Skip to main content
Log in

The Thucydides Trap and the Korean Peninsula: So why Won’t the USA and China Get Caught?

  • Research Article
  • Published:
Journal of Chinese Political Science Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

“It was the rise of Athens and the fear that it instilled in Sparta that made war inevitable” as Thucydides famously stated. But are we destined to hear echoes of “Carthago delenda est” [Carthage must be destroyed] from Beijing and Washington across the Pacific? With the tension notably on the rise in the issue-specific domains of the Taiwan Strait, South China Sea, and the Korean Peninsula, there is cause to delve deeper into the contemporary ‘Thucydides Trap’, as expounded by Graham Allison. This paper will focus on the latest developments of the ongoing Korean Peninsula Nuclear Crisis, post Six-Party Talks, as an issue-specific domain to evaluate the changing power dynamic between an established and a rising power. Here the Thucydides Trap and the challenges presented by policy makers in both China and the USA make special reference to the danger of being plunged into a hegemonic conflict. This analysis covers two trajectories: 1) following the conservative approach – balance of power and conditions of hegemony; and 2) concerning a balance of hierarchies – in which the two hierarchies run parallel to each other. Due to China’s rising power in both military and economic fields, it simultaneously presages the relative decline of American power projection. Allison also reconfirms that an established power, in this case the USA, is challenged by a rising power, personified by China, concludes that the likelihood of war has substantially increased. Despite the fact of their growing geopolitical rivalry, both acknowledge the calculus of falling into the trap and realize that a major conflict would devastate their geopolitical positions. Put more directly, finding the great escape from this trap remains the central issue in the contemporary world, raising the conceptionally challenging question as to whether Allison’s theoretical construction is heuristically sound.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Graph 1
Graph 2
Fig. 1
Fig. 2

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. This phrase is alternatively tranalsated as “the growth of the Athenians to greatness, which brought fear to the Lacedaemonians [Spartans] and forced them to war”. See, [98]: Book I, Chapter 23, p. 43.

  2. Here we have added the 17th case of the USA and the PRC. See, [3], xiv, 42; [2, 45]: 397; [67]: 113; [98]: Book I, Chapter 23, p. 43 and Chapter 77, p. 133. Athanassios Platias and Constantinos Koliopoulos draw a similar inference, putting forth that “the antagonism between two states [in this case: Sparta and Athens] seeking pre-eminence in an international system is a necessary condition for the outbreak of a hegemonic war. When the cost of that war is deemed acceptable, as was generally the case in the pre-nuclear age, then this condition becomes a sufficient one as well”. See, [83]: 34.

  3. Here, Mearsheimer suggests that the main causes of war between great powers are located in the architecture of the international system, further stating a system that contains an aspiring hegemon is set to be unbalanced. See, [71]: 337–347. For the discussion on power transition, see [76]: 10. For the theory of hegemonic war and international change, see [33]: 186–210. For referral to factors of prestige, see [13]: 28; [25]: 21–35.

  4. For the symposium on peaceful change, see [96].

  5. [3]: Introduction; [4].

  6. As for hierarchical arrangements, we refer to the various dominant to subordinate relationships, induced by voluntary conferral of authority of a lesser actor to a major power when net benefits of an agreement are aligned, be it security orientated or economically orientated or both. When disequilibrium arises, hierarchical bargains breakdown, constituting a loss of authority for the dominant. The major contributors to hierarchy are [34, 49, 57, 109]. Other works on the hierarchy symposium include [39, 40, 87].

  7. Here, the decisive component of the approach to multipolarity considers aspects of “geo-economics”, which is the “major factor in returning regional or global power projection back to an importantly economic (as opposed to political-military) exercise” [3]: 20–21; [6]: 11; [106]: 197.

  8. For the signaling theory, see [26, 105]. Considering China’s assertiveness, see [14, 30, 46,47,48, 69, 91].

  9. China’s distrust of the USA is firmly rooted in its contemporary history, stemming from the revolution in 1949, to the range of mannerisms from “official statements, media reports, and the online blogosphere”. See, [63]: 7–8.

  10. Referring to Robert Dahl, power is defined as the “ability of A to get B to do something he would otherwise not do”. See, [18]: 202. Also expanding aspect into the realm of hierarchy studies is David A. Lake’s discussion on authority, power and coercion, as well as hierarchical dimensions on domination and relational authority, see [57]: 21–33, 51–52.

  11. [7]: 102; [19]: Book III, Chapter 2, section 47, p. 311.

  12. See, [93]: 7–9. For a more detailed and comprehensive analysis on how states cooperate under anarchy, see [36]: 496–503.

  13. In this context, the actors are primarily concerned about the maximization of power through material capabilities. [5]: 7; [101]: 109, 126.

  14. See, [93]: 69. For criticism of the balance-of-power theory, see [17]: 27; [43]: 3; [61]: 7; [77]: 239; [80]: 52–53.

  15. Here we see factors of relational contracting stemming from the works of David A. Lake. See, [57]: Chapters 2 and 3. Note that relational contracting outlines rational factors for respective actors to engage in a hierarchical relationship. Lake stipulates that both dominant and subordinate must have aligned interests and policy preferences, as well as enough benefits provided through incentives. Additionally, both actors must conform to similar principles and operate the negotiation and renegotiation of the social contact, which is therefore tied to the operational performance of the contract. These aspects shape the hierarchical relationship, consequently the political order.

  16. See, [57]: 62. Here Lake expands upon Walt’s first dimension of political structure and expounds that relations between state can exist in two continuous dimensions being anarchy to hierarchy; additionally he acknowledges that there are varying levels of authority suggesting types of tight or loose hierarchical relations between dominants and subordinates.

  17. See, [60; 103]. For a more comprehensive historical analysis, see [15].

  18. See, [9]: 142; [21]: 46; [53]: 47. For a more comprehensive insight on the Sino-DPRK relations and how they have recently changed, see [1].

  19. See, [21]: 205–207; [42]: 79–95. The entire situation can be discerned as security dilemma, making the negotiations vital for the preservation of regional security, which had been primarily sought by DPRK in view of the ROK military build-up, even though it had been made primarily responsible for the crisis on the Korean Peninsula. See, [75]; [81]: 146.

  20. On the debate regarding China becoming a responsible great power, see [68].

  21. Japan is also considering to request for the deployment of THAAD within its borders, in order to be appropriately equipped concerning its efforts to provide the optimal protection of its citizens and strategic interests. See, [82].

  22. Within the resolution being considered, the context also encompasses previously adopted resolutions, specifically 825 (1993), 1695 (2006), 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 1887 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017). See, [99].

References

  1. Albert, Eleanor. 2017. The China-North Korean relationship. In CFR backgrounder, Council on Foreign Relations https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-north-korea-relationship. Accessed 10 Jan 2018.

  2. Allison, Graham T. 2015. The Thucydides trap: Are the US and China headed for war?. The Atlantic, 24 September [online]. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/09/united-states-china-war-thucydides-trap/406756/. Accessed 10 July 2018.

  3. Allison, Graham T. 2016. Destined for war: Can America and China escape Thucydides trap. London: Scribe Publications.

    Google Scholar 

  4. Allison, Graham T. 2017. The Thucydides trap: When one great power threatens to displace another, war is almost always the result – But it Doesn’t have to be. Foreign Policy, 9 June [online]. https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/06/09/the-thucydides-trap/. Accessed 22 May 2018.

  5. Aron, Raymond. 1973. International Relations. A Theory of War and Peace. Garden City: Doubleday.

  6. Blackwill, Robert, and Jennifer Harris. 2016. War by other means: Geoeconomics and statecraft. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  7. Bull, Hedley. 2002. The anarchical society. A study of order in world politics. 3rd edition. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

    Google Scholar 

  8. Buzan, Barry. 2004. From international to global society. English school theory and the social structure of globalisation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  9. Buzo, Adrian. 2007. The making of modern Korea. London: Routledge.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  10. Campbell, Charlie. 2017. North Korea Said Sixth Nuclear Test Was a Missile-Ready Hydrogen Bomb. TIME, 3 September [online]. http://time.com/4926030/north-korea-nuclear-test-kim-jong-un/. Accessed 10 Jan 2018.

  11. Cha, Victor D. 2004. The U.S. role in inter-Korean relations: Facilitator, container, or impeder? In Inter-Korean relations. Problems and prospects, ed. Samuel S. Kim, 139–158. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

    Google Scholar 

  12. Cha, Victor D. and Terry, Sue Mi. 2018. Assessment of the Singapore Summit. Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic & International Studies [online]. https://www.csis.org/analysis/assessment-singapore-summit. Accessed 24 Nov 2018.

  13. Choucri, Nacli, and Robert C. North. 1975. National in conflict: National Growth and international violence. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.

    Google Scholar 

  14. Christensen, Thomas J. 2011. The advantages of an assertive China. Foreign Affairs 90(2): 54–67.

  15. Clemens, Walter. North Korea’s Quest for Nuclear Weapons: New historical evidence. Journal of East Asian Studies 10: 127–154.

  16. Colby, Elbridge A., and Wu, Riqiang. April 2016. Seeking strategic stability for U.S.-China relations in the nuclear domain. In Tanner, Travis, and Dong, Wang. U.S.-China Relations in Strategic Domains. NBR Special Report No. 57. Seattle: The National Bureau of Asian Research, pp. 21–41.

  17. Craig, Campbell. 2009. American power preponderance and the nuclear revolution. Review of International Studies 35 (1): 27–44.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  18. Dahl, Robert. 1957. The concept of power. Behavioral Science 2 (3): 201–215.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  19. de Vattel, Emmerich. 1844. The Laws of nations or the Laws of nature applied to the conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns. 6th American edition. Philadelphia: T. & J. W. Johnson.

  20. de Wijk, Rob. November 2017. Breaking the Deadlock. Policy Options for Dealing with North Korea. The Hague: The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies [online]. https://hcss.nl/sites/default/files/files/reports/Strategic%20Alert%20Breaking%20the%20Deadlock%20November%202017_2.pdf. Accessed 22 May 2018.

  21. Deng, Yong. 2008. China’s struggle for status. The realignment of international relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  22. Deutsch, Karl W. 1988. The Analysis of International Relations. Englewood cliffs: Prentice Hall.

  23. Dias, Elizabeth. 2017. Why the Fight with North Korea is Really About China. TIME, 12 October 2017 [online]. http://time.com/4979613/north-korea-donald-trump-china/. Accessed 11 Jan.

  24. Ding, Sheng. 2009. A concealed regionalization without historical roots: A forum of regionalism in rising China’s foreign policy. In China and the global politics of regionalization, ed. Emilian Kavalski, 33–45. Farnham: Ashgate.

    Google Scholar 

  25. Etzioni, Amitai. 1962. International prestige, Competition and peaceful coexistence. European Journal of Sociology 3 (1): 21–41.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  26. Fearon, James D. 1997. Signaling foreign policy interests. Journal of Conflict Resolution 41 (1): 68–90.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  27. Frank, Ruediger. 2006. The political economy of sanctions against North Korea. Asian Perspective 30 (3): 5–36.

    Google Scholar 

  28. Frank, Ruediger. 2012. Why now is a good time for economic engagement of North Korea. Asia-Pacific. Journal 10 (2): 1–7.

    Google Scholar 

  29. Friedberg, Aaron L. 2011. A Contest for Supremacy. China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia. New York and London: W. W. Norton & Company.

  30. Friedberg, Aaron L. 2015. The sources of Chinese conduct: Explaining Beijing’s assertiveness. The Washington Quarterly 37 (4): 133–150.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  31. Gaddis, John Lewis. 2018. On grand strategy. New York: Penguin Press.

    Google Scholar 

  32. Gaouette, Nicole, and Elizabeth Joseph. 2017. UN Adopts Tough New Sanctions on North Korea. CNN, 24 December [online]. http://edition.cnn.com/2017/12/22/politics/un-us-north-korea-resolution/index.html. Accessed 15 Jan 2018.

  33. Gilpin, Robert. 1981. War and change in world politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  34. Goh, Evelyn. 2013. The struggle for order: Hegemony, hierarchy, and transition in post-cold war East Asia. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  35. Gordon, Joy. 1999. Economic sanctions, just war doctrine, and the ‘fearful spectacle of the civilian dead. CrossCurrents 49 (3): 387–400.

    Google Scholar 

  36. Grieco, Joseph M. 1988. Anarchy and the limits of cooperation: A realist critique of the newest Liberal institutionalism. International Organization 42 (3): 485–507.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  37. Haas, Benjamin. 2018. Kim Jong-un Meets Xi Jinping in Second Surprise Visit to China. The Geuardian, 8 May. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/may/08/kim-jong-un-meets-xi-jinping-in-second-surprise-visit-to-china. Accessed 25 Nov 2018.

  38. Haggard, Stephen, and Marcus Noland. 2010. Sanctioning North Korea: The political economy of denuclearization and proliferation. Asian Survey 50 (3): 539–568.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  39. Hobson, John M. 2014. The twin self-delusion of IR: Why ‘hierarchy’ and not ‘anarchy’ is the Core concept of IR. Millennium: Journal of International Studies 42 (3): 557–575.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  40. Hobson, John M., and J.C. Sharman. 2005. The enduring place of hierarchy in world politics: Tracing the social logics of hierarchy and political change. European Journal of International Relations 11 (1): 63–98.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  41. Hundt, David. 2010. China’s ‘two Koreas’ policy: Achievements and contradictions. Political Science 62 (2): 132–145.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  42. Hwang, Eui-Gak. 2010. The search for a united Korea: Political and economical implications. New York: Springer.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  43. Ikenberry, G. John. 2002. America Unrivalled: The Future of the Balance of Power. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.

  44. Ikenberry, G. John. 2011. Liberal leviathan: The origins, crisis, and transformation of American world order. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  45. Jaeger, Werner. 1946. Paideia. The ideals of Greek culture, Vol. 1 (Trans: Gilbert Highet). 2nd English Edition. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

  46. Jerdén, Björn. 2014. The assertive China narrative: Why it is wrong and how so many still bought into it. The Chinese Journal of International Politics 7 (1): 47–88.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  47. Johnston, Alastair Iain. 2003. Is China a status quo power? International Security 27 (4): 5–56.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  48. Johnston, Alastair Iain. 2013. How new and assertive is China’s new assertiveness? International Security 37 (4): 7–48.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  49. Kang, David C. 2003. 2004. Hierarchy, balancing, and empirical puzzles in Asian international relations. International Security 28 (3): 165–180.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  50. Kang, David C. 2017. American grand strategy and east Asian security strategy in the twenty-first century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  51. Kennedy, Paul. 1987. The rise and fall of great powers. Economic change and military conflict from 1500 to 2000. New York: Random House.

    Google Scholar 

  52. Kim, Christine and Yang, Heekyong. 2017. Experts Warn North Korea Missile Crisis Could Trigger Arms Race. TIME, 11 August [online]. http://time.com/4896754/north-korea-missile-south-korea-crisis/. Accessed 11 Jan 2018.

  53. Kim, Samuel S. 2006. The two Koreas and the great powers. New York: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  54. Kim, Sung Chull, and David C. Kang. 2009. Engagement with North Korea. A viable alternative. New York: State University of New York.

    Google Scholar 

  55. Kuo, Lily. 2018. Kim Jong-un Paid ‘Unofficial’ Visit to Beijing, Chinese State Media Confirms. The Guardian, 28 March. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/28/kim-jong-un-paid-unofficial-visit-to-beijing-chinese-state-media-confirms. Accessed 25 Nov 2018.

  56. Kuo, Lily. 2018. Kim Jong-un Meets Xi Jinping for Third Time. The Guardian, 19 June [online]. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/19/kim-jong-un-meets-xi-jinping-for-third-time. Accessed 25 Nov 2018.

  57. Lake, David A. 2009. Hierarchy in International Relations. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.

  58. Lake, David A. 2010. Domination, authority, and Forms of Chinese Power. Chinese Journal of International Politics 7 (1): 357–382.

    Google Scholar 

  59. Lee, Chung Min and Botto, Kathryn. 2018. President moon Jae-in and the politics of inter-Korean Détente. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie endowment for international peace [online]. http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Korean_Strategic_Review_2018_FULL.pdf. Accessed 24 Nov 2018.

  60. Lee, Jae-Bong. 2009. US deployment of nuclear weapons in 1950s South Korea & North Korea’s nuclear development: Toward denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. The Asia-Pacific Journal 7 (3): 1–16.

    Google Scholar 

  61. Levy, Jack S., and William R. Thompson. 2003. Balances and balancing: Concepts and proposition and research design. In Realism and the new balancing of power: A new debate, ed. John A. Vazquez and Colin Elman, 128–153. New Jersey: Prentice Hall.

    Google Scholar 

  62. Li, Zhihui. 2015. China Voice: Ten reasons China, U.S. can avoid Thucydides Trap”, Xinhua News, 27 September [online]. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-09/27/c_134664509.htm. Accessed 26 Dec 2017.

  63. Lieberthal, Kenneth and Wang, Jisi. March 2012. Addressing U.S.-China Strategic Distrust. Washington, D.C.: John L. Thorton China Center at Brookings [online]. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/0330_china_lieberthal.pdf. Accessed 22 May 2018.

  64. Lin, Jinshu, and Quan, Zhenan. 2011. Xiandai Chaoxian Jingji [Modern North Korean Economy]. Yanbian: Yanbian Daxue Chubenshe.

  65. Liu, Rounan, and Feng Liu. 2017. Contending ideas on China’s non-Alliance strategy. The Chinese Journal of International Politics 10(2): 151–171.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  66. Lockheed Martin. 2017. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense. [online]. https://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/products/thaad.html. Accessed 11 Jan 2018.

  67. MacDougall, James C. 2017. Review essay. Destined for war: Can America and China escape the Thucydides’s trap. Parameters 47 (2): 113–116.

  68. Mao, Weizhun. 2017. Debating China’s international responsibility. Chinese Journal of International Politics 10 (2): 173–210.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  69. Mastro, Oriana Skylar Winter. 2015. Why Chinese assertiveness is Here to stay. The Washington Quarterly 37 (4): 151–170.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  70. Maurseth, Per. 1964. Balance-of-power thinking from renaissance to the French revolution. Journal of Peace Research 1 (2): 120–136.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  71. Mearsheimer, John J. 2001. The tragedy of great power politics. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.

    Google Scholar 

  72. Michishita, Narushige 2010. North Korea’s Diplomatic-Military Campaigns, 1966–2008. London and New York: Routledge.

  73. Modelski, George. 1988. Long Cycles in World Politics. Seattle. University of Washington Press.

  74. Mullany, Gerry. 2018. Trump to raise North Korea sanctions with Chinese leader, Pence says. New York Times, 15 November [online]. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/15/world/asia/pence-north-korea-sanctions-china.html. Accessed 25 Nov 2018.

  75. Onishi, Norumitsu. 2005. North Korea’s leader says He’s ready to resume talks to end nuclear standoff. The New York Times, 18 June [online]. https://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/18/world/asia/north-koreas-leader-says-hes-ready-to-resume-talks-to-end.html. Accessed 11 Jan 2018.

  76. Organski, A.F.K. 1958. World politics. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

    Google Scholar 

  77. Owen, John M. 2002. Transnational Liberalism and American Primacy; The Benignity is in the Eye of the Beholder. In: G. John Ikenburry, ed., America Unrivalled: The Future of the Balance of Power Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, pp. 239–259.

  78. Paltiel, Jeremy. 2009. China’s regionalization policies: Illiberal institutionalism or neo-Mencian benevolence? In China and the global politics of regionalization, ed. Emilian Kavalski, 47–61. Farnham: Ashgate.

    Google Scholar 

  79. Panda, Ankit. 2016. What is THAAD, What Does It Do, and Why is China Mad About It?. The Diplomat, 25 February 2016 [online]. https://thediplomat.com/2016/02/what-is-thaad-what-does-it-do-and-why-is-china-mad-about-it/. Accessed 11 Jan 2018.

  80. Paul, T.V. 2005. Soft balancing in the age of US primacy. International Security 30 (1): 46–71.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  81. Paul, T.V., Patrick M. Morgan, and James J. Wirtz. 2009. Complex deterrence. Strategy in the global age. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  82. Perlez, Jane. 2016. For China, a missile defense system in South Korea spells a failed courtship. The New York Times, 9 July [online]. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/09/world/asia/south-korea-us-thaad-china.html. Accessed 11 Jan 2018.

  83. Platias, Athanassios, and Koliopoulos, Constantinos. 2010. Thucydides on strategy. Grand strategies in the Peloponnesian war and their relevance today. New York: Columbia University Press.

  84. Ramani, Samuel. 2018. China's Approach to North Korea Sanctions. The Diplomat, 10 January [online]. https://thediplomat.com/2018/01/chinas-approach-to-north-korea-sanctions/. Accessed 13 Jan 2018.

  85. Ramini, Samuel. 2017. Can Russia Help Solve the North Korea Crisis. The Diplomat, 22 December. https://thediplomat.com/2017/12/can-russia-help-solve-the-north-korea-crisis/. Accessed 13 Jan 2018.

  86. Reilly, James. 2014. China’s market influence in North Korea. Asian Survey 54 (5): 894–917.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  87. Renshon, Jonathan. 2017. Fighting for status: Hierarchy and conflict in world politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  88. Rozman, Gilbert. 2007. Strategic thinking about the Korean nuclear crisis. Four parties caught between North Korea and the United States. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  89. Sanger, David E. 2017. Intelligence agencies say North Korean missile could reach U.S. in a Year. The New York Times, 25 July [online]. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/25/us/politics/north-korea-missiles.html. Accessed 11 Jan 2018.

  90. Schweller, Randall L., and Xiaoyu Pu. 2011. After Unipolarity: China’s visions of international order in an era of U.S. decline. International Security 36 (1): 41–72.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  91. Scobell, Andrew, and Scott W. Harold. 2013. An assertive China? Insights from Interviews. Asian Security 9 (2): 111–131.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  92. Shambough, David. 2008. International Relations of Asia. Lanham. Rowman & Littlefield.

  93. Sheehan, Michael. 1996. Balance of power. History and theory. London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  94. Smith, Josh and Lee, Joyce. 2018. U.S., South Korea Marines Hold Small-Scale Exercises ahead of North Korea Talks. Reuters, 5 November [online]. https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-southkorea-military/u-s-south-korea-marines-hold-small-scale-exercise-ahead-of-north-korea-talks-idUSKCN1NA09D. Accessed 4 Dec 2018.

  95. Stashwick, Steven. 2018. ‘Unsafe’ incident between US and Chinese during FONOP. The Diplomat, 2 October [online]. https://thediplomat.com/2018/10/unsafe-incident-between-us-and-chinese-warships-during-fonop/ Accessed 4 Dec 2018.

  96. Taliaferro, Jeffrey W., Steven E. Lobell, and Norman M. Ripsman. 2018. Is peaceful change in world politics always desirable? A neoclassical perspective. International Security Review 20 (2): 283–291.

    Google Scholar 

  97. Tellis, Ashley J. 2014. Balancing without containment: An American strategy for managing China. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie endowment for international peace. [online]. https://carnegieendowment.org/files/balancing_without_containment.pdf. Accessed 22 May 2018.

  98. Thucydides. 1920. The History of the Peloponnesian War (Trans: Charles Forster). London: Heinemann Ltd.

  99. United Nations Security Council. 2017. United Nations Security Council Resolution S/RES/2397 (adopted on 22 December). New York: United Nations [online]. http://undocs.org/S/RES/2397(2017). Accessed 15 Jan 2018.

  100. Walt, Stephen M. 1987. Origins of Alliances. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.

  101. Waltz, Kenneth N. 1979. Theory of international politics. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.

    Google Scholar 

  102. Wang, Lingxiao. 2017. FM: China, U.S. can sidestep Thucydides Trap, Kindleberger Trap”, CCTV News, 21 March [online]. http://english.cctv.com/2017/03/21/ARTIz3kMcFKNFx717puFAVsa170321.shtml. Accessed 26 Dec 2017.

  103. Waxmann, Olivia B. 2017. How North Korea’s Nuclear History Began. TIME, 7 March [online]. http://time.com/4692045/north-korea-nuclear-weapons-history/. Accessed 10 Jan 2018.

  104. Weeden, Brian, and He, Xiao. 2016. U.S.-China relations in space. In Tanner, Travis, and Dong, Wang. U.S.-China Relations in Strategic Domains. NBR Special Report No. 57. Seattle: The National Bureau of Asian Research, pp. 63–82.

  105. Weeks, Jessica L. Winter. 2008. Autocratic audience costs: Regime type and signaling resolve. International Organization 62 (1): 35–64.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  106. Yang, Yuan. Escape both the ‘Thucydides Trap’ and the ‘Churchill Trap’: Finding a Third Type of Great Power Relations under the Bipolar System. Chinese Journal of International Politics 11(2): 193–235.

  107. Yoon, Sukjoon. 2018. North and South Korea’s New Military Agreement. The Diplomat, 2 October 2018 [online]. https://thediplomat.com/2018/10/north-and-south-koreas-new-military-agreement/. Accessed 21 Nov 2018.

  108. Yuan, Jing-dong. 2009. Identity, nationalism, and China’s policy towards regionalization. In China and the global politics of regionalization, ed. Emilian Kavalski, 63–77. Farnham: Ashgate.

    Google Scholar 

  109. Zarakol, Ayşe. 2017. Hierarchy in world politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgements

Special thanks are awarded to the grant provided by the National Social Science Fund of China (13 & ZD049) and the Chinese Government Scholarship Council for funding provided that made this research possible. Also, we would like to extend our gratitude to Professor Alaric Searle of the University of Salford, Dr. Srdan M. Jovanovic of Nankai University and the anonymous reviewers for the suggestions and improvements they offered.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Zhaoying Han.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Han, Z., Cook, R.J. & Ohle, M. The Thucydides Trap and the Korean Peninsula: So why Won’t the USA and China Get Caught?. J OF CHIN POLIT SCI 24, 105–127 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11366-018-09595-7

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11366-018-09595-7

Keywords

Navigation