Abstract
Dissent is a word we come across frequently these days. We read it in the newspapers, use it in discussions with friends and colleagues—perhaps even engage in the activity ourselves. And yet for all of its popularity, few of us, if pressed, would be able to pin down exactly what dissent is. It is this question I wish to explore in this paper. In particular my aim will be to provide a conceptual analysis of the idea of dissent such that we may more cleanly distinguish it from other related forms of disagreement. I use a recent book written on the topic by Ronald Collins and David Skover as an argumentative foil.
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Notes
I take it that this is the approach David Lefkowitz employs in his paper on civil disobedience (Lefkowitz 2007).
Among other things, the object of a person or group’s dissent can be: a practice; a policy; a decision or line of reasoning; an official action or attitude; a norm adopted by some informal group; a norm adopted by an authoritative body; etc. I have opted to use the term ‘attitude’ due entirely to its generality.
Thoreau was arrested in July 1846 for his ongoing failure to pay the Massachusetts poll tax.
Throughout their book, Collins and Skover make reference to a number of on-the-record conversations with top scholars in the field, all of which were conducted between 2004 and 2012 (cf., Collins and Skover 2013, p. ix).
References
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Callaghan, G.D. What Is Dissent?. Res Publica 25, 373–386 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-018-9405-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-018-9405-6