Abstract
This article is a reply to Baron Reed and Heather Battaly, two critics in a book symposium on my Reflective Knowledge. The reply to Reed concerns the main content and structure of Descartes’s epistemology. The reply to Battaly concerns how best to deal with epistemic circularity.
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References
Descartes, R. (1984). The philosophical writings of Descartes (Vol. II) (J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, & D. Murdoch, Trans.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Sosa E. (2009) Reflective knowledge. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Sosa, E. (2011a). Descartes and virtue epistemology. In K. Clark & M. Rea (Eds.), Science, religion, and metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press (forthcoming).
Sosa, E. (2011b). Descartes’s epistemology. In D. Dodd, C. Wright, & E. Zardini (Eds.), Contemporary perspectives on perceptual justification and skepticism. Oxford: Oxford University Press (forthcoming).
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Sosa, E. On Reflective Knowledge: replies to Battaly and Reed. Synthese 188, 309–321 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-011-9920-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-011-9920-x