Abstract
Despite the currently perceived urgent need among contemporary philosophers of chemistry for adjudicating between two rival metaphysical conceptual frameworks—is chemistry primarily a science of substances or processes?—this essay argues that neither provides us with what we need in our attempts to explain and comprehend chemical operations and phenomena. First, I show the concept of a chemical property can survive the abandoning of the metaphysical framework of substance. While this abandonment means that we will need to give up essential properties, contingent properties can give us all the stability we need to account for chemical continuity as well as change. I then go on to show that this attention to clusters of contingent properties does not force us into the arms of an alternative process metaphysical framework either. Finally, I sketch a view I call particularism with respect to chemical properties on analogy with moral particularism. I conclude by sketching some of the implications for the field of philosophy of chemistry of my proposal that we abandon our interest in the metaphysical question of what chemistry is primarily about in favor of a broadly scientific particularism with respect to kinds and properties.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Bakhurst D. (2000). Ethical particularism in context. In: Hooker B., Little M. (eds) Moral particularism. Oxford, Oxford University Press
Bushan N., Rosenfeld S. (2000). Of minds and molecules. Oxford, Oxford University Press
Bhushan N. (2006). Are chemical kinds natural kinds?. In: Baird, Scerri, McIntyre (eds) Philosophy of chemistry: Synthesis of a new discipline. The Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science Series, 242. The Netherlands, Springer, pp. 327–336
Bhushan, N. (2004). Introduction. In N. Bhushan (Guest Ed.), Explanation and the chemical sciences: Challenges, opportunities, prospects. Special issue of Foundations of Chemistry, 6(1), 3–11.
Carpenter B. (2000). Models and explanations: Understanding chemical reaction mechanisms. In: Bhushan N., Rosenfeld S. (eds) Of minds and molecules. New York, Oxford University Press, pp. 211–229
Cartwright N. (1999). The Dappled World. UK, Cambridge University Press
Christie J., Christie M. (2000). “Laws” and “Theories” in chemistry do not obey the rules. In: Bhushan N., Rosenfeld S. (eds) Of minds and molecules. New York, Oxford University Press, pp. 34–50
Cobb J.B. (1988). Ecology, science, and religion: Toward a postmodern worldview. In: Griffin D.R. (eds) The reenchantment of science. Albany, New York, State University of New York Press, pp. 99–114
Dancy, J. (2005). Moral particularism. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, pp. 21–30.
Earley, J. (2003). Varieties of properties: An alternative distinction among qualities. In Chemical explanation: Characteristics, development, autonomy (pp. 80–89). New York Academy of Sciences.
Earley J. (1998). Modes of chemical becoming. Hyle, 4, 105–115
Grosholz E., Hoffmann R. (2000). How symbolic and iconic languages bridge the two worlds of the chemist: A case study from contemporary bioorganic chemistry. In: Bhushan N., Rosenfeld S. (eds) Of minds and molecules. New York, Oxford University Press, pp. 230–250
Kripke S. (1980). Naming and necessity. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press
Little M. (2000). Moral generalities revisited. In: Hooker B., Little M. (eds) Moral particularism. Oxford, Oxford University Press
Menzies P. (1999). Intrinsic versus extrinsic conceptions of causation. In: Sankey H. (eds) Causation and laws of nature. Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers
Putnam H. (1975). Language, truth and reality. MA, Cambridge University Press
Sankey H. (eds) (1999). Causation and laws of nature. Australasian Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, Vol. 14. Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers
Shummer J. (1998). The chemical core of chemistry I: A conceptual approach. Hyle, 4, 129–62
Stein R.L. (2004). Toward a process philosophy of chemistry. Hyle, 10(1):5–22
van Brakel J. (1997). Chemistry as the science of the transformation of substances. Synthese, 111, 253–282
van Brakel J. (2000a). The nature of chemical substances. In: Bhushan N., Rosenfeld S. (eds) Of minds and molecules. New York, Oxford University Press, pp. 162–186
van Brakel J. (2000b). Philosophy of chemistry. Belgium, Leuven University Press
Weininger S. (2000). Butlerov’s vision: The timeless, the transient, and the representation of chemical structure. In: Bhushan N., Rosenfeld S. (eds) Of minds and molecules. New York, Oxford University Press, pp. 143–161
Weininger, S. (2004). Response to “Telltale signs: What common explanatory strategies in chemistry reveal about explanation itself.’ In N. Bhushan (Guest Ed.), Explanation and the chemical sciences: Challenges, opportunities, prospects. Special issue of Foundations of Chemistry, 6(1), 45–48.
Weisberg, M. (2006). Water is not 2. In Baird, Scerri, & McIntyre (Eds.), Philosophy of chemistry: Synthesis of a new discipline (pp. 337–346). In the Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science Series, 242. The Netherlands: Springer.
Woody, A. (2003). On explanatory practice and disciplinary identity. In Chemical explanation: Characteristics, development, autonomy (pp. 22–29). New York.
Woody, A. (2004). Telltale signs: What common explanatory strategies in chemistry reveal about explanation itself. In N. Bhushan (Guest Ed.), Explanation and the chemical sciences: Challenges, opportunities, prospects. Special issue of Foundations of Chemistry, 6(1), 13–43.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Bhushan, N. What is a chemical property?. Synthese 155, 293–305 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-006-9115-z
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-006-9115-z