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Systematicity is necessary but not sufficient: on the problem of facsimile science

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Abstract

Paul Hoyningen-Huene argues that what makes scientific knowledge special is its systematic character, and that this can be used to solve the demarcation problem. He labels this STDC: “Systematicity Theory’s Demarcation Criterion.” This paper argues that STDC fails, because there are areas of intellectual activity that are highly systematic, but that the great majority of scientists and historians and philosophers of science do not accept as scientific. These include homepathy, creationism, and climate change denial. I designate these activities “facsimile sciences” because they mimic the appearance of science but are not, by the standards of philosophers and scientists, scientific. This suggests that we need additional criteria to demarcate science from non-science and/ or nonsense.

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Notes

  1. Lorraine Daston has suggested that one reason for the failed alignment of history of

    science with science studies is lack of agreement as to what science is. See Daston (2009).

  2. Hoyningen-Huene (2013), p. 6.

  3. Ibid p. 176.

  4. The literature on this is large, but some important titles are: Veblen (1906), Price (1965), Ezrahi (1990), Jasanoff (1998), Kitcher (2001), Weingart and Lentsch (2011) and Oppenheimer (2016).

  5. Shapin (1994).

  6. This of course was the central thrust of the considerable efforts of the logical positivists, empiricists, and Karl Popper: to identify and define what that particular and distinctive form of inquiry was. Useful starting places for these discussions are Ayer (1936), Boyd et al. (1991); and more recently Godfrey-Smith (2003).

  7. One may of course argue about what makes a subject an appropriate topic for scientific

    arbitration; for an interesting discussion on this in the context of matters nuclear, see

    Hecht (2012).

  8. NIH Consensus Development Program (2013). See also Solomon (2007) and idem (2011).

  9. For example, Pigliucci and Boudry (2013).

  10. This is addressed in Oreskes and Conway (2010), a historical situation in which men with robust scientific training and credentials made and promoted assertions that were arguably unscientific, as judged both by the consensus of scientific experts actively pursuing research in those domains, and by the standards of community vetting and peer review. One critique of this work is that it is “asymmetrical” insofar as it grants epistemic privilege to the consensus of scientific experts. Their response is that, while one cannot equate consensus with truth, it becomes almost impossible to critique contrarian activities in an intellectually coherent way if one is unable or unwilling to take some sort of position as to what science “is.” The issues raised by Hoyningen-Huene are exactly pertinent to this point. See also Oreskes and Conway (2012).

  11. Some science studies scholars reject the concept of experts—separate and distinct the rest of society—who develop and hand over knowledge for use, arguing instead for a model in which knowledge is co-produced by scientists and society: for examples, see

    Jasanoff (2004), idem (2003), Novotny et al. (2001). However, Harry Collins and Robert Evans have insisted not only thatthe category of expertise is still needed, but should now be our focus of attention: Collins and Evans (2002).

    This is not the place to engage a major discussion on the merits and limits of the coproduction model, but suffice it to say that in the world as it now exists, we have communities of scientists, who consider themselves and generally are considered to be experts, to whom society often turns for knowledge. No historian or sociologist would argue that these communities are hermetically sealed, and the ways in which science is or is not used by others can and often does influence what sort of work scientists do and how they do it. Is this co-production? Perhaps, but the term seems to imply a high degree of social equity and epistemic symmetry that strikes me as insufficiently warranted by the evidence. Indeed, the very notion of “expert” implies epistemic asymmetry.

    More to the point here, whether or not the knowledge that expert communities produce is accepted, understood and used as those experts would like it to be is a separable question from the character of the processes by which it is produced.

  12. I do not address here the motivations for facsimile science, which, I believe, are several, and not necessarily malicious.

  13. For a recent discussion see Lewis (2017).

  14. Another problem with the term is that many students do not know what it connotes.

  15. Hoyningen-Huene (2013), p. 199.

  16. Ibid pp. 199–200.

  17. Ibid p. 204.

  18. Blakeman (2015).

  19. Linde and Jonas (2005).

  20. National Health and Medical Research Council (2014).

  21. An interesting complication of the Australian study was that the substantive conclusions were based on a subset of all the studies reviewed: only 225 of more than 1800—or less than 12.5%. The remaining more than 1500 studies were rejecting from further consideration because they were judged to be too small or too poorly designed to be worthy of further consideration. The government press release explained: The review found no good quality, well-designed studies with enough participants to support the idea that homeopathy works better than a placebo, or causes health improvements equal to those of another treatment. Although some studies did report that homeopathy was effective, the quality of those studies was assessed as being small and/or of poor quality. These studies had either too few participants, poor design, poor conduct or poor reporting to allow reliable conclusions to be drawn on the effectiveness of homeopathy.

  22. Loudon (2006).

  23. Goldacre (2007).

  24. Robinson et al. (2015).

  25. Ullman (2012). Of course, it’s not clear how significant this finding is, given that homeopathy was grouped with an array of practices. Personally, I would answer yes to such a question, even though I do not believe that most homeopathic medicines are efficacious.

  26. Mathie et al. (2014).

  27. Frenkel (2015).

  28. Harrington (1999), idem (2009).

  29. See for example Schmidt (1992).

  30. On this, see Dean (2005).

  31. Oreskes (1999). The argument here was more historical than epistemological: that there was a long history in geology of accepting the reality of startling geological phenomena, such as nappes and ice ages, even though one could not explain how they occurred. Oreskes suggests that this was epistemically reasonable: To reject evidence simply because one cannot (yet) explain it is at best a missed opportunity to make a discovery, and at worst arrogant and illogical.

  32. American Institute of Homeopathy (2016).

  33. Fisher (2017).

  34. Mathur and Gupta (2016).

  35. Lewis (2010).

  36. Rogers (1998).

  37. Hoyningen-Huene (2013), p. 210.

  38. One might argue that homeopathy receives less support to test its claims, but this is a weak argument because it could nevertheless be the case that limited studies indicated a positive effect. We could compare this with meditation, which has been demonstrated to have positive effects, despite comparatively less attention than pharmaceuticals. See, for example, Grossman et al. (2004).

  39. For example, see Michael Behe, Talk Origins Archive.

  40. Organizations that have issued statements rejecting creationism as scientific include The American Association for the Advancement of Science, the national Center for Science Education, the American Association of University Professors, the American Chemical Society, the American Geophysical Union, and the National Association of Biology Teachers.

  41. One reviewer suggests that if creationist claims are “not testable and subordinate observed data to statements based on authority...” that this means, ipso facto, that the claims lack systematicity. This seems to be an excessively expansive definition of systematicity, one that is so expansive as to include all other possible criticisms—and thus to render the argument virtually circular. Moreover, Hoyningen-Huene’s nine criteria of systematic science (p. 27) say nothing about testability. Therefore, I believe it is appropriate to consider testability, along with falsifiability, to be distinct from systematicity, Indeed, Hoyningen-Huene make considerable effort to demonstrate that his idea is distinct from concepts of demarcation focused on testing and falsification. See, for example, his discussion of Popper on pp. 200–203.

    For statements from the US scientific community rejecting creationism’s claim to be a science, see: National Academy of Sciences (1999), Rennie (2002), AAAS (2006) and NCSE (2016).

    Interestingly, AAAS also issued a statement in support of the teaching of evolution in 1922 response to the Scopes trial. In some ways, it was a stronger statement, including the following affirmation: “The Council of the Association is convinced that any legislation attempting to limit the teaching of any scientific doctrine so well established and so widely accepted by specialists as is the doctrine of evolution would be a profound mistake, which could not fail to injure and retard the advancement of knowledge and of human welfare, by denying the freedom of teaching and inquiry which is essential to all progress.” AAAS (1992).

    A striking rejection of creationism has been offered by the Department of Biological Sciences Department at Lehigh University, the institutional home of one of the most well-known advocates of Intelligent Design, Michael Behe. His colleagues have declared: “The faculty in the Department of Biological Sciences ...are unequivocal in their support of evolutionary theory, which...has been supported by findings accumulated over 140 years. The sole dissenter from this position, Prof. Michael Behe, is a well-known proponent of “intelligent design.” While we respect Prof. Behe’s right to express his views, they are his alone ...It is our collective position that intelligent design has no basis in science, has not been tested experimentally, and should not be regarded as scientific.” Lehigh University (2015). http://www.lehigh.edu/~inbios/News/evolution.html.

  42. Edwords (1981).

  43. Kitcher (1982).

  44. See also Ansted (2013).

  45. More recently, many state legislatures have considered “academic freedom” laws that permit but do not require teachers to present creationist alternatives to evolutionary theory. Often these bills are presented under the guised of stimulating critical thinking. As of this writing, only Louisiana has passed such a law, with the Orwellian name of The Louisiana Science Education Act. The NCSE is tracking developments in this area: National Center for Science Education (2009). On the role of Steven Jay Gould in these debates, see Perez (under review). See also Edwords (1982) and Larson (2003).

  46. Powell (1986). Justice Scalia dissented in a long and rather complicated dissent, in which he questioned the legitimacy of overturning the law based on the motivation of its sponsors—which he insisted could not be known. He also quoted at length from witnesses for the defendants, who argued that evolution could not be considered a fact because it could not be observed in the laboratory: “The body of scientific evidence supporting creation science is as strong as that supporting evolution. In fact, it may be stronger. Id. at E-214 (Young statement); id. at E-310 (Sen. Keith); id. at E-416 (Sen. Keith); 2 id. at E-492 (Sen. Keith). The evidence for evolution is far less compelling than we have been led to believe. Evolution is not a scientific “fact,” since it cannot actually be observed in a laboratory. Rather, evolution is merely a scientific theory or “guess.” 1id. at E-20–E-21 (Morris); id. at E-85 (Ward); id. at E-100 (Reiboldt); id. at E-328 - E-329 (Boudreaux); 2 id. at E-506 (Boudreaux)”. By this standard much biology, most earth science and just about all of astrophysics and cosmology would have to be rejected.

  47. In the closely watched 2005 case of Tammy Kitzmiller et al. v. Dover Area School District, the presiding judge John E. Jones concluded with a vengeance that the theory of Intelligent Design was creationism by another name—and it did smell the same. He expressed his outrage at the “breathtaking inanity” of the school board’s decision to include Intelligent Design in the science curriculum; see Goodstein (2005).

  48. Kitcher (1982), p. 2.

  49. Most famously Niles Eldredge and Steven Jay Gould in their arguments over gradualism v punctuated equilibrium: Eldridge and Gould (1977), Punctuated Equilibria: An Alternative to Phyletic Gradualism; and idem (1977), Punctuated Equilibria: The Tempo and Mode of Evolution Reconsidered.

  50. Behe (1998).

  51. National Center for Science Education. McLean v. Arkansas.

  52. Larson (2003), p. 164.

  53. Numbers (2006) and Moran (2012).

  54. Institute for Creation Research (2017).

  55. Vardiman (2013).

  56. The Creation Biology Society.

  57. Creationists have also attempted to publish creationist arguments in mainstream scientific journals, which, if they succeeded, could potentially support the claim that creationist arguments are legitimate alternative scientific hypotheses and that teaching them could support a secular intent of advancing science instruction. An interesting account of one such attempt was described in 2008 in the Reports of the National Center for Science Education. In a paper entitled, “Creationism slips into a peer-reviewed journal,” computational biologist Steven L Salzberg describes how he recognized a creationist paper in an on-line pre-publication version of a paper in the journal Proteomics. Embedded in a review paper on mitochondria that otherwise appeared to follow conventional scientific reasoning, the authors made the claim that the evidence of “proteomics overlapping between different forms of life are more likely to be interpreted as a reflection of a single common fingerprint initiated by a mighty creator than relying on a single cell that is, in a doubtful way, surprisingly originating all other kinds of life.” Salzberg notes that the title—“Mitochondria, the missing link between body and soul: Proteomic prospective evidence”—should have raised a red flag insofar as “scientific papers do not talk about the ‘soul.”’ He likewise finds it hard to understand how reviewers could have missed the discussion of the “mighty creator” in the body of the text. As it turned out, the paper was heavily plagiarized and on those grounds the journal stopped its publication. But the incident raises a number of interesting challenges, as Salzberg writes:

    This entire episode points out a weakness in scientific peer review that creationists and other pseudoscience proponents may try to exploit again. We only caught this attempted fraud thanks to the diligence of bloggers: the journal itself had already missed it. What is perhaps more troubling is the fact that the journal relied solely on the plagiarism to force the retraction: if not for that, the article might have been published despite its unsubstantiated creationist claims. .... The ... paper demonstrates a new strategy that proponents of creationism might attempt again, and perhaps next time they will not be so foolish as to plagiarize their text. We can only hope that the publicity surrounding this incident will alert both reviewers and editors of scientific journals to be on the lookout for “stealth” creationist claims in the future. Salzberg (2008).

    There are many questions that might be asked about this incident. For our purposes, the pertinent point is that if a paper is written in a scientific style, it may pass scientific peer review, even if its creationist claims are “unsubstantiated.”

  58. The scientific literature on climate change is now vast; the obvious starting point is the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report. For analyses of the scientific consensus on anthropogenic climate change, see Oreskes (2004), Doran and Zimmerman (2009), Anderegg et al. (2010) and Cook et al. (2016);

  59. Gelbspan (1997), Monbiot (2007), Oreskes and Conway (2010) and Hoggan and Littlemore (2009).

  60. For a discussion of climate science as judged by conventional philosophical criteria, see Oreskes (2007). An early example of the scientific community formally rejecting the claims of climate change deniers is NAS Committee on Science, Engineering, and Public Policy, the National Academy of Engineering (NAE), and the Institute of Medicine (IOM), who in the early 1990s conducted a major consensus study on this issue, entitled Policy Implications of Greenhouse Warming (1991, 1992). This analysis concluded that, “Even given the considerable uncertainties in our knowledge of the relevant phenomena, greenhouse warming poses a potential threat sufficient to merit prompt responses. ...Investment in mitigation measures acts as insurance protection against the great uncertainties and the possibility of dramatic surprises.”

    For more recent discussions, see National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (2005). For succinct summaries, see The Governor’s Office of Planning and Research (2011), Wayne et al. (2016) and Climate Nexus (2013). A particularly useful contribution is from The Royal Society (2005).

    For the perspective of the Vatican, see: The Pontifical Academy of Sciences (2017).

  61. Oreskes (2010).

  62. Proctor (2012) and Brandt (2009).

  63. Oreskes (2010), p. 244.

  64. First published as Global Warming: What Does the Science Tell Us? The Marshall Institute republished this as Scientific Perspectives on the Greenhouse Problem in 1989, 1990, and 1991. See Jastrow et al. (1989).

  65. The Institute no longer denies the reality of man-made climate change, and now takes a much more subtle and nuanced approach than in the 1980s and 90s. However, it continues to echo tobacco industry strategy with its persistent emphasis on scientific uncertainty. A recent visit to their web site, found a continued primary emphasis on the uncertainties in climate science, viz: “Many of the temperature data and computer models used to predict climate change are themselves as uncertain as are our understanding of important interactions in the natural climate.” While this claim is not false, it strongly contrasts with the tone and tenor of recent scientific assessments, such as the recent IPCC statement that “warming is unequivocal.” (IPCC Fourth Assessment Report).

    Given that the Marshall Institute provides no link on its home page to any of the major scientific societies’ statements or reports on climate change, it is fair to say, at minimum, that the focus on uncertainty as the central point on its home page is out of step with the central conclusions of the expert community. For a detailed accounting of how the institute’s activities and positions have specifically clashed with mainstream science, see The Desmog Blog and Newsweek (2007).

    In the 1990s Frederick Seitz stepped down from the chairmanship, to be replaced by William O’Keefe, previously Treasurer/Secretary of the Competitive Enterprise Institute, COO of the American Petroleum Institute, and a registered lobbyist for Exxon-Mobil Corporation. Recently, the institute sponsored a talk by physicist William Happer entitled “The Myth of Carbon Pollution,” (Happer 2014). Happer promotes the idea that increased atmospheric CO\(_2\) will be good for the environment because it will promote plant growth, a claim that was investigated—and discredited—by scientists in the 1990s. See Oreskes (2010), “My facts are better than your facts.”

  66. The Oregon petition continues to be cited in public debate as “evidence” that there is no scientific consensus on the reality of anthropogenic climate change, see Bast (2016).

  67. Oregon Institute of Science and Medicine (2015a).

  68. Oregon Institute of Science and Medicine (2015b).

  69. The National Academy of Sciences (1998).

  70. Kuipers (2012).

  71. Singer (2015).

  72. See “About the NIPCC”.

  73. The CATO institute (2017).

  74. Center for the Study of Science (2012).

  75. Compare the CATO Institute’ “Addendum: Global Climate Change Impacts in the United States” with the US Global Change Research Program’s “Global Climate Change Impacts in the United States” (Holdren et al. 2009).

  76. Crawford (2009).

  77. On the social production of ignorance, see Proctor and Schiebinger (Eds.) (2008).

  78. Hoyningen-Huene (2013), note 4 on p. 204.

  79. Chamberlin (1928), p. 83.

  80. Behe (1998).

  81. Lewandowsky et al. (2016).

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Oreskes, N. Systematicity is necessary but not sufficient: on the problem of facsimile science. Synthese 196, 881–905 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1481-1

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