Abstract
Ryle, the most prominent proponent of anti-intellectualism, and Stanley and Williamson, the most influential intellectualists, both invoke dispositions to explain the ascription of knowledge-how. It is now well known that conditional analyses of disposition suffer from two types of counterexamples: finkish and masked dispositions. If it is the case that dispositions play a role in the analysis of ascription of knowledge-how, and dispositions can be masked and finkish, then an important question arises: Can knowing-how be masked or finkish too? In response to this question, Hawley claims that (1) unlike dispositions, knowledge-how does not seem liable to finkishness, and (2) knowledge-how can be accounted for in terms of counterfactual success. In this paper both claims will be challenged. I seek to show that Hawley’s account faces two problems: an unjustified asymmetry and a puzzle. I also argue that knowledge-how can, intuitively, be finkish and masked, and therefore the counterfactual analysis of knowing-how suggested by Ryle, Stanley and Hawley fails. What is more, I show that the debate on finkish and masked dispositions can shed a new light on the practical component which is necessary for knowing-how.
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Notes
Given that Stanley and Williamson (Stanley and Williamson 2001, pp. 427–428) say they ‘remain neutral on the question of whether these modes of presentation have semantic import’, one might worry that unlike Ryle they don’t commit to a dispositional account of know-how. In reply I grant, of course, that we must be cautious in describing Stanley and Williamson’s account as a dispositional account. However, there are two points worth noticing here. First, regardless of his view about mode of presentation, Stanley (2011) explicitly asserts that the modal force of knowing how is a kind of dispositional modal force. Moreover, in his book Know How, Stanley gives a Fregean framework in which modes of presentation are a crucial part of a semantic analysis. Therefore, Stanley definitely endorses that knowing-how semantically entails the possession of dispositions. Second, and more importantly, I don’t need to claim that Stanley and Williamson assume a semantic role for practical mode of presentation; I claim only that, on Stanley and Williamson’s account, an ascription of knowing-how, either semantically or pragmatically, entails possession of dispositions. I think this point, along with the fact that Ryle does give a dispositional account, would be sufficient to provide a prima facie reason for supposing that know-how might be finkish and masked, or at the very least raising the question of whether know-how, like dispositions, might be finkish or masked. In addition to this prima facie reason, I motivate the finkishness and masking of know-how by independent arguments in Sect. 4.
For a review of various solutions to the problem of masks and finks see Cross (2012).
Hawley’s original motivation for this approach is epistemological. In fact, she intends to propose a unified general structure of knowledge which both knowledge-how and knowledge-that have. However, I wish to remain neutral with regard to these epistemological issues.
We will return to this example in the Sect. 5 under our discussion of the Amputee Pianist.
As it will be discussed in Sect. 4, I agree with Löwenstein that the case of Panic Attack can be thought of as a case of finkish know-how. However, here we focus only on how we should interpret Hawley fairly.
Of course, she also spells out some initial motivations for a dispositional account of knowledge-how (2003, p. 25). But none of these initial motivations are sufficient to make Hawley choose a dispositional account.
In order to be clear about this line of argument, consider again Martin’s case of the live wire. The wire, in a non-finkish case, is touched by a conductor and after that, in the absence of the electro-fink, the disposition of wire would be manifested. However, in a finkish case, after touching the conductor and before manifestation, the electro-fink intervenes and prevents it from manifestation. Therefore, that a disposition can be finkish is due to the fact that there is a time delay between stimulus condition and manifestation of a disposition.
Williams (2008), in making a similar point, proposes a rather different interpretation of Hawley’s counterfactual analysis. Perhaps, Williams’s interpretation improves upon Hawley’s account in one respect. However, as demonstrated in fn. 12, the problems with Hawley’s proposal will carry over to Williams’s proposal as well.
The significant point here is that if a circumstance like playing piano without a hand can be described as an instance of a normal circumstance, then we seem not to have an intuitive grasp of this conception of normality.
Perhaps the suggestion seems to be close to Lewis’s much-discussed solution to the problem of finks, i.e., a reformed conditional analysis of dispositions (1997). However, to be clear about our purpose here, I insist on the point that I have tried to pay attention merely to Hawley’s strategy (and some similar solutions) for solving the problem of finks and masks, and remain silent about Lewis’s strategy. However, even if someone complains that Lewis’s solution, as a reformed interpretation of Hawley’s strategy, can avoid the problem of finks, we can resist by saying that, at the very least, the problem of masks still poses a problem for Hawley’s strategy.
As said earlier, Williams uses Hawley’s counterfactual analysis in a rather different way. In particular, he replaces the constraint of ‘being under normal circumstances’ with the constraint of ‘being under circumstance C’. According to Williams (2008, p. 119): ‘If s knows how to ϕ under circumstances C, then if s were to try to ϕ, under C, then s would succeed in ϕ-ing’. This account is very close to Mumford’s account of dispositions in which he replaces ‘normal condition’ with ‘ideal condition’, and one would expect that the same problems for Mumford’s account carry over to Williams’ account. That is, as soon as we try to clarify the circumstance C in some substantial way, the above puzzle arises again. Moreover, it seems that Williams’s interpretation of Hawley faces further difficulties. As Constantin (2018, p. 2316) argues, in a different context, such an analysis may lead to the absurd consequence that, for example, ‘a rock has the ability to write in Chinese because, if it made the attempt in a world where it was sentient and educated, it would likely succeed’. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for encouraging me to discuss Williams’s proposal.
In fact, in a personal communication Hawley herself suggested this line of argument as a solution to above puzzle.
Stanley (2011) defends a contextualist version of Hawley’s counterfactual analysis. In a different context, however, Stanley and Williamson (2016, p. 716) show that a conditional analysis of dispositions suffers from severe problems. They mention masking as an example, concluding that ‘Various solutions have been proposed to the problems facing conditional analyses, but we find none persuasive. We will not assume that dispositions are analyzable’ (176). Given that one of these solutions is the contextualist version of counterfactual analysis, it is not clear why this solution can avoid the masking of knowing-how while it cannot avoid the masking of dispositions.
The second way of arguing against Löwenstein’s special view of finkish know-how is that, in his book Know How as Competence, he himself puts forward three theses which may commit him to the idea that if understanding became finkish, know-how would become finkish too. Here are the three theses: (1) the understanding is itself a competence; (2) competences can be finkish like dispositions; (3) the understanding is a constitutive component of knowing-how. From (1) and (2) we conclude that the understanding can be finkish, i.e. it can be temporarily lost. From this conclusion and (3), it follows that know-how would temporarily be lost if understanding became finkish. It is to say that if understanding became finkish, know-how would become finkish too. The burden of proof, therefore, is on Löwenstein to show why understanding as competence cannot be finkish.
From an anti-intellectualist perspective, Carter and Poston (2018, pp. 101–102) have recently complained that intellectualists face the problem of finkishness in seeking to account for the practical mode of presentation. Carter and Poston themselves account for know-how in terms of ability and endorse a kind of counterfactual analysis of ability. In other word, they propose (2018, p. 108) that the success component of know-how can be best explained in terms of counterfactuality. As Fara (2008) shows, abilities like dispositions can be finkish and masked. Following Carter and Poston I of course grant that a counterfactual analysis of a practical mode of presentation faces the problems of finkishness (and masking). However, their counterfactual account of ability seems to be vulnerable to the same problems too.
Likewise, Löwenstein (2017, p. 157) makes an analogy between Amputee Pianist and the case of Impossible Pudding which can be thought of as a masked competence.
Glick (2012, p. 134), Noe (2005, p. 283) and Löwenstein (2017, p. 157) admit that there are some contexts in which we think that the pianist loses her ability: however, they claim that we don’t ascribe know-how to the pianist in those contexts. In contrast, Constantin think that in the same contexts in which we ascribe know-how to the pianist, we agree that she loses her ability to play. Maybe we need more data on folk intuitions about the case of Amputee Pianist to settle the dispute; however, I have no idea how we could assess these two opposed suggestions given such data is absent.
Carter and Navarro (2017), like Glick, believe that the amputee pianist retains the relevant ability. They appeal to Sosa’s triple S account of ability-competence to explain similar cases. However, I am not confident that this move can accommodate our intuition regarding Amputee Pianist. Sosa (2010) employed a triple account of ability which explains it in terms of constitutional component (seat), internal condition (shape) and external condition (situation). According to this view, one might say that while the pianist does not meet the internal condition (i.e. good shape) to exercise her ability, she retains the constitutional component (i.e. seat) of the ability to play piano. Thus if she were in the proper shape and the right situation, she would be able to manifest that skill reliably enough. However, the crucial point is that, as Carter and Navarro (2017, p. 673), following Noe, themselves argue, ‘Perhaps the skill is extended to the limbs of the agent (embodiment)’. Based on this point, Carter and Navarro affirm that an agent’s relevant ability can be removed due to a change in her shape. Interestingly, relying on evidence from brain research, Noe (2005, p. 283) (in his second interpretation of Amputee Pianist) argues that losing one’s hands leads to a failure of the ability itself. Thus the pianist may indeed have lost a constitutional component of her ability. As said above, I remain neutral on the question of whether the pianist loses her ability; however, this evidence does seem to be a prima facie reason to say that her ability is removed. Therefore, to the extent that Carter and Navarro describe knowing how to play piano as the ability to play piano, it may follow that the amputee pianist does not know how to play piano, although it runs contrary to our intuition about this case. With Noe’s data in mind, at the very least, the burden of proof is on Carter and Navarro to show why losing her hands doesn’t cause the pianist to lose a constitutional component of the ability to play piano.
In the present paper I do not address the sufficiency of the ability or disposition for knowing-how. However, it is worth mentioning that Löwenstein (2017, p. 171), very interestingly shows how the debate over one kind of special disposition, i.e. the mimic disposition, can shed a new light on the case of Lucky Salchow which is the most controversial case for rejecting the sufficiency of ability for know-how.
I don’t dispute that perhaps some source of resistance to this objection can be found in Constantin’s account. Perhaps, in order to avoid such an objection, he would insist on the point that a specific disposition to have an ability (rather than every disposition to have an ability) constitutes knowledge-how. Constantin introduces two ways to define this specific disposition, but I think worries pertain to both. In the first way of characterizing that specific disposition, he invokes the notion of a practical mode of presentation. In addition to the controversies about the notion, this way may get the order of explanation wrong. Intellectualists normally explain practical modes of presentation in terms of specific dispositions, not vice versa. In the second way, Constantin seems to be willing to assign the task of specifying the disposition to empirical science. Maybe this strategy does the job: but a more satisfying account might be required to distinguish conceptually between Selena’s disposition and Serena’s.
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Acknowledgements
Thanks to S.M.Hassan A. Shirazi, Mahrad Almotahari, Katherine Hawley, Reza Dehghan, Hadi Safai, Mehdi Hatef, Hosein Khodadadi, Mahdie Mirmohammad, Milad Mahjouri, Hamed Karimpour, Moslem, Laleh Ghadakpour, Mahmoud Vahidnia, Ben Young, Ehsan Karbasizade, Mohamad Yarandi, Reza Abdorahmani, Neda Farahani, Omid Karimzadh, Fatemeh Khalaj and Zahra Sarkarpour. Two anonymous reviewers gave me very useful comments which led to several improvements of earlier drafts.
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Khalaj, M.H.M.A. Knowledge-how and the problems of masking and finkishness. Synthese 198, 1623–1641 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02155-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02155-3