Abstract
Discussions about the nature of essence and about the inference problem for non-Humean theories of nomic modality have largely proceeded independently of each other. In this article I argue that the right conclusions to draw about the inference problem actually depend significantly on how best to understand the nature of essence. In particular, I argue that this conclusion holds for the version of the inference problem developed and defended by Alexander Bird. I argue that Bird’s own argument that this problem is fatal for David Armstrong’s influential theory of the laws of nature but not for dispositional essentialism is seriously flawed. In place of this argument, I develop an argument that whether Bird’s inference problem raises serious difficulties for Armstrong’s theory depends on the answers to substantial questions about how best to understand essence. The key consequence is that considerations about the nature of essence have significant, underappreciated implications for Armstrong’s theory.
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Notes
This claim is strictly speaking true only for simple universals, as Armstrong accepts that complex universals stand in non-trivial modal relations with their constituent universals. Bird (2007, pp. 94–96) argues, though, that the inference problem that he raises cannot be blocked by claiming that N is a complex universal.
See Bird (2007, p. 94) for Bird’s argument that the regress is vicious. I discuss the key idea behind this argument in the next section.
F here is the property, fragility, D is the property, dropped, and S is the property, shattering.
This parenthetical comment is aimed at accommodating the version of dispositional essentialism developed by Mumford and Anjum (2011).
For this reason, Tugby’s (2012) response to Barker and Smart will not feature in my discussion. Tugby follows Barker and Smart in interpreting Bird’s inference problem as a version of the explanatory problem. So, while Tugby’s response to Barker and Smart’s use of the explanatory problem against dispositional essentialism may succeed, it is not relevant to the validation problem that Bird raises for the Armstrongian.
For a discussion of this point, see Schaffer (2004, pp. 95–97).
See Tugby (2012, pp. 729–730) for both suggestions for making sense of this grounding connection and a recognition that these suggestions need further development. Jaag (2014, pp. 17–18) presses the point that none of these accounts currently give a satisfactory account of how qualitative essences can ground dispositional roles.
See Schaffer (2017) for a recent attempt to employ this point in responding to the inference problem.
Thanks to an anonymous referee for raising this concern.
Of course, a more informative account of the connection between N and its necessary but non-essential properties might reduce the theoretical cost of claiming that it has such properties. A seemingly attractive approach, suggested by an anonymous referee for Synthese, would be to model the connection on the connection between Socrates and {Socrates}, and claim that it is essential to N’s dispositional role that it is played by N but not essential to N that it has its dispositional role. Given a plausible account of the qualitative view of categorical properties, this sort of approach might provide a promising approach for the Armstrongian.
See the second section of Denby (2014) for a detailed argument for this claim.
Torza (2015) provides a helpful account of the various responses to Fine’s criticism of classic modalism.
However, see Yates (2013) for an independent argument that dispositional essentialism is compatible with a Finean but not a modal conception of essence.
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Acknowledgements
I would like to thank David Martens, Thad Metz, Samantha Vice and two anonymous referees for this journal for helpful suggestions.
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Coates, A. Essence and the inference problem. Synthese 198, 915–931 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-02074-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-02074-9