Abstract
There is some consensus that for S to know that p, it cannot be merely a matter of luck that S’s belief that p is true. This consideration has led Duncan Pritchard and others to propose a safety condition on knowledge. In this paper, we argue that the safety condition is not a proper formulation of the intuition that knowledge excludes luck. We suggest an alternative proposal in the same spirit as safety, and find it lacking as well.
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Hiller, A., Neta, R. Safety and epistemic luck. Synthese 158, 303–313 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-006-9041-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-006-9041-0