Abstract
Previous research has demonstrated that unfairness judgments of resource allocations become more complex when there are more than two recipients. In order to explain some of this complexity, we propose a set of psychological mechanisms that may underlie four different choices of maximally unfair resource allocations (MUA): Self-Single-Loser, Self-One-Loser-of-Many, Self-Single-Winner, and Self-One-Winner-of-Many. From this psychological theory, several predictions are derived and tested in vignette studies involving a total of 708 participants recruited online using MTurk. As predicted by our theory, (1) choices of MUA where there is a single loser were much more common when the allocated resource was of negative rather than positive valence, and (2) the amount of egoistic bias individuals exhibited when judging the unfairness in receiving a small rather than a large share in a non-extreme multi-party allocation was predicted by their choices of MUA. These findings suggest that an individual’s choice of MUA reveals some generally relevant principles of how unfairness is perceived in multi-party allocations. This opens up new lines of inquiry, especially regarding research on social dilemmas and social value orientation.
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Notes
To see that this is the case, consider an allocation in four shares, a ≥ b ≥ c ≥ d ≥ 0. It is straightforward to calculate the total inequality as (a − b) + (a − c) + (a − d) + (b − c) + (b − d) + (c − d) = 3a + b − c − 3d. This expression is clearly maximized when a is maximal and d is minimal. For 36 vases, this occurs when a = 36 and b = c = d = 0.
Essentially the same effect, termed “last-place aversion,” is discussed in behavioral economics (Kuziemko, Buell, Reich, & Norton 2014).
For each study, 400 responses were collected. From these samples, we excluded anyone who had not completed every measure or taken part in this set of studies more than once as indicated by their Mturk user ID.
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Appendix: Vignettes
Appendix: Vignettes
Positive Valence
Imagine that your elderly neighbor, “Mrs. P,” has just died. She had no children, but there were three neighbors (you, “A” and “B”) who used to take turns taking care of her. You have never met the other two neighbors before and have no relation to them. Mrs. P used to say that the three of you would not learn her definitive evaluation of your efforts and willingness to help her until after her death. Soon after Mrs. P’s death, all three of you are called to a meeting with her attorney who will read out the old lady’s evaluation of you as part of her will. The attorney says that the only things of value in Mrs. P’s estate are 9 identical precious vases. According to the will, the 9 have to be discreetly distributed among you as follows: “A” receives 1 vase, “B” receives 3 vases, and you receive 5 vases.
[The other two conditions presented other allocations in the last sentence, either 3:5:1 or 5:1:3.]
Negative Valence
Imagine that your elderly neighbor, “Mrs. P,” needs help moving a cupboard that contains 9 identical precious vases. Three neighbors (you, “A” and “B”) help her. You have never met the other two neighbors before and have no relation to them. Unfortunately, the three of you manage to drop the cupboard while moving it so that all 9 vases break. Through her attorney, Mrs. P demands that the three of you replace the vases. The attorney informs you that Mrs. P has requested that “A” must replace 1 vase, “B” must replace 3 vases, and you must replace 5 vases.
[The other two conditions presented other allocations in the last sentence, either 3:5:1 or 5:1:3.]
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Eriksson, K., Kazemi, A. & Törnblom, K. A New Look at Individual Differences in Perceptions of Unfairness: The Theory of Maximally Unfair Allocations in Multiparty Situations. Soc Just Res 28, 401–414 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11211-015-0255-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11211-015-0255-5