Abstract
Two families of positions dominate debates over a metaphysically reductive analysis of knowledge. Traditionalism holds that knowledge has a complete, uniquely identifying analysis, while knowledge-first epistemology contends that knowledge is primitive—admitting of no reductive analysis whatsoever. Drawing on recent work in metaphysics, I argue that these alternatives fail to exhaust the available possibilities. Knowledge may have a merely partial analysis: a real definition that distinguishes it from some, but not all other things. I demonstrate that this position is attractive; it evades concerns that its rivals face.
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Notes
As we shall see, even this description does not identify a unique project, as there is substantial disagreement among metaphysicians about what metaphysical reduction consists of.
The extent to which epistemologists previously accepted a justified-true-belief analysis of knowledge is somewhat debatable (see Dutant 2015). Minimally, however, subsequent discussions about the analysis of knowledge can be reasonably considered to be a reaction to Gettier’s work.
Williamson does not himself use terms like ‘metaphysically posterior’ or ‘ontologically depend.’ However, those who countenance such notions would, presumably, understand knowledge-first epistemology in this way. For one such view, see Horvath (forthcoming).
As I mentioned before, other projects may count as ‘an analysis of knowledge.’ The distinction I make here (and the history of inquiry I briefly describe) is not intended to capture these other projects; its focus is solely on those who take themselves to be investigating a metaphysically reductive analysis of knowledge.
I introduce the term ‘primitivist’—instead of using ‘knowledge-first epistemologist’—for two reasons. The first is that it allows for more concise prose. The second is that, at least sometimes, ‘knowledge-first epistemology’ refers not only to the conviction that knowledge is primitive but also to the positive project of analyzing other notions in terms of knowledge. Philosophers can consistently hold that knowledge is primitive and take all such proposals to be false. ‘Primitivism,’ as I use the term, encompasses both those who accept and those who reject analyses of notions like justification and belief in terms of knowledge.
Williamson’s initial characterization of knowledge-first epistemology is stated in terms of conceptual analysis rather than metaphysical reduction. However, for discussions of the knowledge-first approach that are more explicitly metaphysical in nature, see Carter et al. (2017), Ichikawa and Jenkins (2017), Schechter (2017) and Williamson (2017).
Please permit a brief discussion of the motivation behind this development: while epistemologists debated the analysis of knowledge, metaphysicians were beset by a problem of their own. The formalization of quantified modal logic broke a long-standing resistance to essentialism; philosophical analyses were thought to be correct just in case they provided adequate necessary and sufficient conditions. It has been claimed that modal accounts of essence were once “so widespread that it would be pointless to provide references” (Correia 2005, p. 26). However, see Marcus (1967), Kripke (1980) and Plantinga (1974) for defenses of this claim. Metaphysicians began to unabashedly provide putative analyses in modal terms.
The shortcomings of the modal approach quickly became apparent. Fine challenged modal conceptions of essence on the grounds that there are many necessary yet inessential connections between various sorts of things. For example, it may be that Socrates is necessarily the entity contained in {Socrates} but it would be absurd to analyze personal identity in terms of set theory. Various philosophers have attempted to revive modal accounts of essence, but the general consensus is that these attempts have been unsuccessful. See, for example, Zalta (2006), Wildman (2013) and Livingstone-Banks (2017). Rather than defining essence in terms of modality, some have suggested defining modality in terms of essence. See Sect. 4.5 for a further discussion of this turn.
There may well be a reading of ‘being a vixen is the property of being a female fox’ which resembles an identity. If there is, this is not the reading I am concerned with. I contend that there also is a reading that does not resemble an identity because it is asymmetric; while ‘the property of being a vixen is the property of being a female fox’ is true, ‘the property of being a female fox is the property of being a vixen’ is false. In any case, not much turns on this particular example, so long as the target phenomenon is clear.
More precisely, if there is a necessary and sufficient connection between knowledge and justified true belief and the concept of knowledge is grounded in an n-tuple of the concepts of justification, truth and belief.
It comes apart in that the terms ‘to be F’ and ‘to be G’ need not denote, so there may be no entities that are strictly identical.
Nor will it help to frame primitivism as the claim that there are no true instances of ‘To be knowledge is to be G’ where ‘G’ is a term other than ‘knowledge’; ‘To be knowledge is to be either knowledge or knowledge’ is also a true generalized identity.
Correia (2017) operates with a somewhat different reading of ‘To be F is to be G’ than Dorr does. In particular, Correia’s reading of ‘To be F is to be G’ is irreflexive, because being G grounds being F (and grounding is an irreflexive relation). As with Rosen, Correia’s proposal is compatible with merely partial definition if we allow for merely partial grounding.
Chalmers may have more resources than this brief discussion indicates. Perhaps he would add the ‘knowledge truths’ to the basic class of truths from which all others are derived. I lack the space to adequately address this proposal, but have a few brief thoughts: it is worth noting that not all of the knowledge truths need be added to Chalmers’ basic class in order for them to be scrutable. If, for example, the content of an agents S’s belief concerned a physical falsity, then the physical truths would suffice to derive that S does not know that p. At most some of the knowledge-truths need be added to the basic set. This motivates an interesting picture: one on which some (but not all) of the knowledge-truths are primitive (in that some are added to the basic class of truths, while others are not). I am unsure whether primitivists would accept this position, but suspect many would prefer to frame the debate in other terms. My thanks to an anonymous reviewer for raising this point.
Quidditists need not accept this claim. Perhaps properties are not defined in terms of their causal roles, but necessarily play the roles that they actually play.
For an argument that the necessary connection between belief and knowledge need not entail a definition or analysis of knowledge in terms of belief, see Williamson (2017).
Goldman (2009) hints that this might be the case. I take his work to be an insightful precursor to my own. He suggests that knowledge may have necessary but no sufficient conditions. He does not, however, investigate the metaphysical underpinnings of his proposal. He offers no discussion of what it takes, metaphysically speaking, for this to be the case.
However, for challenges to this view, see Teitel (forthcoming) and Wildman (forthcoming).
This may need some qualification. Presumably, if God were to fix all of the facts about truth, she would have fixed all of the facts. This would trivially fix all of the facts about knowledge. Let us set this worry aside. Assume that God fixed all of the facts about the truth of the content of agents’ beliefs; and not the facts about their knowledge.
Of course, those who dispute the intelligibility of definition—or who prefer other conceptions of it—may take this to be an empty question. As before, it is not my aim to defend this conception here.
For those who describe knowledge-first epistemology in this way, see Gerken (2017) and—most explicitly—Schechter (2017), who states, “Once it is claimed that knowledge is unanalyzable and irreducible (in anything like the traditional way), we have a new primitive to deploy. We can try to put this primitive to work in providing conceptual analyses and metaphysical reductions . . . The characterization of belief in terms of knowledge is part of the essence of belief. It provides the real definition of belief (and similarly for other cognitive states). The characterization of justification in terms of knowledge is part of the essence of justification. It provides the real definition of justification (and similarly for other epistemic statuses)” (pp. 133–135).
This does not conflict with the claim that modality is reducible to essence. Socrates is necessarily such that 2 and 2 make 4. This is inessential to him, but follows from essential truths for the vacuous reason that it follows from any essential truth that Socrates is such that 2 and 2 make 4.
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Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Shamik Dasgupta, Michael Della Rocca, Catherine Elgin, Daniel Greco, Michael Hannon, Timothy Williamson, and the attendees of the Northern New England Philosophical Association, The Philosopher’s Cocoon Conference and the Bled Philosophical Conference for providing comments on earlier versions of this paper.
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Elgin, S.Z. Merely partial definition and the analysis of knowledge. Synthese 198 (Suppl 7), 1481–1505 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1846-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1846-0