Abstract
In this paper we propose that cosmological fine-tuning arguments, when levied in support of the existence of Intelligent Designers or Multiverses, are much less interesting than they are thought to be. Our skepticism results from tracking the distinction between merely epistemic or logical possibilities on one hand and nonepistemic possibilities, such as either nomological or metaphysical possibilities, on the other. We find that fine-tuning arguments readily conflate epistemic or logical possibilities with nonepistemic possibilities and we think that this leads to treating the search for an explanation of fine-tuning as analogous to standard empirical theorizing about first-order nomological matters, when in fact the two investigational enterprises are profoundly different. Similar conflation occurs when fine-tuning arguments do not carefully distinguish between different interpretations of probabilities within the arguments. Finally, these arguments often rely on spatial analogies, which are often misleading precisely in that they encourage the conflation of epistemic and nonepistemic possibility. When we pay attention to the distinctions between merely epistemic versus nonepistemic modalities and probabilities, the extant arguments in favor of intelligent designers or multiverses, or even for the nonepistemic improbability of fine-tuning, consist of empirically unconstrained (beyond what is entailed by facts about the actual universe) speculation concerning relevant nonepistemic modal facts.
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Notes
Barrow and Tipler’s book The Cosmological Anthropic Principle (1986) was, we believe, the first to widely popularize this kind of argument.
There are objections to be made to such proposed ‘explanations’ of observed patterns other than the one that we are pressing in this paper. See, for example, Hacking and others who have argued for or against the claim that multiversers or multi-system advocates in such cases commit the ‘inverse gambler’s fallacy’ (Hacking 1987; White 2000; Juhl 2005).
Or at least ‘higher-level’ powers, in the sense of first-order-natural-law-transcending, as we characterize this below.
See (Collins 2000) for the corresponding response to ‘higher-order law’ objections to his ID argument.
There are objections to fine-tuning arguments to be made on the basis that ‘the constants’ that we currently deploy in our best theories may turn out to be fictitious, as is Newton’s G. But for our purposes in this paper, we are leaving aside this and many other concerns about the arguments.
Some special forms of divine revelation might best be counted as sources of empirical data. But to our knowledge no fine-tuning advocates have as yet adopted this research methodology into the nonepistemic modal facts which are meant to motivate their argument. If they were to do so, however, this would be a different fundamental difference between the methodology of fine-tuning arguments and related ‘research’ and standard empirical methodology.
There are undoubtedly some hypotheses concerning ‘other universes’ according to which such universes do causally interact with ours. It is unclear to us what would make such universes ‘other’ in the relevant sense, as opposed to parts of our actual universe. But if there are such entities, our arguments about epistemic inaccessibility do not apply to them. Similarly, for a Hobbesian Deity or a powerful Alien who causally interacts with us and is detectable in standard causal ways, our arguments in this paper do not apply.
Whether this dearth of evidence might ever be different for anything that we would take to be fundamental laws is a matter that we will discuss later in the paper.
Theorists could bypass probabilities and posit similarly empirically unfathomable subjunctives and other modal claims. But it appears that in the actual situation theorists prefer to deploy probabilities. Probabilities have the advantage that we can calculate using them. A disadvantage, as we suggest below, is that it is easy to neglect, in a rush to calculate, crucial matters pertaining to the types of modality relevant to the interpretations of the probabilities deployed.
The evidence is straightforward: we have observed many things at many locations, and have not yet had reason to think that any bit of matter is precluded from being at any spatial location. By contrast, it is unclear how scientists could find themselves in a circumstance in which they both had strong evidence of the possibility of alternative values for some quantity, yet referred to that quantity as a fundamental constant. But we leave open whether it is possible.
We are using ‘real’, ‘genuine’ and so on to emphasize the difference from merely epistemic or logical notions of possibility. ‘Real’ features can causally explain in ways that epistemic or logical ones do not.
Colyvan et al. (2005) begin their excellent paper by asking about what sorts of modalities are to be deployed in fine-tuning arguments. They proceed to discuss probabilistic arguments involving logical possibilities. This leads them into some difficulties, in our view, partly due to the vexed relations between modal (im)possibilities and probabilities, and partly because they do not explicitly distinguish merely epistemic probabilities and possibilities from non-epistemic probabilities and possibilities. In addition, perhaps because their focus is on the fine-tuning arguments for intelligent design, they appear not to notice that many of the same points undermine fine-tuning arguments for multiverses, for structurally similar reasons. Nevertheless, we agree with most of what they claim in that paper.
See, e.g., (Ward and Brownlee 2000)
Nevertheless, it is very difficult at this point to estimate probability distributions for features of planets, which would seem to be necessary to run a convincing ‘we live on a uniquely Goldilocks planet’ argument. But there is room for argument and empirical data concerning these matters, and our point in this paper is to contrast such arguments with the cosmological/fundamental law fine-tuning arguments.
We change Collins’ example to make it analogous in relevant respects to finding ourselves within a universe that is life-permitting. If we just observed a biodome on Mars, positing a bunch of other planets would not as clearly be relevant to why there is a biodome on Mars, near us, if no other planets within a quadrillion light years would be likely to contain a biodome.
Another type of purported fine-tuning phenomenon is the supposed low-entropy initial conditions. The relation of our arguments to that complicated case is beyond the scope of this paper. We are addressing the most common fine-tuning arguments, which concerns the constants in currently well-established laws.
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Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Josh Dever, Sinan Dogramaci, Alex Grossman, Brad Saad, Jason Schukraft, David Sosa, and the participants of the Spring 2016 Epistemology Reading Group at UT Austin for comments, objections, and suggestions about earlier drafts of this paper. Special thanks also to two anonymous referees for many helpful suggestions.
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Juhl, C., Knab, B. On the empirical inaccessibility of higher-level modality and its significance for cosmological fine-tuning. Synthese 196, 3697–3710 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1610-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1610-x