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Distributed Knowability and Fitch’s Paradox

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Abstract

Recently predominant forms of anti-realism claim that all truths are knowable. We argue that in a logical explanation of the notion of knowability more attention should be paid to its epistemic part. Especially very useful in such explanation are notions of group knowledge. In this paper we examine mainly the notion of distributed knowability and show its effectiveness in the case of Fitch’s paradox. Proposed approach raised some philosophical questions to which we try to find responses. We also show how we can combine our point of view on Fitch’s paradox with the others. Next we give an answer to the question: is distributed knowability factive? At the end, we present some details concerning a construction of anti-realist modal epistemic logic.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Logic, Nicholas Copernicus University, Asnyka 2, 87-100, Toruń, Poland

    Rafał Palczewski

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  1. Rafał Palczewski
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Correspondence to Rafał Palczewski.

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Special Issue Formal Epistemology II. Edited by Branden Fitelson

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Palczewski, R. Distributed Knowability and Fitch’s Paradox. Stud Logica 86, 455–478 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11225-007-9070-9

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