Abstract
The main objective of this article is to analyse strategies of embodied cognition and the intersubjective ground for individual intentions in the process of image-based oncoradiology diagnosis. The article presents a range of both oncoradiology imaging specifics and concrete operations performed by radiologists during their daily professional routine. This data shows how the embodied diagnostic cognition based on medical imaging is structured. Hence, this paper proposes an enactive theory of oncoradiology imaging and considers the wider problem of how knowledge is related to the (embodied) subjectivity in a particular social setting.
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Notes
Representationalism, first of all, is a claim about the existence of stable structures endowed with natural or intrinsic content and that play a role in cognitive processing [43].
According to Heidegger, equipment is often revealed to subjects as being for the sake of (the lives and projects of) other Dasein (in our case, other radiologists, patients, etc.) [17, Sect. 26].
This “indeterminancy” is productive, because there is a difference between not yet having made up your mind whether tumor or something else, on the one hand, and positively affirming that either tumor or something, on the other.
Regarding an anti-representational approach to radiograms, we may add that other contextual factors, for example, histology (knowledge of regularities of a particular tissue), also determine how the cancer “looks.”.
“An apprehension is that which gives form to the presenting or representing contents (hyletic data) belonging to an act. It is the experiential grasp of an object in a determinate manner” [9: 39].
See in this regard [40].
The inner displacement combines what is given in person with other modes of intentionality. This means that our self is multiplied and correlated with its displaced correlate. Displacement allows us to combine what we have seen with what we are apprehending now, creating anticipations and possibilities.
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Briedis, M. Sensing Diagnostic Images: Skilful Embodied Cognition in Oncoradiology. Sens Imaging 23, 2 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11220-021-00372-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11220-021-00372-0