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Naïve Realism With or Without the Content View: Response to Giananti

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Notes

  1. See Travis (2004), Brewer (2011), Raleigh (2015).

  2. See Byrne (2001), Siegel (2010).

  3. Cf. Giananti (2020, p. 1).

  4. “In effect, this seems to repeat the mistake identified above, namely the conflation between being presented with something (a proposition, an object, an event or a property-instance) and being presented with something as the specific thing that it is)” (Giananti 2020: 3).

  5. This usage goes back to Frege (1956).

  6. For prominent arguments, see Fodor (1978), Field (1978).

  7. That the bearers might be more fundamental than the qualities is not a reason to think that our awareness of the bearers is more fundamental than our awareness of their qualities.

  8. See Ivanov (2017, p. 337) on the alternative which would deny experiences guiding role in comparisons among instances.

  9. Note that views similar to Giananti’s are fairly common among proponents of naïve realism: see Travis (2004), Brewer (2011), Raleigh (2015), and Allen (2015).

  10. See Siegel (2010), Ch. 4.

  11. In this author’s view, this is due to veridical experiences presenting parts of the essence of perceived instances: so, for example, what a perception of an instance of roundness is like in normal circumstances gets inherited from what the perceived roundness is essentially.

  12. This is a significant result in light of the recent proposal of a version of naïve realism this sort (Logue 2014). It also helps contrast naïve realism with elaborate forms or representationalism, such as the views proposed by McDowell (2013) and Schellenberg (2014).

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Acknowledgements

This research was supported by a Humanities and Social Sciences General Research Project of the Chinese Ministry of Education, titled ‘Perceptual Experience: Beyond the Mainstream Intentional Approach’ (21YJA720001).

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  1. Department of Philosophy, Sun Yat-Sen University-Zhuhai, Tangjiawan, Zhuhai, 519082, Guangdong, China

    Ivan V. Ivanov

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Correspondence to Ivan V. Ivanov.

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Ivanov, I.V. Naïve Realism With or Without the Content View: Response to Giananti. Topoi 41, 221–225 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-021-09778-7

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