Abstract
While open-mindedness as an intellectual trait has been recognized for centuries, Western philosophers have not explicitly endorsed it as a virtue until recently. This acknowledgment has been roughly coincident with the rise of virtue epistemology. As with any virtue, it is important to inform contemporary discussion of open-mindedness with reflection on sources from the history of philosophy. Here I do just this. After reviewing two major accounts of open-mindedness, which I dub "Contest" and "Indifference," I explore some ideas pertinent to the subject in four philosophers spanning eighteen centuries: Sextus Empiricus, John Locke, John Stuart Mill, and Paul Feyerabend. Despite their varying concerns and terminology, their contributions may valuably inform current reflection on the virtue of open-mindedness, whether construed in terms of the Contest or Indifference account.
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Notes
As Hare acknowledges, he is indebted to Bertrand Russell who first used the phrase “critical receptiveness” as a way of characterizing open-mindedness. See Russell (1950).
It should be noted, though, that Locke, following his medieval forbears, did believe there to be a supreme academic discipline, namely theology. He expounds upon this point in Of the Conduct of the Understanding, section 23.
This phrase “anything goes” has been subject to a variety of interpretations. For a critical examination of some of the major epistemological and socio-political interpretations of this thesis, see Russell (1983).
Feyerabend actually speaks to this issue specifically when he uses it to illustrate his advocacy for a “pluralistic methodology” in science. In using such a method and hearing all views, a scientist “may then discover that the theory of evolution is not as good as is generally assumed and that it must be supplemented, or entirely replaced, by an improved version of Genesis” (p. 14).
There are plenty of other significant scientific advancements that arose by irrational means. Examples include Rontgen’s accidental discovery of x-ray technology, Kekule’s solving the puzzle of the chemical configuration of benzene in a dream, Fleming’s accidental discovery of penicillin antibiotics, and Spencer’s invention of the microwave oven.
This publication benefited from a research fellowship at Biola University's Center for Christian Thought, which was made possible through the support of a grant from the John Templeton Foundation.
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Spiegel, J.S. Contest and Indifference: Two Models of Open-Minded Inquiry. Philosophia 45, 789–810 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-017-9850-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-017-9850-z