Abstract
I argue that a standard formulation of hinge epistemology is host to epistemic relativism and show that two leading hinge approaches (Coliva’s acceptance account and Pritchard’s non-doxastic account) are vulnerable to a form of incommensurability that leads to relativism. Building on both accounts, I introduce a new, minimally epistemic conception of hinges that avoids epistemic relativism and rationally resolves hinge disagreements. According to my proposed account, putative cases of epistemic incommensurability are rationally resolvable: hinges are propositions that are the objects of our belief-like attitudes and are rationally revisable in virtue of our overarching commitment to avoid systematic deception in our epistemic practices.
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Notes
This motivation for relativism can be found in Kusch (2013, 2016a) and Carter (2017); see also Baghramian and Coliva (2019, ch. 7). Furthermore, there are different definitions of relativism, as well as different arguments that motivate it [arguments from underdetermination (Barnes and Bloor 1982) and semantic considerations (MacFarlane 2014; Kölbel 2003)]. In this paper, I will work with a formulation of relativism from incommensurable disagreements as this is a form of relativism that seems most pressing for hinge epistemology.
An exception is Williams (2007), who thinks that Dependence, Pluralism and Equal validity are sufficient for relativism, provided the relativist argues that justifications for epistemic systems are inevitably circular.
See Coliva (2016).
Cf. Coliva (2015, p. 34).
Cf. Coliva (2015, p. 177).
In order to be in a hinge disagreement, the parties in a dispute need not disagree explicitly over hinges. Hinge disagreements are disagreements rooted in differences in hinges, and not in the conscious dispute over what are the right hinges of a given epistemic practice. On the possibility and intelligibility of there being disagreement over hinges such as “there are physical objects”, see Coliva and Palmira (forthcoming).
A classic discussion of this disagreement in the context of epistemic relativism is Rorty (1979). See also Boghossian (2006), and Seidel (2014). Cf. Kinzel and Kusch (2017). As cases like this are commonly discussed in the literature about epistemic relativism, I should clarify that this is a go-to case study from both sides of the debate: relativists appeal to it to motivate the argument from incommensurability, whereas anti-relativistic strategies normally show why and how a non-relativistic reading of the case is more compelling. This means that the case neither proves relativism right nor wrong, nor entails that the different arguments in favor or against epistemic relativism should speak to Galileo and Bellarmine’s particular dispute. The use of the case, both in this paper and in the literature, assumes just this much: if an epistemological theory predicts that epistemic relativism from incommensurability is true or false, then it should show that (and how) it is true or false of the kind of disputes exemplified by Galileo and Bellarmine.
For ease of exposition, I am simplifying matters a little here. For strictly speaking, there was no observational and available proof or demonstration that the Earth moves at the time of Galileo and Bellarmine’s dispute (cf. Graney 2011). More concretely, if Galileo’s hinges are unjustified even for himself, they are also unjustified for any other set of hinges (such as Bellarmine’s) that conflicts with Galileo’s.
A similar point is made by Boghossian (2006, p. 103). Roughly, if everyone has to use their perception to acquire information about the world and relate the contents of their perception according to general principles such as Induction or Modus Ponens, then there are no radically different epistemic systems and hence no incommensurability. See also Seidel (2014).
I should mention that my target is not Coliva’s particular acceptance account, but rather the prospects of a conception of hinges as accepted propositions to avoid epistemic relativism from incommensurability.
It is important to clarify that the relativist is not saying that the nature of hinges as accepted propositions is determined by the contingencies of Bellarmine and Galileo’s dispute. Rather, the relativist contends that the acceptance account cannot avoid relativism by simply insisting that methods of belief formation like Revelation are not hinges, because (so argues the relativist) Bellarmine’s epistemic practices can be interpreted as if Revelation is a hinge, which is what the relativist needs in order to commit the acceptance account to epistemic relativism.
Consider what Bellarmine thought about Galileo’s discoveries and Copernicanism in general:
if there were a true demonstration that the sun is at the center of the world and the earth in the third heaven, and that the sun does not circle the earth but the earth circles the sun, then one would have to proceed with great care in explaining the Scriptures that appear contrary, and say rather that we do not understand them than that what is demonstrated is false. (“Cardinal Bellarmine to Foscarini (12 April 1615)” in Finocchiaro 1989, p. 68, Emphasis added).
The relativist can contend that the emphasized consequent suggests that Revelation was a hinge for Bellarmine, since its validity did not depend on the deliverances of Observation or of any other method. Furthermore, Bellarmine’s apparent reluctance to give up either Scripture or ‘what is demonstrated’ by Copernicanism suggests that Revelation and Observation were independent of each other and there was no hierarchy between them. For instance, Bellarmine takes it that the truth of Copernicanism does not debunk Revelation, but rather it calls for a more careful interpretation of Scripture. In this way, both hinges are independent in that even if Bellarmine was open to concede that the deliverances of Observation could affect his carrying out of Revelation (i.e., he should have to proceed with care in explaining Scriptures), this does not mean that the latter’s justification depends on the former.
It could be objected, against the relativist and on behalf of the acceptance account, that Galileo and Bellarmine’s is not a disagreement about hinges, for are they not merely disagreeing about very entrenched (maybe irrational) beliefs? The relativist responds that most interlocutors in the debate about hinge disagreements agree that disputes such as Galileo and Bellarmine’s are not just disagreements over what to believe, but also over what justifies our beliefs. And hinges, by definition, are the building blocks of epistemic justification. Thus, to say that Galileo and Bellarmine’s is not a hinge disagreement, but a mere disagreement over beliefs, would assume that Revelation is not a hinge, which is precisely what the acceptance account cannot easily avoid.
This critical observation has been raised, in a different context, by Adam Carter (2017) against Pritchard’s account of hinges and rational resolution of disagreements, to which I will turn in the next sub-section.
Again, remember that Galileo and Bellarmine’s (or a structurally similar) case does not render epistemic relativism from incommensurability neither true nor false. The relativist is not bootstrapping her position from an interpretation of the case. At this point, all the relativist contends against the acceptance account is that if the hinges of such an account can save us from epistemic relativism, then it has to be shown how and why Galileo and Bellarmine’s case is not well suited to a relativistic reading.
Carter also talks in terms of Archimedean metanorms as the ones that can meet the Discriminating condition (Carter forthcoming).
Someone might think that this begs the question against Coliva’s view. It could be that hinges do not meet the Discriminating condition because they (as the necessary presuppositions of any epistemic practice) are not supposed to decide who is right between Galileo and Bellarmine, given that Galileo and Bellarmine do not embrace fundamentally different epistemic systems (cf. Coliva forthcoming-a; Baghramian and Coliva 2019, p. 180 and ff.). I find this rejoinder problematic. First, the relativist is not committed to (and her position does not depend on) any view about hinges or about Galileo and Bellarmine’s case. All she is saying is that under the acceptance account of hinges, Galileo and Bellarmine’s case can be interpreted along relativistic lines, which is precisely what the acceptance account seems unable to avoid. Second, the rejoinder is based on the idea that Bellarmine’s embracing of Revelation is not a hinge acceptance. To this, the relativist has at her disposal two lines of argumentation: first, that in light of the acceptance view we can allow Bellarmine the possibility of accepting Revelation as a hinge, since from Bellarmine’s perspective Revelation is the object of acceptance and is basic. Second, that even if we grant that Revelation is not a hinge, we can ask: how can Bellarmine be rationally convinced that he should drop Revelation and accept Observation to form beliefs about the movements of heavenly bodies? The acceptance account should be able to say how rational resolution of hinge disagreement is possible, even if there are no radically different epistemic systems.
In this respect, Christopher Graney says:
… Bellarmine had seen the Moon and Venus through a telescope for himself. At that time he had written to the Jesuit professors of the Roman College to confirm that what Galileo had discovered was real, and not merely an appearance (…) / Through a letter (…) Bellarmine expressed a willingness to listen to Galileo’s ideas. But he also expressed caution in regard to interpreting as simply accommodating human perception those scriptural passages that speak of the Sun’s motion: “This is not something to jump into, just as one ought not to jump hurriedly into condemning any one of these opinions.” (2011, pp. 71–72).
A possible rejoinder from Baghramian and Coliva (2019, p. 182 and ff.) contends that Galileo and Bellarmine disagree over non-fundamental epistemic methods, such as Observation-restricted-to-the-heavens. That is, their disagreement is about the correct application of basic and fundamental methods such as Observation. If this is so, theirs is not a hinge disagreement and there is in principle a rational path to solve their dispute! This rejoinder is not very helpful to the acceptance account, for the problem is that there is no non-circular way to convince Bellarmine of the correct application of Observation and thus Bellarmine is rational to stick to his guns even in his restricted application of Observation—and this is troublesome enough for the possibility of there being a rational resolution of a (restricted)-hinge disagreement.
According to Graney (2011), the Copernican system was at odds with the physic of the seventeenth century, whereas Tycho Brahe’s geocentric model of the universe, “was identical to the Copernican world system both from the standpoint of mathematics and from the standpoint of astronomical observations” (72).
In the discussion, we are assuming that epistemic systems, and enquiries in general, aim at getting at the truth. If someone insincerely embraces Observation, it is not clear what propositional attitude she would have towards the deliverances of Observation, or whether such a propositional attitude aims at truth.
Pritchard’s non-doxastic account of hinges has been recently discussed regarding its merits to actually solving one of the faces of the skeptical challenge [see Coliva (2018); Jope (2019); Nebel (2019); Simion et al. (2019); Zhang (2018)]. My target is not Pritchard’s particular account, but rather the prospects of a conception of hinges as a-rational, non-doxastic commitments that can rationally change over time to respond to relativism.
Pritchard could rejoin that this again shows that resolving a hinge disagreement is practically difficult. Note, however, that the argument just mentioned on behalf of the relativist does not appeal to practical or cognitive limitations (epistemic vices and biases, say), but to the epistemic possibility of Adam being rational in not changing his wider set of beliefs.
I thank two anonymous referees of this journal for inviting me to clarify this point.
This minimal epistemic reading is similar to Kusch (2016b). Kusch suggests that the uber hinge that we are not systematically deceived in our inquiries cannot be known or justified even though (particular) hinges such as Observation or Revelation are justifiable and knowable (cf. 2016b, p. 60 and ff.). Unlike other epistemic readings of hinges (such as Wright 2004, and Williams 2007), I do not think that the uber hinge is the object of a doxastic state that entails entitlement and/or knowledge.
I thank an anonymous referee of this journal for inviting me to clarify this point.
Thanks to Anna Boncompagni, Annalisa Coliva, Louis Doulas, Duncan Pritchard, and two anonymous referees at Synthese for generous feedback during the process of writing this paper.
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Thanks to Anna Boncompagni, Annalisa Coliva, Louis Doulas, Duncan Pritchard, and two anonymous referees at Synthese for generous feedback during the process of writing this paper.
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Piedrahita, O.A. Can hinge epistemology close the door on epistemic relativism?. Synthese 199, 4645–4671 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02995-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02995-4