Abstract
Consider two similarity facts: a is similar to b with respect to G, and c is similar to d with respect to G. According to the Platonist approach to similarity, the analysis of such facts forces us to admit that similarity facts are to be analyzed into facts about universal similarities of the form: a is similar to b with respect to G, and c is similar to d with respect to G, where similarity is a universal. In this paper, I defend Neutralism, a view according to which there are properties and similarities, but these are not universals, particulars, or of other categories. After presenting the Platonist analysis of similarity proposed by Russell and Grossmann, I examine the question of whether or not the Platonist analysis of similarity leads us inevitably to a conception of similarity as a universal. Then I offer a novel, alternative analysis of similarity free of commitment to universals.
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Notes
“Instantiation” will be used here as a neutral term to mean ‘property possession’.
For the sake of simplicity, I shall focus on ordinary particulars such as a, b, c and d.
For a survey of related problems, see Cumpa (2018b).
Compare Rodriguez-Pereyra (2010).
The difference between ‘having’ and ‘sharing’ properties has been a source of metaphysical problems. See Cumpa (2014).
See Heil (2012: 33).
See Grossmann (1983: 132).
The same holds for scientific property F.
For more details, see Cumpa (2018a), and Cumpa & French (forthcoming). Compare Forrest (2018).
A similarity fact is a fact about similarity. A similarity fact may be about one or more similarities. If it is about one similarity, then the similarity fact is an atomic similarity fact. If it is about more than one similarity, then the similarity fact is a molecular similarity fact. Molecular similarity facts may be conjunctive, etc.
Compare Cumpa (2019).
See Price (1953).
See Grossmann (1992, p. 23).
By introducing multiple terms for similarity relations, Russell’s regress does not seem to arise.
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Acknowledgements
This publication has been made possible thanks to financial support provided by the Research Talent Attraction Program (Project ID: 2016-T1/HUM-1263) from Consejería de Educación e Investigación de la Comunidad de Madrid. Thanks to Peter Forrest, Erwin Tegtmeier, Nils Kürbis, Alexandre Declos, Pinelopi Stylianopoulou, María José Encinas, and audiences at the University of Birmingham, the University of London’s Logic, Epistemology and Metaphysics Seminar, Collége de France, and Complutense University of Madrid.
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Cumpa, J. The Neutralist Analysis of Similarity. Philosophia 49, 37–47 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-019-00151-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-019-00151-y