Abstract
This paper defends a Wittgenstein-inspired conception of the nature of mind and self-knowledge. Thus, it is claimed that the mind is to be conceived as expressive behaviour; and that knowledge of one’s own mind is not to be thought of as a matter of first-person access, i.e. a special sort of access available to oneself alone, but rather as a matter of ordinary access, similar to other people’s. It is also argued that this conception does not undermine the distinctness of the first-person perspective, including the asymmetry with the third-person perspective, which should be construed semantically, rather than epistemically. As a result, an alternative to contemporary conceptions of mind and self-knowledge is provided.
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Notes
As usual, references to Wittgenstein’s Philosophical investigations (hereafter, PI) indicate either paragraph numbers (for the first part), or section and page numbers (for the second part). In addition, the paragraph numbers for the second part, introduced anew in the fourth edition, are also provided, preceded by “PPF”. The wording is taken from the third edition.
A distinction between mental and bodily self-knowledge is common nowadays. The former is the exclusive topic of this paper; hence talk of self-knowledge should be read accordingly throughout.
Some of the aspects of Wittgenstein’s work emphasized here have already been noted by others, e.g. Moyal-Sharrock (2000). What this paper provides is new conceptual tools, extra textual evidence and a broader scope.
A priori is often used in this way in contemporary discussions of self-knowledge. Thus, introducing McKinsey’s paradox, Wright says: “many types of intentional self-knowledge, including in a wide class of cases knowledge of what one thinks or believes, are immediately available to a normal subject, without empirical investigation (in the armchair, or ‘a priori’ in one loose and popular sense of the phrase)” (2011, p. 80; italics in the original).
An inclusive reading of first-person access is common in the literature. Here is Moran on his deliberative approach to self-knowledge: “a rational requirement on belief, on being a believer [is] that one should have access to what one believes in a way that is radically non-evidential […] the first-person accessibility of mental states seems … something that is a normal rational expectation we make of them” (2001, p. 68; emphases added). Similarly Boyle (2009, p. 134, fn. 3), Wright (2015), and others. The basic idea is simple: self-reports are self-ascriptions, and have truth-conditions, so the self-ascribing subject must enjoy some form of awareness of a certain mental condition, though not necessarily via tracking. Bar-On denies that the special security of avowals is a matter of “a special epistemic access, route or basis” (2004, p. 18), but she insists that avowals are truth-apt self-ascriptions; therefore, the subject must be aware of the self-ascribed mental conditions. As expression fits the bill, the inclusive reading of first-person access applies to her too.
Wittgenstein writes: “It makes sense to ask: ‘Do I really love her, or am I only pretending to myself?’ and the process of introspection is the calling up of memories; of imagined possible situations, and of the feelings that one would have if…” (PI §587).
This echoes a concern voiced by Moran, when he writes: “among the people we take a certain interest in and entertain thoughts about will be the particular people we are, and even the most selfless among us are not barred by logic from doing so” (2001, p. xxx). He worries that some readings of Wittgenstein fall prey to this concern (2001, p. 72).
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Acknowledgements
This work was supported by the Spanish Ministry for the Economy and Competitiveness (grant FFI2012-38908-C02-02). Thanks are given to all the members of the research project associated to the grant.
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García Rodríguez, Á. A Wittgensteinian View of Mind and Self-Knowledge. Philosophia 48, 993–1013 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-019-00143-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-019-00143-y