Abstract
In the course of defending his view of the relation between the special sciences and physics from Jaegwon Kim’s objections Jerry Fodor asks “So then, why is there anything except physics?” By which he seems to mean to ask if physics is fundamental and complete in its domain how can there be autonomous special science laws. Fodor wavers between epistemological and metaphysical understandings of the autonomy of the special sciences. In my paper I draw out the metaphysical construal of his view and argue that while in a sense it answers Fodor’s question it is immensely implausible.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Cartwright N. (1999) The dappled world: A study of the boundaries of science. Cambridge University Press, London
Fodor J. (1974) Disunity of science as a working hypothesis. Synthese 28(2): 97–115
Fodor J. (1989) Making mind matter more. Philosophical Topics 17: 59–80
Fodor J. (1991) You can fool some of the people all of the time, everything else being equal: Hedged laws and psychological explanation. Mind 100(397): 19–34
Fodor J. (1997) Special sciences: Still autonomous after all these years. Philosophical Perspectives 11: 149–163
Fodor, J. (2007). Against Darwinism (ms).
Goodman N. (1983) Fact, fiction, and forecast. (4th ed.). Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA
Kim, J. (1997). The mind-body problem: Taking stock after forty years. Noûs, 31, 185–207 (Supplement: Philosophical Perspectives, 11, Mind, Causation, and World, 1997).
Kim J. (2005) Physicalism, or something near enough. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ
Kim J. (2007) Causation and mental causation. In: McLaughlin B., Cohen J. (eds) Contemporary debates in philosophy of mind. London/Oxford, Wiley/Blackwell
Kitcher P. (2001) Science, truth, and democracy. Oxford University Press, NY, USA (paperback 2003)
Loewer B. (2007a) Mental causation; or something near enough. In: McLaughlin B.P., Cohen J.D. (eds) Contemporary debates in philosophy of mind. Blackwell, Oxford
Loewer B. (2007b) Counterfactuals and the second law. In: Price H., Corry R. (eds) Russell’s republic: The place of causation in the constitution of reality. Oxford University Press, NY, USA
Loewer B. (2008) Why there is thing except physics. In: Kallestrup J., Hohwy J. (eds) Being reduced: New essays on reduction, explanation, and causation. Oxford University Press, NY, USA
Papineau D. (2001) The rise of physicalism. In: Gilette C., Loewer B. (eds) Physicalism and its discontents. Cambridge University Press, London
Pietoski P., Rey G. (1995) When other things aren’t equal: Saving Ceteris Paribus laws from vacuity. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46(1): 81–110
Warfield T. (1993) Folk-psychological Ceteris-Paribus laws. Philosophical Studies 71(1): 99–112
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Loewer, B. Why is there anything except physics?. Synthese 170, 217–233 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9580-2
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9580-2