Abstract
In this paper we discuss three different kinds of disagreement that have been, or could reasonably be, characterized as deep disagreements. Principle level disagreements are disagreements over the truth of epistemic principles. Sub-principle level deep disagreements are disagreements over how to assign content to schematic norms. Finally, framework-level disagreements are holistic disagreements over meaning not truth, that is over how to understand networks of epistemic concepts and the beliefs those concepts compose. Within the context of each of these kinds of disagreement it is not possible for the parties to the dispute to rationally persuade one another through only offering epistemic reasons for their conflicting points of view. However, in spite of the inability to rationally persuade, we explore how it may nevertheless be possible to rationally navigate each of these varieties of deep disagreement.
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Notes
Unless we explicitly state otherwise, when we use the expression ‘deep disagreement’ we are referring to deep epistemic disagreements.
As one reviewer points out, there are two possible interpretations of this ‘recognize’ requirement for rational persuasion. On the one hand, a strong reading of ‘recognize’ would require that one have good reasons to know, or reasonably believe, that the premises provide enough support for the conclusion. On the other hand, ‘recognize’ may be read weakly, requiring that one is in a position to access reasons to know, or reasonably believe, that there are good reasons supporting the belief. Weighing in on this issue here, however, is beyond the scope of the present paper. As far as we can tell, whichever reading is preferred should be compatible with the positions taken in this paper.
Some may wonder whether the characterization of deep disagreement should leave open the possibility that deep disagreements could be resolved drawing on epistemic reasons. We think not. The reason is that, if that were the case, there would be a class of deep disagreements that are resolvable drawing on epistemic reasons and a class of deep disagreements that are not so resolvable. We think it is clearer to simply say that some disagreements are very intractable and difficult, without being “deep” and other disagreements are “deep” (in these sense that they can’t be resolved drawing on epistemic reasons).
We will call a cogent argument that draws on epistemic reasons alone an epistemically cogent argument.
This norm is modified for present purposes from the statement of a testimonial norm found in Goldman (2010, p. 197).
There are a few things that should be noted about D-norm. First, D-norm is a modification of Pritchard’s (2016, p. 13) formulation of a closure principle. Of course, a closure principle is different from a norm governing belief formation based on competent deductions. Closure principles are supposed to capture the thought that “knowledge” is closed under known entailments. Norms governing belief formation tell us what doxastic attitudes are reasonable under which circumstances. Pritchard formulates a closure principle that holds that, if the antecedent of (D-Norm) is true, then S knows that p. This is different than what D-norm says. According to D-norm, the truth of its antecedent implies that S should believe that p. The purpose of D-norm is not to make any kind of commitment on the discussions on closure in the epistemology literature. Rather, the purpose is to merely express the plausible thought that, if one knows a proposition p and correctly deduces another proposition q from p, while maintaining knowledge that p, then there is some epistemic obligation to believe that q. The second thing to note about D-norm is that we qualify the obligation as an epistemic obligation. The reason for this qualification is that it is conceivable that there may be practical reasons not to believe q. Perhaps belief in q is psychologically uncomfortable for some reason or other and, thus, there is at least some practical reason not to believe that p. Finally, the third point that I want to note about D-norm is that it specifically employs the notion of an ‘admissible logic’ as opposed to just a ‘logic.’ There are several proposals for characterizing which logics are among the set of admissible, or correct, logics (Shapiro 2014, Chap. 2; Beall and Restall 2006; DeVidi 2010; Kouri Kissel 2018; Simard Smith forthcoming). While the details of this issue are beyond the scope of this discussion, it is worth noting that, plausibly, a norm that specifies what is reasonable to believe about a proposition p that one has competently deduced from other beliefs, should restrict its attention to competent deductions that accord with correct, or admissible, logics.
The feature a disagreement possesses when it extends to a wide variety of domains is most probably breadth rather than depth. Some disagreements with wide breadth may be deep and others not.
Someone may reasonably form the impression that talk of ‘levels’ of deep disagreement is meant to refer to the degree of depth of the deep disagreement. Perhaps the thought goes that a level-2 deep disagreement is of a deeper of depth than a level-1 deep disagreement. We have no intention to talk of grades of depth among deep disagreements here. For our purposes each variant of disagreement is equally deep, so to speak, since they are all resistant to resolution through a give and take of reasons. The explanation of the depth may vary from one case to the next. However, that need not entail that different levels are of different degrees of depth.
Many thanks for an anonymous reviewer for pressing us on these objections on the level-1/level-2 distinction.
Christopher Ranalli also discusses this point in his “What is Deep Disagreement” (Ranalli 2018).
There is considerable discussion within the literature on framework propositions as to whether these are the kind of propositions to which agents should be understood as adopting the propositional attitude of belief. Some have argued that one can only adopt the attitude of commitment towards framework propositions. See Prichard (2015), for example. In order to clarify, our point here is that Fogelin style disagreement is not best modeled, or conceptualized, in terms of conviction or belief towards a specified set of discrete propositions or principles. Rather, it operates at a different level. Certainly people who find themselves in such a disagreement may identify various particular framework propositions, facts or epistemic principles to which they would hold contrary convictions. However, the disagreement pivots around clashing frameworks or conflicting worldviews rather than propositions or principles, as Fogelin himself argues (Fogelin 2005, pp. 8–9). We develop this point further, with more discussion and an example shortly.
It is worth noting that Lynch is not committed to deep disagreement turning on one framework proposition, or one epistemic principle. While Lynch’s (2010, 2016) discussions of deep disagreement present deep disagreements in terms of disputes over specific FESPs, given what he says it is conceivable that deep disagreement could be nested and involve several epistemic principles. Note, however, that it is still possible that agent’s may share an epistemic position, in the sense characterized above, and disagree over several epistemic principles. Disagreements that emerge at the level of frameworks will vary both with respect to several epistemic principles and with respect to epistemic position.
For discussion of proposals for resolving deep disagreements see Lugg (1986), Campolo (2005), Feldman (2005), Godden and Brenner (2010), Sunstein (2018). As well, Lynch (2010, 2016) discusses an approach to resolving deep disagreement he calls the “epistemic method game.” Very roughly the idea is that agents who are unaware of their “social and educational position” and also unaware of what principles are reliable—are behind an epistemic veil of ignorance so to speak—would agree to principles that are accessible to anyone, open to public revision and non-secret (Lynch 2016). For some interesting discussion and criticisms of Lynch’s solution to deep disagreement see Kappel (2012).
Note there could be quite a divergence here. For example, one party to the dispute may understand “religious perspectives should be taught in schools” as part of academic religious studies programing so students learn about the history, beliefs and practices associated with a variety of different religious and spiritual traditions, including problematic episodes within a given religion’s history. The other may understand this statement to include teaching intelligent design or young earth creationism, or views along those lines.
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Smith, P.S., Lynch, M.P. Varieties of Deep Epistemic Disagreement. Topoi 40, 971–982 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-020-09694-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-020-09694-2