exclusive purpose of meeting foundational explanatory constraints, they fail to adequately conceptualize crucial aspects that make normative attitudes normative at all.
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Giromini, J. The Logical Structure of Normative Attitudes. Philosophia 51, 1271–1291 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-022-00587-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-022-00587-9