Abstract
This paper aims to show that Sosa’s theory of knowledge based on safety condition can provide a convincing response to the problem of philosophical skepticism. With regard to that, it is divided in three sections. The first section is dedicated to presenting the form of skeptical argument and few options we encounter when skeptic rises the challenge in the form of the so-called radical alternatives. The second section consists of the presentation of Sosa’s theory and safety condition, as well as its differences and similarities with Nozick’s sensitivity condition and Dretske’s condition of conclusive reason. Finally, the third section evaluates Sosa’s theory in the light of Comesana’s counterexample. After the careful analysis of the hypothetical situation, it is shown that Comesana overlooks one important moment when he fixes the initial set of circumstances, which allows a successful defense of Sosa’s analysis of knowledge and safety condition.
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Stamenković, B. Sosa’s Safety Condition and Problem of Philosophical Skepticism. Philosophia 49, 421–435 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-020-00219-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-020-00219-0