Abstract
Lougheed (Ratio 31:331–341, 2018) argues that a possible solution to the problem of divine hiddenness is that God hides in order to increase the axiological value of the world. In a world where God exists, the goods associated with theism necessarily obtain. But Lougheed also claims that in such a world it’s possible to experience the goods of atheism, even if they don’t actually obtain. This is what makes a world with a hidden God more valuable than a world where God is unhidden (where it’s impossible to experience atheistic goods), and also more valuable than an atheistic world with no God (and hence no theistic goods). We show that Lougheed never considers the comparison between a world where God hides and an atheistic world. We argue that it’s possible for a person to experience theistic goods in a world where God does not exist, a possibility Lougheed never considers. If this is right it undermines his axiological solution to divine hiddenness. We conclude by showing how our discussion of the axiology of theism connects to the existential question of whether God exists; that is, we show that the axiological question is (partly) dependent on the existential question.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
It’s worth noting that this doesn’t include impersonal goods, since they may not have to be experienced.
While one of the authors in this paper (Lougheed) wrote the article we criticize, for the sake of clarity we write as if it wasn’t written by one of us. Lougheed hopes to address some of the challenges we raise in his future work.
One possible downside to this is that it makes God a deceiver. However, it isn’t clear to us that this type of deception really lowers the value of the world (e.g. deceiving the Nazis about the location of Jews isn’t a bad-making feature of the world). There is more to say here, but we won’t discuss this issue further; for the rest of this project we’re going to assume that this type of deception doesn’t entail a value drop.
In his words: “In light of this it…appears that Hidden Theistic World is the most rational world to prefer. One gets the complete set of goods of one ontology (theism) and the experience of another set of goods from another ontology (atheism). Neither Atheistic World nor Unhidden Theistic World can offer both.” (2017: 7).
We’re grateful to an anonymous referee for bringing the force of this objection to our attention. The counterexample comes directly from them.
We emphasize that we are not assuming that NDEs entail, or even are evidence for, an afterlife. Rather, we are only assuming that the testimony of the subjects is not fabricated—we are assuming that the subjects really had the experiences they say they had. For some looks at the plausibility, or evidential force, of NDEs, see e.g. Carol Zaleski (1987) and Kenneth Ring (1980).
In other words: the experience seems to the subject as having occurred after their death, and thus their experience is of events that happen after the life of their body.
Guy Kahane (2018) has recently observed that it’s possible to get the actual good of an afterlife on atheism. However, as a critique of Lougheed, our project need only show that the experience of theistic goods is possible on atheism. Hence, we won’t affirm the more controversial position that the actual theistic goods can obtain.
Mawson isn’t naïve about potential problems with attempting to make this is comparison (e.g. counterpossibles are only trivially true) but set this worry to the side. Likewise, ignore concerns about the identity of the indiscernibles.
Mawson ultimately favours a form of (weak) pro-theism because he believes that we should prefer a world where God exists to world with a simulacrum of God who is necessarily at least slightly less than God, etc. But evaluating his conclusion isn’t important for our project here. The point we’re gleaning here is that theistic goods are possible in similar atheistic worlds.
The objection discussed in this section is owed to a referee.
This is a fictional example.
Kahane also shows that this good can actually obtain on atheism (2018, 95–133).
We do not pretend that these are the necessary and sufficient conditions for justice to obtain in this case.
We have added the qualification “is in the process of receiving her due” on account of the traditional Christian view of hell, in which a person suffers an everlasting punishment (perhaps via separation from God) for her sins. Obviously, since the punishment is never ending, she has not received her due in full—if she had, then it would have ceased. Thus, the fact that she is in the (direct) process of receiving her due (which is never ending) is sufficient for cosmic justice to obtain, and hence the feeling that all are in the (direct) process of receiving their due is sufficient for the experience of cosmic justice to obtain.
Again, Kahane demonstrates that this theistic good can obtain on atheism (2018, 95–133).
For a concrete example, see Teresa of Avila (2010).
From the fact that it could happen we infer it has happened. This because in our world there are many people who report having such experience. We take this to be uncontroversial.
There might be worlds which are incompatible with God’s existence (and hence impossible for God to create) which are more valuable than worlds with God. This is what Kahane (2018) appears to think, but this does not undermine this possible reply for Lougheed. For so long as the experience of atheistic goods would increase the value of a theistic world, God has reason to ensure such goods obtain.
This, of course, assumes that all theistic goods can be experienced in an atheistic world (which we argued above) and that all atheistic goods can be experienced in (certain) theistic worlds.
Or, it must be shown that the experience of goods is of no (or little) value.
We also need to know whether or not God is hidden.
References
Cullison, A. (2010). Two solutions to the problem of divine hiddenness. American Philosophical Quarterly, 47(2), 119–134.
Davis, R. B., & Franks, W. P. (2018). Plantinga’s defence and his theodicy are incompatible. In K. J. Kraay (Ed.), Does God matter? Essays on the axiological consequences of theism (pp. 203–223). New York: Routledge.
Heathcote-James, E. (2001). Seeing angels: True contemporary accounts of hundreds of angelic experiences. London: John Blake Publishing.
Kahane, G. (2018). If there is a hole it is not God shaped. In K. J. Kraay (Ed.), In does God matter? Essays on the axiological consequences of theism (pp. 95–132). New York: Routledge.
Kraay, K. J. (2018). Invitation to the axiology of theism. In K. J. Kraay (Ed.), Does God Matter? Essays on the axiological consequences of theism. New York: Routledge.
Lougheed, K. (2018). The axiological solution to divine hiddenness. Ratio, 31, 331–341.
Mawson, T. J. (2018). An agreeable answer to a pro-theism/anti-theism question. In K. J. Kraay (Ed.), Does God matter? Essays on the axiological consequences of theism (pp. 70–92). New York: Routledge.
Moody, R. (1975). Live after life. New York: Bantam Books.
Nagel, T. (1970). Death. Nous, 4.1, 73–80.
Penner, M. A., & Arbour, B. H. (2018). Arguments from evil and evidence for pro-theism. In K. J. Kraay (Ed.), Does God matter? Essays on the axiological consequences of theism (pp. 192–202). New York: Routledge.
Ring, K. (1980). Life at death: A scientific investigation of near death experience. New York: Coward McCann.
Schellenberg, J. L. (1993). Divine hiddenness and human reason. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Schellenberg, J. L. (2015). The hiddeness argument: Philosophy’s new challenge to belief in God. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Schellenberg, J. L. (2018). Triple transcendence, the value of God’s existence, and a new route to atheism. In K. J. Kraay (Ed.), Does God matter? Essays on the axiological consequences of theism. New York: Routledge.
Terisa of Avila. (2010). Autobiography of St. Teresa of Avila. New York: Dover Publications.
Tooley, M. (2018). Axiology: Theism versus widely accepted monotheisms. In K. J. Kraay (Ed.), Does God matter? Essays on the axiological consequences of theism. New York: Routledge.
Zaleski, C. (1987). Other wordly journeys: Accounts of near death experience in medieval and modern times. Oxford: Oxford University Press
Acknowledgements
We’re grateful to G. LG. (Colin Patrick Mitchell) and Klaas J. Kraay for particularly insightful comments on an earlier version of the paper. Lougheed’s contribution to the paper was made possible, in part, by funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Hendricks, P., Lougheed, K. Undermining the axiological solution to divine hiddenness. Int J Philos Relig 86, 3–15 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-018-9693-y
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-018-9693-y