Abstract
Edward Feser defends the ‘Aristotelian proof’ for the existence of God, which reasons that the only adequate explanation of the existence of change is in terms of an unchangeable, purely actual being. His argument, however, relies on the falsity of the Existential Inertia Thesis (EIT), according to which concrete objects tend to persist in existence without requiring an existential sustaining cause. In this article, I first characterize the dialectical context of Feser’s Aristotelian proof, paying special attention to EIT and its rival thesis—the Existential Expiration Thesis. Next, I provide a more precise characterization of EIT, after which I outline two metaphysical accounts of existential inertia. I then develop new lines of reasoning in favor of EIT that appeal to the theoretical virtues of explanatory power and simplicity. Finally, I address the predominant criticisms of EIT in the literature.
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Notes
Roughly, x is a sustaining cause of y’s existence provided that (i) y’s existence causally depends on x’s causal activity at any moment at which y exists, and (ii) x’s moment-by-moment causal activity is a necessary condition for y’s moment-by-moment existence.
The arguments to which I refer include (but are not limited to) four of the five proofs explored in Feser (2017), wherein Feser concludes to a purely actual, absolutely simple being whose essence and existence are identical by arguing that each of the following require sustaining causes of their existence: (i) changeable beings; (ii) composite beings; (iii) beings with essence-existence distinctions; and (iv) contingent beings.
The only explicit treatments of which I’m aware are Beaudoin (2007), Feser (2011), and Audi (2019). But see Kvanvig and McCann (1988) for treatments of related topics such as divine creation, conservation, and explanations of persistence. See also Oppy (2019) wherein existential inertia is (briefly) leveled against the Aristotelian proof.
Feser, who accepts DDC, concurs: “The Doctrine of Divine Conservation (DDC) holds that the things that God has created could not continue in existence for an instant if He were not actively preserving them in being” (emphasis added) (Feser 2011, p. 237).
Indeed, the tendencies are simply opposites. For P-EIT, it is to continue to exist; for EET, it is to cease to exist.
An alternative formulation quantifies not over concrete objects simpliciter but instead on a subset of them—the fundamental, underlying physical stuff of the material world (whatever its intrinsic nature). Under this formulation, the inertialist holds that there is something possessing existential inertia out of which the composite physical objects of the world are constructed.
Beaudoin does not specify how his first condition—in conjunction with neither a tendency to persist nor a tendency to expire—could account for the world’s continuance. Absent a tendency to persist, (for all Beaudoin’s account shows) things could instantaneously annihilate without there being an annihilating power exercised such as that specified in (i).
I leave open (for conservatism) which of the accounts is correct.
If time is continuous, consider the temporal state immediately prior to t as some suitably small finite interval of time with t as its later-than bound.
Two notes. First, the phrase ‘O-at-t’ is non-committal about its being (i) an enduring object wholly present at t versus (ii) a temporal stage of a four-dimensional object. Second, the account remains neutral on the type of explanation at play. Depending on one’s other metaphysical commitments, it could be causation, grounding, counterfactual dependence, or a host of other forms of explanation.
While some of the following arguments solely reference causation, they are aimed more broadly at explanations simpliciter. Again, (1) is cast solely in terms of explanation.
Perhaps one way to avoid this conclusion is to hold that our grasping of the connection between premises and conclusion is not extended through time but is rather done in a single, all-encompassing mental act. I would aver, however, that this contravenes not only my phenomenological evidence of discursive reasoning but also the evidence of the correlation between temporally extended brain states and discursive reasoning processes.
An accidentally ordered (per accidens) series is contrasted with an essentially ordered (or per se) series. In a per se series, each member wholly derives—right now—the relevant causal power from prior members of the series. In a per accidens series, by contrast, each member is such that it can exhibit the relevant causal power independently of prior members. Per se series only exist insofar as the relevant causal power is continuously and concurrently conjoined to the members with derivative power.
One illustration of this derives from (necessary) mathematical propositions. There are, for instance, different logically equivalent axiomatizations for mathematical theories, so there is no uncontroversial and non-arbitrary way to determine which mathematical propositions are more basic so as to ground or explain less basic propositions. Second, there are unprovable mathematical truths, in which case it is unclear what their explanation could be.
One might think talk of God’s persistence is inappropriate if God is timeless. If so, the argument is unaffected since the following will remain true: (i) the ultimate explanatory terminus of persistence on the divine sustenance account is God, and (ii) God will nevertheless have primitive existence (if not primitive persistence).
Of course, EIT and EET couldn’t both obtain—the point is that a proposed grounding for EET seemingly could equally well be a proposed grounding for EIT (e.g. if natures ground the expiration tendency, it seems natures could equally well ground the persistence tendency).
Even if it did, it would seem to introduce other primitives as well. For instance, it will simply be a primitive or basic necessary truth that God’s willing x brings x about (e.g. God’s willing objects to have a tendency to expire brings it about that objects have such a tendency). Likely, TST also introduces brute contrastive facts concerning God’s freely willed actions (why did God choose to sustain x rather than y, or sustain x for duration d rather than duration d*?).
Here is another reason supporting (2). Arguably, existence itself is a basic, primitive feature of reality. After all, any explanation of why there are existing things could only be in terms of an existing thing, in which case it presupposes the prior reality of the very thing to be explained. And while existence’s being primitive does not by itself entail that persistence in existence is primitive, intuitively it gives us at least some reason to expect it.
Here is a suggestion for a third account: adopt Feser’s attempts at reconciliation (Feser (2013)) between the Aristotelian act-potency causal principle and mechanical inertia. Feser writes:
[W]e could take seriously the idea that inertial motion is a state, involving no real change and thus no actualization of potency. In this case, the question of how the principle of motion and the principle of inertia relate to one another does not even arise… (Feser 2013, pp. 250–251).
Similarly, we can hold that persistence is not itself a change but rather the absence of change—and hence the Aristotelian principle Feser employs to justify the requirement of sustaining causes is inapplicable. More can be said, but this suffices for a footnote.
Objection: This would only be true if TST predicts the observability of sustaining causes. Response: First, all it requires is that, under TST, the probability of observing sustaining causes is not low. So, if (say) there is no reason to expect—either way—whether sustaining causes would be observable under TST, then the conditional expectation of their observability would be 0.5, whereas it is much lower for EIT. This alone would provide evidential confirmation of EIT vis-à-vis TST. Second, Feser explicitly attempts to identify observable cases of sustaining causal actualizers.
‘They’ rigidly designates O-at-t and O-at-t*.
Unfortunately, Feser does not define or explicate the notion (indeed, it seems to be a conceptual primitive in the Aristotelian framework).
References
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Acknowledgements
I am grateful to Joshua Rasmussen for his gifts of time and energy as well as his role in cultivating my interest in philosophy. I also want to thank my parents for their love and support.
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Schmid, J.C. Existential inertia and the Aristotelian proof. Int J Philos Relig 89, 201–220 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-020-09773-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-020-09773-9