Abstract
I argue that conventionalists should construe a posteriori necessity as restricted necessity. I take Sidelle’s defence of the conventionalist explanation of a posteriori necessity against the contingency problem as the starting point. Sidelle construes a posteriori necessity as unrestricted necessity and then argues that a posteriori necessity is to be considered under a fixed convention (meaning) and is thus irrelevant to the contingent nature of our linguistic conventions. I offer a different solution to the contingency problem. I argue that conventionalists should construe a posteriori necessity as restricted necessity based upon a use-based meta-semantic picture. Restricted necessity is contingent in a broader sense and does not conflict with the contingency of conventions. My solution allows conventionalists to explain a posteriori necessity as restricted necessity. I show that the realist’s arguments for a posteriori necessity are unconvincing in regard to real modal features and a posteriori necessity as unrestricted necessity. We thus have good reason to continue to accept a posteriori necessity as restricted necessity under the conventionalist explanation.
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Notes
To some extent, my response is not merely to “account for” but to “revise” the view of a posteriori necessity (as restricted necessity) (Sidelle, 2009, p. 226). We may need to reconsider the meaning and usage of “□” and related axioms. But this is not within the scope of this paper.
This view is explicitly expressed in his earlier paper as follows. “Briefly, when we evaluate a counterfactual (or a statement about past times before our conventions were introduced) – even one about what would be true if we had not had the conventions we have – we do so, as Kripke rightly insists, in our language, governed by whatever conventions govern these actual statements” (Sidelle, 1992, p. 286). I argue in section 6.2.4 that Kripke’s argument makes use of the restriction of our language but that it is problematic.
The reason for saying that “being H2O“ is only the current meaning of the term “water” is that the meaning of “water” has changed from “being watery stuff” to “being H2O”. I argue for this meaning change in section 4.1.
An example of a change of spelling and pronunciation features being traceable is as follows. In the 1950s and 1960s, China systematically changed the way in which they wrote their characters, moving from traditional Chinese characters to simplified Chinese characters. The terms written with the simplified Chinese characters and their corresponding traditional Chinese characters are terms with changed but traceable spelling and pronunciation features.
Depending on the case at hand, the process of meaning change may be fast or slow. Some spontaneous process might be slow and gradual, whereas some other change, which is imposed by an organization, such as a government or a scientific society, might be fast and sudden.
In the following I mainly discuss the consideration of possibility at the level of meaning and at the level of Term. However, we should not reject the possibility that we can also consider possibility at the level of the term “water” in common sense or at the level of all homophones of “water”, and so on.
Strictly speaking, we also need to consider possible meaning changes in our language in the future. Hence, the conventions that we can use to evaluate possible worlds include but are not limited to the conventions associated with these two meanings.
It could be objected that in the conclusion of Argument 2 “water” applies to H2O in all possible worlds and thus the conclusion is an unrestricted necessity already. However, from the conventionalists’ point of view, a case of a posteriori possibility or a posteriori impossibility should cover both the empirical situation of a possible world and an evaluation (description) of a possible world (see section 6.1 for more details, where I call the case a suitable case). With respect to such cases, the a posteriori necessity in the conclusion of Argument 2 is restricted necessity because it does not cover the cases which are combinations of possible worlds and evaluations using “water” under the meaning of “being watery stuff”. Alternatively, we can use “possible worlds” to refer to such cases and say that the a posteriori necessity in the conclusion of Argument 2 is restricted necessity because it does not cover all possible worlds.
Moreover, I doubt that we need to invoke the condition of considering possibility in our language. When we consider possible situations, we consider different situations with respect to the actual world. If we are allowed to consider different empirical situations with respect to the actual world then we should also be allowed to consider different languages with respect to our language. It seems that in this case there is another hidden premise according to which language and empirical situations should be treated differently when we consider possibility. However, as per the UMP, we can understand language as our empirically using of related symbols to cast doubt on this differently threat. For reasons of space, I cannot discuss the above view further in this paper.
Sidelle’s arguments against realist explanations of a posteriori necessity are suitable not only for a posteriori necessity claims involving natural kind terms, but also for the first type and the third type of a posteriori necessary statements discussed in section 1.
According to Kripke’s doctrine, counterpart objects in the possible worlds of an object in the actual world are exactly the object itself. In contrast, according to the bundle theory, an object in the actual world and associated counterpart objects in possible worlds are different objects, for they are different sections in a transworld object (see section 6.2.2 for more). Here, I use the inclusive expression “counterpart objects”, which can be understood either under Kripke’s doctrine or according to the bundle theory.
It is worth noting that my understanding of conventionalism is not a kind of trivial conventionalism. According to the trivial conventionalism, language (conventions) plays an indispensable but trivial role, that is, it determines what proposition is expressed by a sentence in question. However, I think that language is involved in evaluating (or describing) possible worlds in which the most important factor is the designation relation between terms and things as referents in possible worlds.
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Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Kristie Miller and Nicholas Smith for their great support and helpful instructions. I would also like to thank Michael Duncan, James Norton, Eran Asoulin, and the anonymous reviewers for discussion and useful comments.
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Liu, B. A Posteriori Necessity as Restricted Necessity. Philosophia 50, 1955–1976 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-022-00499-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-022-00499-8