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On Media Reports, Politicians, Indirection, and Duplicity

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Abstract

We often say one thing and mean another. This kind of indirection (concerning the content conveyed) is both ubiquitous and widely recognized. Other forms of indirection, however, are less common and less discussed. For example, we can sometimes address one person with the primary intention of being overheard by someone else. And, sometimes speakers say something simply in order to make it possible for someone else to say that they said it. Politicians generating sounds bites for the media are an example of this kind of indirection. In this paper, I will explore—via a series of fictionalized examples—these less discussed forms of indirection and consider how such forms of indirection can be duplicitous and misleading.

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Notes

  1. I should stress at the outset that this paper is exploratory. I also draw on work from different disciplines (e.g., philosophy, linguistics, argument theory, sociology) and even different frameworks within a discipline. By relying on this work, I am not thereby endorsing the entire framework; I am merely making use of a helpful way to illuminate some particular aspect of linguistic communication. For an explicit description of my theoretical commitments, see McGowan (2019).

  2. Grice (1989).

  3. Grice (1989) explores the complex higher-order nature of communicative intentions and Sperber (1994) stresses the complex nature of the mental representations involved.

  4. In Levinson’s own words: Because there are strict constraints on contributions to any particular activity, there are corresponding strong expectations about the functions that any utterance at a certain point in the proceedings can be fulfilling (1979, p. 79).

  5. Some relevant work on the production side includes: Korta and Perry (2011); Lepore and Stone (2015).

  6. Clark and Carlson call this ‘audience design’; it is “fundamental property” of all utterances (1982, p. 342).

  7. Cf. Clark and Carlson (1982); Lewiński (2021).

  8. Some dogwhistles works this way. Saul (2018) calls them overt intentional dogwhistles. See also Khoo (2017) and Witten (2008).

  9. See note 7.

  10. Some of these issues come up with respect to the so-called paradox of the answering machine. See Sidelle (1991); Cohen (2013).

  11. Many dogwhistles rely on the fact that they will be repeated by others. This is how they work. For an exploration of the now infamous Willie Horton ad, see Saul (2018).

  12. Speech act theory has recently been applied to various forms of online speech. For work on sharing, see Arielli (2018); retweeting, see Marsili (2021); liking, see McDonald (2021), and for an understanding of how online speech acts both spread and undermine knowledge, see Labinaz and Sbisà (2021).

  13. For the classic account of indirect speech acts and this very example, see Searle (1979).

  14. Searle (1979). For skepticism about indirect speech acts, see Bertolet (1994).

  15. A similar example occurs in Levinson (1979, pp. 82–84). The lawyer is also aiming to get the questions and answers on the record and this concerns other-agent reuse. According to Clark and Carlson (1982, p. 340), this must also involve their inforrmatives.

  16. One might think that the primary aim here is perlocutionary, rather than illocutionary. On this way of thinking, R’s primary aim is to bring about a causal effect (i.e., get the smoker to give them a cigarette) as a result of that smoker recognizing R’s speech action. I have no objection to thinking about the case this way; it still works via audience indirection.

  17. Defining lies is philosophically challenging. For a survey, see Mahon (2016).

  18. Saul (2012) questions our moral preference for misleading indirection over outright lying.

  19. Clark and Carlson (1982, p. 337) offer an example of an intended overhearer (involving a “pretense of speaking linearly when the primary illocutionary act is lateral and indirect”) that is not covert.

  20. Bach and Harnish (1979). Elsewhere, I mean something else by ‘covert’. McGowan (2019).

  21. According to the traditional definition of lying, an intention to deceive is required. For an overview of the complexities, see Mahon (2016).

  22. T’s utterance presupposes the existence of Santa Claus. van Fraassen (1968) Stalnaker (1973, 1974, 1998); Beaver and Guerts (2011).

  23. For an exploration, see Saul (2018); Witten (2008). See also notes 8 and 11.

  24. Goffman’s distinction between animator, author, and principal could be useful here. Goffman (1981, p. 145).

  25. Arielli (2018); Marsili (2021).

  26. Arielli (2018).

  27. Some regard this to be a widespread phenomenon. See, for example, this from Heather Cox Richardson: “In the first impeachment hearings, Representatives Jim Jordan (R-OH) and John Ratcliffe (R-TX) used their positions to shout and badger witnesses and to create sound bites for right-wing media” (2022).

  28. van Fraassen (1968) Stalnaker (1973, 1974, 1998); Beaver and Guerts (2011).

  29. Langton (2018); Stanley (2015).

  30. Langton (2018).

  31. Again, there are similarities with some types of dogwhistles. See notes 8 and 11. Saul (2018); Witten (2008).

  32. Lewiński and Aakhus (2023).

  33. Johnson (2019); Sbisa (2013); Lewiński (2021).

  34. For other potential forms of multiplicity, see Bach and Harnish (1979) on collateral acts, Langton (2018) on back door speech acts, McGowan (2019) on parallel acts, Clark and Carlson (1985) on informatives, Searle and Vanderveken (1985), and Sbisà (2013) and Johnson (2019) on hearer-dependent illocutionary pluralism.

  35. Lewiński (2021) also argues for multiple primary illocutionary acts even in cases of just one hearer.

  36. Lewis (1983) originally devised the scorekeeping framework in order to account for the phenomenon of accommodation (where participants’ treating something as fair play makes it so). His conception of score is adequate to that task.

  37. Common ground is another. Clark (1996, pp. 62–70); Stalnaker (1973, 1974, 1998). Common ground tracks only certain kinds of participants’ psychological states. For a discussion of the difference between score and common ground as well as their complementarity, see Langton (2012, p. 87); McGowan (2019, pp. 39–50).

  38. Other conceptions of conversational score are less inclusive. See Thomason (1990); Lepore and Stone (2015); Witek (2015); Camp (2018). There are many ways to specify the score in terms of what it tracks and what it is ontologically.

  39. Langton and West (1999); Langton (2012); McGowan (2003, 2004, 2019).

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    Mary Kate McGowan

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McGowan, M.K. On Media Reports, Politicians, Indirection, and Duplicity. Topoi 42, 407–417 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-023-09897-3

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