Abstract
In Spinoza’s philosophy affects illustrate the way human beings interact with each other and the world, where the necessary meetings with other particular things define their being and its expressions. Most human beings don’t know themselves, are not conscious of their affects and, even less, do they know what the affects of others are. Although, they are by their definition as particular things obliged to exist in society and create a minimum of consensus. According to Spinoza, this consensus is built upon the biological substrate defined by human body’s physiology, through the mechanism of imitation and is supported by empathy. Leading researchers in affective neuroscience argue for a theory of embodied cognition and recent research in neurosciences attributes human capacity for empathy to mirror neurons, recognising in Spinoza’s texts the philosophical roots of current scientific thinking on body, mind and feeling. Keeping in mind the debate concerning how different levels of explanation can be related to each other or how different disciplines can form the context for interpreting neuroscience’s data, we attempt to promote an implicit dialogue between Spinoza’s psychological theory and the neuroscientific findings, supporting that is legitimate and necessary to examine these questions from the point of view of philosophy and formulate new research questions that can promote further theoretical and empirical study of the complex phenomena concerning human nature and society.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
The following common abbreviations have been used to refer to Spinoza’s writings: E = Ethics, TTP = Theological-Political Treatise, TdIE = Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect, KV = Short Treatise on God, Man and his Well-being. When referring to the Ethics these common forms and abbreviations are used: E = Ethics, 1(2...5) = part 1(2...5), app = Appendix, ax = Axiom, p = Proposition, c = Corollary, s = Scholium, def = Definition, def.aff. = Definition of Affect, gen.def.aff. = General Definition of Affect, d = Demonstration, exp. = Explanation, l = Lemma, post = Postulate, pref = Preface. For long texts and his Correspondence we are referring to the pagination in the Gebhardt edition of Spinoza Opera, 4 vols. (Heidelberg: Carl Winter 1925).
Spinoza’s view on interpersonal relations results necessarily from his metaphysical theory. In his ontology he accepts a unique substance, God, and this substance’s attributes and modes (E1a1,d3 and d5). Human intellect perceives substance through its attributes, and modes are expressions of these attributes. Singular things, as modes, are affections by which the attributes of God are expressed in a certain and determinate way (E1p25c).
Spinoza distinguishes between three fundamental temporal concepts: time, duration and eternity. Taking account of these distinctions and of his Letter “On the nature of the Infinite”, we can explain the existence of substance by e ternity and the existence of modes by d uration (Letter 12 to Meyer, GIV/54/16–55).
Empathy could also be the result of true knowledge but through a different process, by the recreation of the causal chain that produced the affect the other feels.
Memory is defined by Spinoza as “a certain connection of ideas involving the nature of things which are outside the human body”. Commenting this definition he specifies that the connection is according to the order of the affections of human body and distinguishes it from the order of the intellect (E2p18s). The order of the affections of human body is strictly personal though the order of the intellect is common in human nature and intellect conceives things through their causes. Memory is a necessary condition for imagination, in so far as the existence of external things in our life wouldn’t be possible without it, but the way we are determined towards the others is defined by the interaction between imagination and imitation.
Spinoza rephrases some verses of Ovidi, Amores II, xix, 4–5, probably betraying their initial meaning.“Ferreus est , siquis, quod sinit alter, amat. Speremus pariter, pariter metuamus amantes” writes Ovide and Spinoza cites “Speremus pariter, pariter metuamus amantes: Ferreus est , si quis, quod sinit alter, amat”.
A. Ben-Ze’ev, in a spinozistic approach, had underlined the role of change in affective life and the practical function of feelings as one type of awareness that indicates significant changes, perceived or imaginary, that influence our normal functioning (Ben Ze’ev 1999).
In Spinoza’s terminology some terms have meaning within one of the attributes, other terms apply to both. J. M. Beyssade claims that for Spinoza there are affections of the body and affects of the body, just as there are for the mind (Beyssade 1999).
Evidence that a mirror system exists in humans comes from electroencephalography, magnetoencephalography, transcranial magnetic stimulation and brain imaging studies.
It is important to mention here Jacobi’s critique from a philosophy of mind perspective (Jacobi 2009) and stress the role of previous experience in mirroring perceptual responses to another agent’s observed movements. As Jacobi points out, referring to Rizzolatti’s work (Rizzolatti et al. 2001), mirror responses seem to reflect the observer’s motor expertise and motor familiarity with the other’s executed movements. Rizzolatti draws a further distinction between the ways an action could be understood, pointing out that, if the observer cannot map a perceived action onto his own motor repertoire, then understanding of the perceived action cannot be grounded in “motor resonance” and the action can only be categorized on the basis of its visual properties, without any other meaning. Jacobi’s critique goes further and calls into question Gallese’s assumption (Gallese et al. 2004) that there is a constitutive link between action-mirroring and third-person understanding and argues that it is not clear that a shared motor representation of another’s action turns into a shared motor representation of another’s mind or psychological state. Jacobi questions that mirror neurons activity alone enables the observer to interpret onother agent’s intention, but he cannot deny that, in order to represent and understand the intention of another agent, it is nessecary to have our mirror neurons active.
Furthermore the mirror-neuron system is considered to be the neurophysiological basis from which language was developed, as an extension of gestural communication (Rizzolatti and Arbib 1998; Rizzolatti 2005).
Questioning what really shapes the mind, the body itself or the way we mentally represent the body, Damasio seems to drive further Gallagher’s distinction between body schema and body image (Gallagher 2005). Gallagher, even if he argues for a theory of embodied cognition and against the Cartesian view, leaves out the affective part of the body.
A further condition that makes this active affect so rare is its particular relation with time, as G. Lloyd points out in his analysis (Lloyd 1998).
Representational art in Michelangelo’s, Goya’s, Carravagio’s paintings arouses physical empathy for pain, which transmutes into a feeling of empathy according to their experiment. Abstract painting, e.g. J. Pollock’s works, can also produce the same empathetic reactions as representational art and architectural works, like a twisted Romanesque column or sculptures, can have the same effect (Freedberg and Gallese 2007). A question that arises and is the scope for further research by neuroscientists is about the degree to which empathetic responses to actions in real life differ from responses to actions that are represented in paintings and sculptures, concerning parameters as intensity or duration as well as the way they are related to action. Under this light it would be interesting to re-examine the role of Spinoza’s model of human nature in our affective life, during the long lasting effort to empower reason (Boukouvala 2008).
Hope and fear are related with images of a future thing, confidence and despair are produced when doubt involved in the previous mentioned affects is removed and gladness or remorse when the affect arises from the image of a past thing (Ε3p18s2).
We support that the recognition of the similarity of the other as felt emotion and not as conscious knowledge, describes in psychological terms the phenomenon which in Spinoza’s theory of knowledge is called perception of basic common ideas. The recognition of the other as similar confirms via a different path the indication that we possess the foundations of Reason, although at a limited and spermatic level, insofar as the recognition of similarity requires the conception of the common element defining us as human beings.
References
Batson, C. D. (2009). These things called empathy: Eight related but distinct phenomena. In J. Decety & W. Ickes (Eds.), The Social Neuroscience of empathy (pp. 3–16). Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Ben Ze’ev, A. (1999). Emotions and change: A spinozistic account. In Y. Yovel (Ed.), Desire and affect: Spinoza as psychologist (pp. 139–154). New York: Little Room Press.
Beyssade, J.-M. (1999). Nostri corporis affectus: Can an affect in Spinoza be ‘of the body’? In Y. Yovel (Ed.), Desire and affect: Spinoza as pshycologist (pp. 113–128). New York: Little Room Press.
Bickle, J., Mandik, P., & Landreth, A. (2012). The philosophy of neuroscience. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2012/entries/neuroscience. Accessed 1 June 2016.
Bosse, T., Jonker, C. M., & Treur, J. (2008). Formalisation of Damasio’s theory of emotion, feeling and Core consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition, 17(1), 94–113.
Boukouvala, A. (2008). The weakness of reason and the function of Spinoza's model of human nature. Ypomnima, 7, 157–196 (in greek).
Bove, L. (1992). Theorie de l’ amour propre et de l’ orgueil. Studia Spinozana, 8, 69–93.
Damasio, A. R. (1994). Descartes’ error: Emotion, reason and the human brain. New York: Putnam.
Damasio, A. R. (2003). Looking for Spinoza: Joy, sorrow and the feeling brain. Harvest/Harcourt: Orlando.
Damasio, A. R. (2010). Self comes to mind: Constructing the conscious brain. New York: Pantheon Books.
Decety, J. (2011). The neuroevolution of empathy. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 1231(1), 35–45.
Fogassi, L., Ferrari, P. F., Gesierich, B., Rozzi, S., Chersi, F., & Rizzolatti, G. (2005). Parietal lobe: From action organization to intention understanding. Science, 308, 662–667.
Freedberg, D., & Gallese, V. (2007). Motion, emotion and empathy in esthetic experience. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 11(5), 197–203.
Gallagher, S. (2005). How the body shapes the mind. New York: Oxford University Press.
Gallese, V. (2003). The roots of empathy: The shared manifold hypothesis and the neural basis of intersubjectivity. Psychopathology, 36(4), 171–180.
Gallese, V. (2009). Mirror neurons, embodied simulation and the neural basis of social identification. Psychoanalytic Dialogues, 19, 519–536.
Gallese, V., & Goldman, A. (1998). Mirror neurons and the simulation theory of mind-reading. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 2(12), 493–501.
Gallese, V., Keysers, C., & Rizzolatti, G. (2004). A unifying view of the basis of social cognition. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 8(9), 396–403.
Iacoboni, M., Molnar-Szakacs, I., Gallese, V., Buccino, G., Mazziotta, J. C., & Rizzolatti, G. (2005). Grasping the intentions of others with one’s own mirror neuron system. PLoS Biology, 3, 529–535.
Jacob, P. (2009). A Philosopher’s reflections on the discovery of mirror neurons. Topics in Cognitive Science, 1, 570–595.
Lloyd, G. (1998). Rationalizing the passions: Spinoza on reason and the passions. In S. Gaukroger (Ed.), The Soft Underbelly of Reason: The Passions in the Seventeenth Century (pp. 34–46). New York: Routledge.
Matheron, A. (1969). Individu et communauté chez Spinoza. Paris: Minuit.
Moreau, P. F. (2011). Imitation of the affects and Interhuman relations. In M. Hampe, U. Renz, & R. Schnepf (Eds.), Spinoza's Ethics. A Collective Commentary (pp. 167–178). Leiden: Brill.
Naor, N., Ben-Ze'ev, A., & Okon-Singer, H. (2014). The modern search for the holy grail: Is neuroscience a solution? Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 8, 1–6.
Negri, A. (1991). The savage anomaly: The power of Spinoza’s metaphysics and politics. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Northoff, G. (2014). Minding the brain: A guide to philosophy and neuroscience. New York: Palgrave Mackmillan.
Ravven, H. M. (2003). Spinoza’s anticipation of contemporary affective neuroscience. Consciousness & Emotion, 4(2), 257–290.
Rizzolatti, G. (2005). The mirror neuron system and its function in humans. Journal of Anatomy and Embryology, 210(5–6), 419–421.
Rizzolatti, G., & Arbib, M. A. (1998). Language within our grasp. Trends in Neurosciences, 21, 188–194.
Rizzolatti, G., & Craighero, L. (2004). The mirror-neuron system. Annual Review of Neuroscience, 27, 169–192.
Rizzolatti, G., & Fabbri-Destro, M. (2008). The mirror system and its role in social cognition. Current Opinion in Neurobiology, 18(2), 179–184.
Rizzolatti, G., Fogassi, L., & Gallese, V. (2001). Neurophysiological mechanisms underlying the understanding and imitation of action. Nature Review of Neuroscience, 2, 661–670.
Spinoza. B. (1925). Spinoza Opera. 4 vols. Edited by Carl Gebhardt. Heidelberg: Carl Winters.
Steinberg, D. (1984). Spinoza’s ethical doctrine and the unity of human nature. Journal of the History of Philosophy, 22(3), 303–324.
Varela, F., Thompson, E., & Rosch, E. (1991). The embodied mind: Cognitive Science and human experience. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Wicker, B., Keysers, C., Plailly, J., Royet, J.-P., Gallese, V., & Rizzolatti, G. (2003). Both of us disgusted in my insula: The common neural basis of seeing and feeling disgust. Neuron, 40, 655–664.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Boukouvala, Α. Imitation of Affects and Mirror Neurons: Exploring Empathy in Spinoza’s Theory and Contemporary Neuroscience. Philosophia 45, 1007–1017 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-017-9857-5
Received:
Revised:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-017-9857-5