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Adversarial argumentation and common ground in Aristotle’s Sophistical Refutations

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Abstract

In this paper I provide support for the view that at least some forms of adversariality in argumentation are legitimate. The support comes from Aristotle’s theory of illegitimate adversarial argumentation in dialectical contexts: his theory of eristic in his work On Sophistical Refutations. Here Aristotle develops non-epistemic standards for evaluating the legitimacy of dialectical procedures, standards which I propose can be understood in terms of the pragmatic notion of context as common ground. Put briefly, Aristotle makes the answerer’s meaning in giving assent in dialectical contexts the basis for further moves in the game of dialectic. Moves which subvert the answerer’s meaning or do not solicit the answerer’s consent are marked as eristic, i.e. adversarial in a problematic sense. I conclude with remarks on what Aristotle’s theory may teach us about how semantic features relate to the normative evaluation of argumentation.

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Notes

  1. Moulton (1983), 153.

  2. As Moulton correctly points out (1983: 163, n. 11), these dialogues place emphasis on contrasting combative procedures with cooperative ones. In the Euthydemos, Socrates emphasizes the protreptic function of philosophy (Euthyd. 275a–b) and offers his own refutation of Kleinias as a kind of counter-model to that of the sophist brothers Dionysodoros and Euthydemos (Euthyd. 278e–279b). In the Gorgias Socrates draws attention to a salient difference between his mode of argument and rhetorical proof, namely that he only requires the testimony and consent of his interlocutor for the introduction of premisses, whereas rhetoric argumentation operates on the basis of extrinsic evidence such as reputable opinions (Gorg. 471d–472d).

  3. The distinction between these two types of dialectic is made in Top. Θ3–4. An axiom for the acceptance of premisses in dialectical inquiry is theorized in Top. Θ5, the rules derived from this axiom are developed in Top. Θ6.

  4. See Hundelby 2010, who adopts the notion of the adversarial paradigm from Moulton 1983. Hundleby argues that fallacy theory pedagogy in the form of critical thinking textbooks has contributed to this paradigm by (among other things) assuming a dismissive attitude to argument repair.

  5. For a defense of adversarial roles in argumentation under the assumption that its telos is epistemic betterment, see Stevens and Cohen 2019. Though the goal of dialectical argumentation on Aristotle’s conception of it is not epistemic betterment (at least not primarily), his theory of eristic invokes norms of cooperation through properly pursued adversariality which gives support to this defense.

  6. Aristotle recognizes another type of faulty argumentation, “pseudo-demonstration” (paralogismos), which accomplishes real deduction on the basis of premisses which are specific to a field of knowledge but are false (Top. Α 2, 101a13–15). This term is occasionally used by Aristotle in a wider sense, to denote fallacious argumentation in general see e.g. Rhet. Β 25, 1402b25–26.

  7. Wieland 1962, 159, followed by Hadot 1980, 310–312.

  8. Wieland 1962, 160 cites as further examples of contexts in which pragma must be thought of as linguistic or propositional Top. Ζ7, 146a6 (where the definition is said, ideally, to be identical to the “thing”, i.e. pragma) and Top. Α5, 102a18–19 (where the specific difference is said to be that which belongs to an item alone and which can be predicated in the place of the pragma). Clearly in these cases pragma is being used to refer to a linguistic item representing what is under discussion. As Wieland 1962, 160 puts it: “Es gehört zur Phänomenologie der Aussage, daß dieses „Worüber “der theoretischen Unterscheidung von Sachbereich und Sprachbereich gegenüber indifferent ist”.

  9. This will be seen in the interpretation of the qualified account of refutation which Aristotle gives in SE 5, 167a23–27, where the refutation is a contradiction of “one and the same thing, not of the name alone but of the object”. See Malink 2015, 269, who cites Alexander, in An. Pr. ii.1, 372.29–30: “deduction has its being not in expressions, but in what is signified by them” For an important qualification of this position in SE 6, see Malink 2014.

  10. For Aristotle’s account of sophistical refutation by form of expression, see SE 4, 166b10–19 and Dorion 1995, 230–232. The example which Aristotle gives there for this type of fallacy involves the use of a present infinitive suffix (−ein).

  11. See Fait 2007, 132 ad loc. on the role of the tode ti in explicating the function of a predicate.

  12. A simple statement is “significant spoken sound about whether something does or does not hold (in one of the divisions of time)” (De Int. 5, 17a23–24).

  13. De Int. 7, 17a38–b3: “Since some things are universal and others are particular – by universal I mean things which can be predicated of many, and by particular I mean that which cannot; for example man is a universal and Callias is a particular – so it must be the case that when one says one thing holds of another, this is sometimes of a universal and sometimes of a particular”.

  14. On the text, see Hasper 2013, 53–54 (which lists Hasper’s deviations from Ross’ edition).

  15. The notion of context as common ground is developed in a series of publications by Robert Stalnaker. For the purposes of understanding Aristotle’s theory, concept of common ground given in Stalnaker 2014, 24–25 will be sufficient and appropriate.

  16. Stalnaker 2014, 55–56 summarizes the notion of pragmatic presupposition as a relation between a speaker and a proposition. If a speaker takes a proposition to be common ground, she makes a pragmatic presupposition. The objective of pragmatic presupposition theory is then to explain what sort of constraints are in force with regard to the context, i.e. the common ground of the discourse situation at any given moment in time.

  17. Lewis 1979, 340 formulates a first, working version of the rule of accommodation for presupposition as: “If at time t something is said that requires presupposition P to be acceptable, and if P is not presupposed just before t, then – ceteris paribus and within certain limits – presupposition P comes into existence at t.”.

  18. Cf. the slightly abridged, two-fold definition of eristic argumentation in SE 2, 165b8–9: “Eristic arguments (λόγοι: see 165a38) are those upon the basis of items which seem to be endoxa but are not, and which are either deductively conclusive, or seem to be”.

  19. The visual metaphor features in Aristotle’s introduction of the notion of merely apparent refutation in SE 1. As he puts it following a comparison between argumentation and real and false gold, “In the same way, one thing is deduction and refutation, the other only seems to be, and this on account of inexperience, for the inexperienced are like those who look from further away” (164b25–27).

  20. The usual translations of Top. Α 1, 100b29–101a1 as describing some minimal cognitive capacity – “those capable of even modest discernment” (Smith 1997, 1); “even to persons with little power of comprehension” (Pickard-Cambridge in Barnes 1984, 167) – are thus misleading in light of the importance of perceiving “details” on the Aristotelian psychology of argumentation. More on this passage in the discussion of eristic argumentation below.

  21. Ebbesen 2011, 78 n. 4 cites several passages in which Aristotle mentions a “listener” or “listeners”: SE 1165a15–17; SE 8, 169b30–32; SE 15, 174a35–36; SE 22, 178a20–23. He convincingly makes the case for an audience-sensitive (and thus in this sense context-sensitive) conception of argumentation in the SE.

  22. See Reinhardt 2015 and in particular Fait 1998.

  23. ἔλεγχος μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἀντίφασις τοῦ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἑνός, μὴ ὀνόματος ἀλλὰ πράγματος, καὶ ὀνόματος μὴ συν-ωνύμου ἀλλὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, ἐκ τῶν δοθέντων ἐξ ἀνάγκης (μὴ συναριθμουμένου τοῦ ἐν ἀρχῇ), κατὰ ταὐτὸ καὶ πρὸς ταὐτὸ καὶ ὡσαύτως καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ. See Dorion 1995, 239; Fait 2007, 120; Malink 2014, 155–156. Whereas elsewhere συνώνυμον refers to things which have the same name and definition, here, as Fait points out (ad loc.), συνώνυμα are different words which signify the same thing. For this use of συνώνυμον see also Rhet. Γ2, 1405a1.

  24. Dorion 1995, 239.

  25. See Morison 2011, 187, in speaking of Aristotle’s treatment of Barbara: “he locates the explanation of the validity of such arguments in what the premisses say: if things are to be as the premisses say they are, then such-and-such must be the case”.

  26. But see Malink 2014, 164–168, who persuasively argues that in SE 6 Aristotle also considers deduction as a consequence relation between linguistic items, i.e. expressions of a language.

  27. Fait 2007, xvii–xxi; Malink 2014, 169–173.

  28. See Cat. 1, 1a1–6: “Things are said to be homonymous when they have only a name in common, but the definition of their being is different according to the name. For example: both a human being and a drawing are called an animal, but they only have the name in common, whereas the definition of the being which corresponds to the name differs for each. For if one gives a definition of what it is for each of these things to be an animal, one will give each its own definition”. On the notion of homonymy in Aristotle, see Shields 1999 and Barnes 1971, 75–79. Barnes distinguishes five uses of the adjective ὁμώνυμος (based on Bonitz’s Index and Aristotle’s Topics) and defends the interpretive thesis that none of them force us to understand “homonymous” items as linguistic ones. I accept his conclusions, and therefore have chosen to refer to homonymous “items”, even if (as Barnes notes: 77–78) Top. Α15 is one of the places in the Organon where such items seem to be conceived linguistically. On the tests for homonymy in Top. Α15, see Shields 1999, 50–56.

  29. The concept of speaker meaning was introduced by Grice 1957. For a helpful introduction to the concept and its history, see Kemmerling 2013.

  30. On the notion of a constitutive rule and its application to communication, see Searle 2018.

  31. The use of epistemic language is salient in this passage of Top. Α18, with four instances of the verb “to know”: 108a19, a27, a28, a31.

  32. The example Aristotle cites in this connection is strange: “calling a person a plane-tree” (109a31–32). It is reasonable to assume that stipulative but aberrant expressions like this were employed not just to be bizarre, but to set up a refutation through an argument scheme which employed the term introduced.

  33. De int. 2, 16a26–28: “I say “by convention”, because no name is a name by nature, but only when it becomes a symbol. Even inarticulate noises, for example of beasts, indicate something, but not as a name of that which they indicate”. Aristotle thus takes a side in an already existing debate on the nature of signification which we find in Plato’s Cratylus. On convention in Aristotle’s theory of signification, see Crivelli 2009, 83–88.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, Providence College, Providence, RI, 02918, USA

    Colin Guthrie King

  2. Philosophisches Seminar, Universität Heidelberg, Schulgasse, 69117, Heidelberg, Germany

    Colin Guthrie King

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King, C.G. Adversarial argumentation and common ground in Aristotle’s Sophistical Refutations. Topoi 40, 939–950 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-020-09734-x

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