Abstract
The Direct Argument is an important argument for demonstrating that moral responsibility is incompatible with determinism because it makes no presuppositions about the nature of free will. One of the inference rules employed in the Direct Argument is rule A: If a proposition is broadly logically necessary, then it is true and no one is, nor ever has been, even partially morally responsible for the fact that the proposition is true. While inference rule A is assumed by all parties to the debate, I demonstrate that the rule is invalid.
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Notes
While almost everyone in the debate assumes that rule A is valid, Kearns (2011) provides some alleged counterexamples to the rule.
References
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Acknowledgments
Author is grateful to Grayson Rains, Brian Trietsch, an anonymous referee, and the students of the University of Texas—Arlington’s 2013 seminar in philosophical research methods for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. Work on this paper was supported by the National Endowment for the Humanities, although views expressed here do not necessarily represent those of the Endowment.
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Hermes, C. A Counterexample to A. Philosophia 42, 387–389 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-013-9509-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-013-9509-3