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Some remarks on the bearing of model theory on the theory of theories

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Abstract

The present paper offers some remarks on the significance of first order model theory for our understanding of theories, and more generally, for our understanding of the “structuralist” accounts of the nature of theoretical knowledge that we associate with Russell, Ramsey and Carnap. What is unique about the presentation is the prominence it assigns to Craig’s Interpolation Lemma, some of its corollaries, and the manner of their demonstration. They form the underlying logical basis of the analysis.

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Demopoulos, W. Some remarks on the bearing of model theory on the theory of theories. Synthese 164, 359–383 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-008-9355-1

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