Abstract
There are two central kinds of epistemological mistakes: believing things you shouldn’t, and failing to believe things that you should. The knowledge-first program offers a canonical explanation for the former: if you believe something without knowing it, you violate the norm to believe only that which you know. But the explanation does not extend in any plausible way to a story about what’s wrong with suspending judgment when one ought to believe. In this paper I explore prospects for a knowledge-centering account of positive epistemic norms that describe epistemic duties to believe.
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Notes
This paper, like the knowledge-first project generally, focuses on the epistemic evaluations of committal doxastic states like belief. There are other epistemic norms too, such as those governing credences; they are not my project.
For example, Pace (2011, p. 246), Miracchi (2019), Ichikawa (2020), and Gardiner (2021) all commit to positive epistemic norms, but do little to actually establish them beyond pointing to cases that seem like obvious examples. Feldman (2000, p. 678)’s evidentialism implies the existence of positive norms, which Feldman recognizes and seems to consider unremarkable. However, situating Feldman’s approach into my question here is somewhat complex, as he appears to employ quite a weak notion of belief, according to which one ought to believe P when the evidence makes P even slightly more likely than its negation, if one considers the question. In the knowledge-first tradition I’m focused on in this paper, belief is a much more committal attitude; I do not, and should not, believe that the roll of a six-sided die will be less than 6. Simion (forthcoming) is a clear example of a project in a similar spirit to mine, explicitly committed to positive epistemic norms, and interested in explaining them in a knowledge-first framework. (In the draft of that paper that is currently available at the time I am writing, Simion does not engage with arguments against positive epistemic norms.) Francesco Praolini has told me he is developing arguments focused on establishing positive epistemic norms in work in progress.
Other authors emphasize positive norms requiring belief, but not specifically epistemic ones. Goldberg (2017), for example, defends interpersonal norms demanding knowledge (and so demanding belief), but these are norms that derive from our obligations to one another as people, not from epistemology itself.
Some of this discussion has played out in the context of discussions about the viability of so-called “epistemic deontology,” in the light of the apparent involuntariness of belief. Epistemic deontologists like Feldman (2000) and Chrisman (2008) do explicitly defend the view that there are obligations to believe, but their focus is more on whether there are genuine obligations in the doxastic realm. The same is true of related projects like Kornblith (2001), which focuses on the relationship between epistemic obligations and epistemic internalism—they say little or nothing about the difference between obligations to believe, and obligations not to; they do not engage arguments to the effect that there are epistemic obligations, but only negative ones.
Some attribute a similar status for ideas that, they say, are empirically well-supported, but where believing them would be racist. See e.g. Gendler (2011) and Zimmerman (2018, p. 136). The idea that these beliefs are sufficiently empirically well-supported to satisfy the epistemic norms is controversial; some deny it by embracing moral encroachment, holding that the moral features of the situation raise the bar for epistemically permissible belief. See e.g. Basu (2019), Fritz (2020), Moss (2018). Others argue that even by ordinary standards, beliefs of this type are not epistemically justified. See Munton (2019).
Fricker (2007, ch. 1).
Dandelet (2021, p. 498) gives one way of developing such a strategy. Moral and practical considerations, on Dandelet’s view, come into play within the scope of the epistemically permissible. However, see Simion (forthcoming) for an argument that moral blameworthiness depends on epistemic norms.
For the theoretical framework behind explaining away intuitions, see Ichikawa (2009).
Clifford (1879) seemed to think that epistemic norms—at least the negative ones he emphasized—always carried moral significance. (I say he seemed to, because he does not write entirely clearly about the distinction.) He argues, for example, that even insufficiently-justified beliefs about trivial matters are morally prohibited, because they will inevitably lead to careless belief-forming dispositions, which are ultimately likely to lead to moral harm. I do not know whether Clifford is right about this. If he is, the same should go for positive epistemic norms. But since the moral implications of these epistemic failures are controversial and far from obvious, focusing on these cases can still help us to recognize the operation of epistemic norms, independently from moral ones.
Cases like this are part of what motivate discussion of normative constraints on suspension of judgment. See e.g. Sosa (2019) and Miracchi (2019). The idea that suspension can be prohibited is closely related to the idea that belief can be required. This case also has important features in common with Mona Simion’s (forthcoming) “Perceptual Non-Responsiveness” case.
“The Pyrrhonist, if such a person is possible, complies with all three [negative] norms even in the sceptical scenario. ... Non-sceptics may find little to admire in the Pyrrhonist’s self-imposed ignorance, especially when that ignorance concerns the needs of others. There may be positive norms for knowledge, such as a norm enjoining knowledge-gathering in various circumstances, and so positive as well as negative norms for beliefs.” Williamson (forthcoming) Williamson’s invocation of the needs of others may suggest that he thinks positive norms might be primarily moral ones.
I take up that project further in Ichikawa (forthcoming).
The point of disanalogy I focus on is quite different from ones other theorists have identified. Mcglynn (2014, pp. 32–33), Goldberg (2015, pp. 167–8), and Willard-Kyle (2020), for instance, each emphasize the publicity of assertion, in contrast with the privacy of belief. Like me, they provide reasons to expect these norms to differ from one another, but they will pull in quite different ways. (Indeed, Willard-Kyle’s ultimate view ends up close to the converse of my own: he accepts a knowledge norm of belief, but rejects the knowledge norm of assertion in favour of a position-to-know norm of assertion similar to the one I will discuss for belief in Sect. 5.)
In these abbreviations, K is for knowledge, A and B are for assertion and belief, g is for governing, and o-is for a negative ‘ought’ norm.
For critiques of the knowledge norm of belief along these lines, see McGlynn (2013), Hughes (2017), Schechter (2017, p. 138). For replies, see Littlejohn (forthcoming), Williamson (forthcoming).
Some epistemologists have denied that knowledge requires belief—see e.g. Radford (1966). But most, including typical defenders of knowledge norms, accept this requirement.
See Whitcomb (2014, p. 93) for a similar argument against this way of characterizing the knowledge norm of belief.
This quote is ambiguous between this and a different reading, concerning constraints on positive norms—namely, that if one doesn’t know p, it is false that one ought to believe p (but allowing that it might be permissible to do so). In the broader context it is clear that Williamson’s intention is the negative norm. Some philosophers give statements that are ambiguous in English between this problematic norm and a more plausible wide-scope one; e.g. Sutton’s (2007, p. 19) “one ought not believe that p unless one knows that p,” which, for reasons of charity, we should probably read as \(\Box (\lnot Kp \rightarrow \lnot Bp)\), rather than the implausible \(\lnot Kp \rightarrow \Box \lnot Bp\). Perhaps Williamson’s statement quoted above was also intended that way with a wide-scope obligation, although I’m not sure the English sentence in question can deliver that reading without further punctuation. Elsewhere when he intends wide-scope norms, Williamson punctuates to indicate as much, as in e.g. “One must: assert p only if one knows p”. Williamson (2000, p. 243)
However, I don’t see any particular case for a positive epistemic norm of assertion, the way I argued in Sect. 2 that there is one for belief. So it would actually be less of a problem if one’s assertion norm ruled that out.
CK here is for counterfactual knowledge.
Whitcomb (2014, p. 96–7) offers a case with a similar structure, making a similar point. I largely agree with Whitcomb’s discussion of that case, although I think it is helpful to distinguish, as he does not, the positive from the negative knowledge norms of belief. Whitcomb considers many examples of possible ways to draw the connection between knowledge and whether one ought to believe, but he exclusively considers norms that involve biconditionals that identify a condition as both necessary and sufficient for appropriate belief—either wide-scope norms of the form \(\Box (S\) believes
, or narrow-scope norms of the form 
believes P). Section 6 below gives reason to reject the assumption that the positive and negative norms are symmetric in this way.The philosophical locus classicus is Lewis (1973). I do not assume the details of Lewis’s account—the commitments about counterfactual conditionals I rely on are shared by a wide orthodoxy, including Stalnaker (1968), Kratzer (2012), Ichikawa (2011), Moss (2012), Lewis (2015) and many more. (Not all these accounts invoke the language of ‘closeness’ or ‘similarity’ of possible worlds, but they do all endorse the idea that the possibility of A & C doesn’t suffice for its being true that
. That’s all I assume here. In particular, I make no assumption about the controversial ‘conditional excluded middle’.)I do have an argument against the particular letter of \(\textit{PKB}_{o+}\)—I’ll articulate it in Sect. 6.
This challenge is similar in spirit to one of the main ideas of Whitcomb (2014), namely that “[i]f a knowledge-first theory of what we should believe (and what we should withhold belief on) ... [cannot] be made to work, then that is some reason to reject the knowledge-first approach to epistemology as a whole.” (p. 89.) But Whitcomb is neutral in his paper on whether this condition is met.
Yli-Vakkuri (forthcoming, n. 2) go so far as to attribute the wide contemporary use of the term to Williamson. But this seems to be an exaggeration: Shope (1983) uses the notion at length, attributing it to Ernest Sosa (1974; 1979). Thanks to Steven Diggin for pointing this out to me.
Willard-Kyle (2020) defends the view that being in a position to know is the central norm of assertion; his view too fits poorly with the knowledge-first project for this reason. Consistency with that project is not one of his stated ambitions, but he does describe his view as one that preserves “Williamson’s (etc.) insight that knowledge is central to assertion.” (p. 348) It does so only on the assumption that knowledge is central to being in a position to know, which is not something to take for granted in this context. Indeed, Sosa (1974), which seems to have introduced the phrase ‘position to know’ into the epistemological canon, attempted to use it in the service of an analysis of knowledge.
The same goes for other candidate facsimiles for propositional justification. So my argument does not turn on the invocation of the position to know in particular. It extends, for instance, against the “sufficient evidence” criterion for duties to believe discussed in the drafts of Simion (forthcoming) currently available at the time I’m writing.
What’s important for these counterexamples is that it’s epistemically permissible not to have an opinion; it doesn’t matter, for the evaluation of the principle, whether there might be moral or other reasons to be opinionated. However, as in my Sect. 2 discussion of the intuitive case for positive epistemic norms in the first place, the clearest examples of such cases will be ones where no norm whatsoever is violated by ignoring the question. So I’ll focus on such cases here.
For example, a person with normal vision who sees but does not pay attention to the birds flying in front of them might tacitly believe, even tacitly know, that there are birds flying in front of them. Nelson (2010, p. 87)
Ichikawa and Jarvis (2013, pp. 284–288), Ichikawa and Jarvis (forthcoming). See also Smithies (2015) for a similar commitment.
In Ichikawa and Jarvis (2013) we did not emphasize the relevance of the question arising, although we did have it in mind, and stipulated that feature in the relevant cases where we said there was a rational requirement to believe, e.g. on pp. 132, 166.
Feldman (2000, pp. 678–679) anticipates the Nelson-style objection to positive norms, and makes a move quite similar to the one I here suggest. As indicated in fn. 2, however, Feldman is working with a much weaker conception of belief than I am.
“Q” here is for considering the question, and “\(\Box \)” is for the idea that one is required do so. I have omitted the “K” from the previous names, letting “P” stand for position to know. I also omit the “B” for belief here, as I am only considering belief norms at this time.
\(^{\Box }{} \textit{QP}_{o+}\), with its more normative condition, may have a more intuitive extension, insofar as one thinks that one makes an epistemic mistake by failing to consider, and know, something they that was important to their interests. Cf. Greenberg (2020, p. 3287). But it also comes with deeper theoretical challenges, especially if one is committed to a knowledge-first framework—one owes a story about the circumstances under which one should consider a question.
Nelson (2010, p. 89), emphasis in original.
Nelson (2010, p. 86).
Sutton (2007, p. 19): “I will not in general be concerned to argue that there are any positive epistemic obligations, and, indeed, I am inclined to think that the vast majority of beliefs that one ought to hold are such for nonepistemic reasons.” Wrenn (2007, p. 117): “Epistemic duties are doxastic duties that are grounded in purely epistemic considerations, such as what evidence one has.” Littlejohn (2012, p. 48): “If the ends were not epistemic in nature, it is not clear why there would be distincively epistemic obligations to form the beliefs that suited these non-epistemic ends.”
Sosa (2019, p. 361) notes that “[it] is crucial in epistemology to distinguish theory of knowledge from theory of inquiry.” If Sosa is right, and if norms on belief depend on norms of inquiry, then the knowledge-first project is bound to be seriously incomplete.
Details of theorists’ commitments vary; one might defend pragmatic encroachment about knowledge, which would commit one to the denial of purism if one adopts a knowledge norm for belief. Or one might accept a different norm on belief, but accept pragmatic encroachment about it. See Ichikawa et al. (2012), Rubin (2015) on the significance of these distinctions. Pragmatic encroachment is defended by Weatherson (2017), Kim (2016), Stanley (2005), Fantl and McGrath (2009), Weatherson (2011). Moral encroachment is defended by Basu (2019), Fritz (2020), Bolinger (2020), Pace (2011), Moss (2018). The “subject-sensitive invariantism” of Hawthorne (2004) also denies purism, even though it is arguably not a pragmatic or moral encroachment view.
Indeed, the very notion of a non-epistemic consideration becomes somewhat obscure under close scrutiny. See Ichikawa (2017, pp. 32–33).
Thanks to two referees for this journal for helpful feedback. For further helpful conversations and advice on topics related to this paper, I’m grateful to Matt Benton, Pat Bondy, Charles Côté-Bouchard, Marc-Kevin Daoust, Will Fleisher, Daniel Greco, Shane Hendrix, Carrie Jenkins, Chris Kelp, Clayton Littlejohn, Graham Seth Moore, Jennifer Nagel, Ángel Pinillos, Kathryn Pogin, Francesco Praolini, Olle Risberg, Mona Simion, Daniele Sgaravatti, Maxim Smyrnyi, Dennis Whitcomb, and Christopher Willard-Kyle. I’m especially grateful to Alisabeth Ayars, Steven Diggin, Devin Morse, Carrie Jenkins, and Jonathan Weinberg for detailed comments on an early draft of this paper. Thanks to Alex Bryant for help with proof-reading. Work on this paper was supported in part by a SSHRC Insight Grant on rape culture and epistemology.
, or narrow-scope norms of the form 
believes P). Section 
. That’s all I assume here. In particular, I make no assumption about the controversial ‘conditional excluded middle’.)References
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Ichikawa, J.J. You ought to have known: positive epistemic norms in a knowledge-first framework. Synthese 200, 400 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-022-03872-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-022-03872-y