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The Epistemic Significance of Religious Disagreements: Cases of Unconfirmed Superiority Disagreements

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Abstract

Religious disagreements are widespread. Some philosophers have argued that religious disagreements call for religious skepticism, or a revision of one’s religious beliefs. In order to figure out the epistemic significance of religious disagreements, two questions need to be answered. First, what kind of disagreements are religious disagreements? Second, how should one respond to such disagreements? In this paper, I argue that many religious disagreements are cases of unconfirmed superiority disagreements, where parties have good reason to think they are not epistemic peers, yet they lack good reason to determine who is superior. Such disagreements have been left relatively unexplored. I then argue that in cases of unconfirmed superiority disagreements, disputants can remain relatively steadfast in holding to their beliefs. Hence, we can remain relatively steadfast in our beliefs in such cases of religious disagreements.

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Notes

  1. See for example Feldman (2007), Kraft (2012) and Matheson (2017).

  2. See for example Bergmann (2015), Bogardus (2013), DePoe (2011), Pittard (2014) and King (2012).

  3. See for example Frances (2015), Kraft (2012), Lackey (2014) and Matheson (2017).

  4. See for example Bergmann (2015), Bogardus (2013), DePoe (2011), Oppy (2010) and Pittard (2014).

  5. See for example Sherman (2015) and arguably Feldman (2007).

  6. Some take peer disagreement to be cases where disputants are in actual fact peers, or cases where one takes the other to be a peer, or cases where one justifiably takes one as a peer. I take peer disagreement to be cases in which one has reason to take the other party as a peer.

  7. See for example Feldman (2007).

  8. See for example Christensen (2011), Elga (2007), Matheson (2017).

  9. See for example Bergmann (2009, 2015), Kelly (2005), Lackey (2010).

  10. See for example Kelly (2005, pp. 174–175), Matheson (2015, p. 22), King (2012, p. 252).

  11. To note, there may also be circumstantial factors that causes one not to assess the evidence reliably in a particular dispute. For example, one may be overly tired on a particular occasion when weighing the evidence. Hence, what is required is being in equal epistemic positions in the particular dispute, and not just merely generally (Matheson 2015, p. 23).

  12. See for example Christensen (2011), Elga (2007), Matheson (2015).

  13. Elga (2007) takes peer disagreement to occur when both parties are equally likely to be right in the particular occasion.

  14. See for example King (2012), Elga (2007, p. 492) and Lackey (2010, pp. 311–312).

  15. To note, the disputant’s agreement must be independent of your assessment.

  16. This term comes from Sherman (2015, p. 427).

  17. An error theory is a theory one has about why others are in error. For example, if I meet someone who is drinking a lot of alcohol and disagrees with me on an intellectual issue, I have an error theory, namely that the alcohol he drinks causes cognitive malfunction.

  18. See for example Frances (2015), Kraft (2012), Lackey (2014) and Matheson (2017).

  19. See for example Bergmann (2015), Bogardus (2013), DePoe (2011), Oppy (2010) and Pittard (2014).

  20. See for example Sherman (2015) and arguably Feldman (2007).

  21. They might for example agree on propositions with a logical disjunction such as <either God exists or God does not exist>.

  22. This can be seen in the Calvinism versus Arminianism theological debate.

  23. Moser (2010, pp. 142–184) for example rejects natural theology outright, thinking that natural theology provides evidence that is impersonal which is not what we should expect from God.

  24. One reviewer has pointed out that this may further give us reason to dismiss the other party as a peer. The fact that both parties appeal to epistemic methods or standards which the other party find unacceptable seems to hint that they are not peers in regards to the issue at hand.

  25. To be precise, Plantinga thinks that the faculty is damaged by sin but under certain conditions, such as the Holy Spirit working in a person, the faculty will function properly.

  26. DePoe (2011, pp. 109–110) claims that “many non-Christians have rejected Christianity on the grounds that they want to believe that they are the ultimate authority of their lives.” This fear of submitting to God is a cognitive defect. As examples, he cites Thomas Nagel and C. S. Lewis in his pre-Christian state of mind.

  27. Thune (2010, p. 720) uses this example when it comes to the Buddhist doctrine of ‘‘dependent origination’’ (which teaches that ‘everything is a stream of mental activity in constant flux’).

  28. One reviewer raises an objection here. Since there is a possibility that the person is an epistemic superior, I should be uncertain whether I should doubt. If I am uncertain whether I should doubt, then I should doubt. In reply, I do not see why this is so. Given that I believe a proposition and have reasons for my belief, and I am uncertain whether there are good reasons to doubt, it does not seem that I should end up in doubt.

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Acknowledgements

I wish to acknowledge the funding for this project from Nanyang Technological University under the Undergraduate Research Experience on CAmpus (URECA) programme. For suggestions and comments, I like to thank Chris Suhler, Preston Greene, Adam Elga, Esther Goh, Andrew Loke, Max Deutsch, the participants at the Haifa Philosophy of Religion Conference 2018, the two anonymous reviewers at Topoi and also guest editors Pat Bondy and David Godden.

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Correspondence to Frederick Choo.

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Choo, F. The Epistemic Significance of Religious Disagreements: Cases of Unconfirmed Superiority Disagreements. Topoi 40, 1139–1147 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-018-9599-4

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