Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Duns Scotus’ univocity: applied to the debate on phenomenological theology

  • Article
  • Published:
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Scotus’ theory of univocity is described: his exact definition of univocity and his view of transcendental concepts that are ‘simply simple’. These concepts are said to be univocally applied to God and creatures. Next, we describe Scotus’ views on univocity in ‘being’ and the precise meaning of the infinite and finite ‘mode’ of being. Finally, we apply these results to work of Heidegger and Marion. It appears that they had an insufficient grasp of the intricacies of Scotus’ theory of univocity and that Marion’s religious phenomenology could have benefitted from these scotistic tools.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. For an introduction to his thought against the backdrop of the history of Scotus-scolarship of the last 100 years, see (Honnefelder et al. (1996), pp. 1–33). And Cross (1999).

  2. I use the term ‘phenomenological theology’ to denote the often apophatic theologians like Jean-Luc Marion and E. Levinas. Traditionally, the apophatic way or ‘aphairesis’ is one of three interwoven ways of knowing God: the ‘via negativa’, ‘analogia’ and ‘eminentia’, see, e.g. Scotus, Lectura I. 8.58. As such, this ‘via negativa’ or ‘via abstractiva’ is part and parcel of scholastic thought on God-talk; Scotus uses it too. It refers to the process of removing creaturely imperfections from terms applied to God. If used exclusively, however, at the expense of the other two ways, the ‘via negativa’ tends to acquire another meaning: the mystic process of a Neoplatonic or pantheistic religious conviction rather than a semantic analysis in a theistic or Christian context. See (Rocca (2004), pp. 3–7) and Wisse (2011).

  3. (Marion (1991), pp. 108–111): ‘From our real point of view, the agapē that envisages remains unenvisageable (since, precisely, the icon intervenes only when it takes the initiative to envisage us and consists only in such an inversion of the gaze).’

  4. In a similar vein Marion states: ‘The history of philosophy has a long-standing knowledge of such saturated phenomena. One could go so far as to maintain that none of the most important metaphysicians has avoided the description of one or more saturated phenomena, even at the price of a head-on contradiction of his own presuppositions’ (Marion 2000, p. 213).

  5. As far as Catherine Pickstock is concerned, Richard Cross honoured her work with a detailed assessment (Cross 2001, 2005).

  6. See also Swinbur-ne (1977), Williams (2005), Alston (2007) does not belong to this category: he argues for literacy. The same holds for Muis (2011). Univocity implies literacy, but not the other way around.

  7. Nor do I claim an all-inclusive exposition of his thought; those familiar with Scotus know that this would require an impressive monograph. I leave out, e.g.: an account of the difference between in quid and in quale; an extensive exploration of the relation between divine knowledge and the ontological status of ens.

  8. Lectura I. 3.11: ‘Et huiusmodi conceptus qui tantum unus est unitate analogiae, est duo; sed tamen est quasi unus, quia sunt propinqui ad invicem per attributionem, et sic concipiuntur quasi unus.’ See (Cross (1999), p. 34). See also De Corte (1996).

  9. E.g. Lectura I. 3.25: ‘si conceptus dictus de Deo et creatura sit analogus et realiter duo conceptus omnino nihil cognosceremus de Deo. Consequens falsum, ergo antecedens.’ Prove further in nn. 21 t/m 30.

  10. (Honnefelder (1979), p. 310): ‘alterius et alterius rationis’.

  11. ‘Te esse infinitum et incomprehensibilem a finito’, (Schönberger (1996), p. 489).

  12. (Schönberger (1996), p. 489). So although we cannot know God in his unique essence in this state, we are able to develop an abstract, discursive kind of knowledge of Him.

  13. Duns: ‘Ut mihi videtur, haec propositio falsa est quod ‘nihil potest nominari a nobis magis proprie quam intelligatur’ ((Schönberger (1996), p. 491)).

  14. Lectura I. 8.53: ‘Tertia est opinio, media, quod est aliquis conceptus communis Deo et creaturae, et tamen Deus non est in genere; et hanc tenebo.’ See Lectura I. 8.99, proof nn. 100–105. Pace Blond, who states: ‘It was for this reason that Duns Scotus, when considering the universal science of metaphysics, elevated being (ens) to a higher station over God, so that being could be distributed to both God and His creatures’ (Blond 1998, p. 3).

  15. Lectura I. 3.22 (interpolation): ‘conceptus univocus est qui ita est unus quod eius unitas sufficit ad contradictionem, affirmando et negando ipsum de eodem.’ See (Vos (2006), p. 287). And Scotus adds: a univocal term yields a valid syllogism, ‘sufficit pro medio syllogistico’.

  16. Of course univocity still manifests itself in the genus-species relation, but this relation no longer defines the concept of univocity.

  17. (Sarot (2012), p. 121): ‘God BESTAAT, God bestaat niet.’

  18. He defines EXISTS as: ‘making a difference for our possibilities of acting’, (Sarot (2012), p. 121).

  19. Lectura I. 3.68: ‘Conceptus autem simpliciter simplex est ille conceptus qui non est resolubilis in alios conceptus priores; conceptus autem non simpliciter simplex est ille conceptus qui est resolubilis in alios conceptus priores ... licet simplici actu intelligendi concipiatur.’ See also (Vos (2006), pp. 172–174).

  20. It is not explained by something more known, see (Honnefelder (1979), p. 158).

  21. Lectura I. 8.109; (Vos (2006), pp. 288–292), (Honnefelder (1990), pp. 401–421).

  22. Lectura I. 8.106–107. See also 110: ‘Sic dicitur aliquis conceptus transcendens quia non habet supervenientem conceptum quem determinat: ideo est transcendens.’ Also Ordinatio I. 8.113.

  23. Ordinatio I. 8.115. ‘Disjuntive’ here means this or that (not both). I cannot digress on these disjunctive properties and perfections. Some of these disjunctive properties will reappear in the main text below. See (King (2003), pp. 26–28).

  24. Ordinatio I. 8.115: ‘et utrumque membrum illius disiuncti est transcendens quia neutrum determinat suum determinabile ad certum genus’.

  25. If we take a closer look at Muis’s definition, we find a certain degree of circularity. For what is univocity? Muis’s response is that the central semantic features must be in common. However, ‘in common’ in this context seems to be another term for univocal. This relates to the fact that simple concepts are semantic stop points (Muis 2011, p. 597).

  26. ‘Ens est primum obiectum adaequatum intellectui nostro’; Lectura I. 3.97; then follows the proof.

  27. However, Scotus is not a nominalist. This is bound up with his theory of individuality and his technical instrument of the distinctio formalis a parte rei. See e.g. (Dumont (1998), pp. 153–170).

  28. Pace (Marion (1995), pp. 31–66). In this article Marion argues that Aquinas’ position cannot be classified as ‘ontotheologie’. I am not convinced by this rather apophatic interpretation: an important objection is that Aquinas rejects the Neoplatonic doctrine that the highest principle (God) is above being. Summa Theologiae I. q.4 art. 2: ‘Secundo vero, ex hoc quod supra ostensum est, quod Deus est ipsum esse per se subsistens, ex quo oportet quod totam perfectionem essendi in se contineat. Manifestum est enim quod, si aliquod calidum non habeat totam perfectionem calidi, hoc ideo est, quia calor non participatur secundum perfectam rationem, sed si calor esset per se subsistens, non posset ei aliquid deesse de virtute caloris. Unde, cum Deus sit ipsum esse subsistens, nihil de perfectione essendi potest ei deesse.’ See also (Rocca (2004), pp. 72–74), (De Rijk (1981), pp. 204–206), Schönberger (1996, pp. 475–496), Wisse (2011).

  29. Lectura I. 3.225-241, especially n.235: ‘Praeterea, humanitas in quantum humanitas, aut est conceptus cui repugnat aliquid subesse in effectu, aut est conceptus ex se determinans esse in effectu, aut est conceptus cui non repugnat esse in effectu, non tamen sibi hoc determinat. \(<,\,>\) Si autem conceptus tertio modo, cui non repugnat esse in effectu, non tamen sibi hoc determinat, tunc est conceptus entis rati, secundum doctorem (Henry of Ghent) quem sequitur, quia in hoc distinguitur secundum ipsum ens ratum a ficticio.’ See also footnote 33.

  30. Ordinatio I. 36.60 : ‘Et quare homini non repugnat et chimaerae repugnat, est, quia hoc est hoc et illud illud, et hoc quocumque intellectu concipiente.’ See Honnefelder (1990, p. 52). See also Lectura I. 36.32 and n. 39. See also (Knuutila (1996), pp. 127–144).

  31. Not in an epistemic sense, because we learn the concrete daily concept of ‘being’ first. We mean primary ‘predicationis communitate’; i.e., that this concept is the most common. Only in that sense it is first: by everything made more precise, while itself does not make anything more precise.

  32. In terms of a theory of possible worlds: a state of affairs in a possible world W. See Vos (2006, p. 291).

  33. Due to this last sentence, Kant’s transcendental critique comes to mind. Kant must be understood against the backdrop of the Scotistic transcendental tradition in the eighteenth century: the line Scotus, Suárez, Wolff, Baumgarten. Of prime importance in this tradition is the relation between God’s knowledge and the ‘ratitudo’ of ens. Clearly, ens is something in thought, it is ‘esse intelligibile’. But is its ‘ratitudo’ constituted by this relation: is it a mere product of the divine act of knowing? (Dicunt quod ratitudo rei et res habens esse ratum non est nisi dependentia quaedam et respectus vestigialis ad Deum, Lectura I. 3.231). Or is this ratitudo ex se? For Scotus, the ratitudo rests in ens itself: it is ex se. This, however, does not mean that esse intelligibile has any form of real being, it is a category of its own. Until this point, Kant sticks to the inherited Scotistic tradition: knowledge is knowledge of something, or it isn’t knowledge. There is, however, this difference. Concerning the ‘ratitudo’, we must differentiate between a formal and a material aspect. The formal aspect is the ‘non-repugnantia’, the material aspect is the ‘somethingness’ (aliquitas) of the terms able to generate this (non)-repugnantia. Kant does not accept that the material aspect refers to—or is the expression of—a real ontological possibility. This is a nominalistic tendency, radicalised by Kant. I maintain that logical possibility is a sign of ontological possibility. See Honnefelder (1990, pp. 443–463). For Baumgarten see Ameriks (1992, pp. 249–279).

  34. Also for example between essential and accidental predicates.

  35. See footnote 23 above.

  36. ‘quod ipsum est cui nihil entitatis deest, eo modo quo possibile est illud haberi in aliquo uno.’ And: ‘Ens infinitum est quod excedit quodcumque ens finitum, non secundum aliquam determinatam proportionem, sed ultra omnem determinatam proportionem vel determinabilem.’ Quodl. q.5 n.4, cited by Honnefelder (1990, p. 111).

  37. See Lectura I. 8.79–80, a critical appraisal of Dionysius: the mode of knowing ‘quando cognoscitur per remotionem’.

  38. We are unable to prove this deductively, see Honnefelder (Honnefelder 1990, pp. 56–74); Lectura I. 39.40.

  39. In this case there is a being that cannot contradict itself (by not being). So it is a necessary being. In this line a reconstruction of the ontological argument is possible. Although Scotus himself endorses and ameliorates Anselm’s ontological argument, his own ‘via’ is this tripartite way: there must be a primacy in efficient cause, in final cause and in eminence (Vos 2006, pp. 471–479).

  40. These are Scotus’ disjunctive transcendental terms, see also footnote 23: ens is necessarily either necessary or contingent, either a se or ab alio, either infinite or finite. These disjunctive transcendentals do not coincide, although they necessarily imply each other.

  41. Discursive means not direct, but involving all kinds of steps in reasoning. See also (Boulnois (1995), pp. 104–105).

  42. Lectura I. 3.23: ‘Inter philosophos fuit controversia de primo principio entis. Quidam dixerunt illud esse litem et amicitiam, quidam autem ignem etc., sed nullus dubitavit, immo quilibet fuit certus quod illud quod posuit primum principium, fuit ens; unde certum conceptum habuerunt de ente, sed tamen quilibet dubitavit, nec fuit certus quod esset primum principium, ...’

  43. Lectura I. 3.24: ‘Praeterea, quilibet experitur in se ipso quod potest concipere ens non descendendo ad ens participatum vel non participatum. Si fiat descensus ad utrumque conceptum, quaero an stet conceptus entis, aut non? Si sic, habetur propositum; si autem indeterminate importat quasi unum, et quando fit descensus, est duo conceptus, tunc impossibile esset probare aliquid esse univocum, ut hominem respectu Socratis et Platonis; dicam enim quod ‘homo’ importat duos conceptus, videtur tamen tibi quod sit unus conceptus, quia illi conceptus sunt propinqui, sicut tu dicis de ente.’

  44. Virtual is a difficult term; in my opinion, Scotus uses it here in this sense: what can be construed out of it. See (Honnefelder (1979), pp. 329–331).

  45. What is left is only a theory of illumination: ‘nisi Deus velit imprimere sicut sibi placet’—unless God would imprint what pleases him. This argument is developed broader in Lectura I. 3.25–28.

  46. This objection only goes for Henry of Ghent’s theory of analogy. Aquinas, e.g., denies that God is the primum cognitum (he prefers the quidditas of the sense particular).

  47. Some work has already been done to fill in the enormous gap between Heidegger and Scotus. Honnefelder (1990) examined the Scotistic content of Suárez, Wolff, Kant and C.S. Peirce. See also footnote 33 above.

  48. Die Kategorien- und Bedeutungslehre; The Grammatica Speculativa is now commonly attributed to Thomas of Erfurt. See also Veldhuis (1990).

  49. Einführung in die Metaphysik, a text going back to a lecture from 1935.

  50. See e.g. (Heidegger (1987), p. 19). The term ‘ontotheologie’ stems from Kant, Heidegger gave it another sense; see (Heidegger (1987), p. 31). Later he wrote it like this: Onto-Theo-Logic, (Honnefelder (1996), p. 126).

  51. As a ‘ens a se’ Scotus would have phrased it more meticulously. See (Honnefelder (1996), pp. 71–72).

  52. See Heidegger (1916, p. 27): ‘Etwas überhaupt’; ‘Alles somit, was keinen Widerspruch einschließt’, 30.

  53. See Heidegger (1987, p. 31): ‘Dies ist doch die Frage, ob das Sein nur als der allgemeinste Begriff gelten kann, der in allen besonderen Begriffen unvermeidlich vorkommt, oder ob das Sein völlig anderen Wesens ist und somit alles andere, nur nicht der Gegenstand einer ‘Ontologie’, gesetzt, dass man dieses Wort in der herkömmlichen Bedeutung nimmt.’

  54. (Honnefelder (1996), p. 65), translation from: ‘Die Differenz von Sein und Seiendem ist als Unter-Schied von Überkommnis und Ankunft der entbergend-bergende Austrag beider.’ Against this his own words could be adduced: ‘Philosophie als vom Leben abgelöstes, rationalistisches Gebilde ist machtlos, Mystik als irrationalistisches Erleben ist ziellos.’ (Heidegger 1916, p. 241).

  55. For a discussion of Heideggers specific and use of the concept of ‘ontotheology’ see Boulnois (1995, pp. 85–108). Heideggers use of ‘ontotheology’ is ambiguous according to Boulnois: he does not distinguish between 1) ‘une constitution ontothéologique (la métaphysique comme science sous une considération dimorphique)’ and 2) ‘une structure ontothéologique’ (107-108).

  56. See Marion (1991) ‘Double Idolatry’ and Marion (1995, p. 36): Marion describes his own view of the exact nature of onto-theo-logie, neatly in line with Heidegger: (1) \(\ll \) Le Dieu \(\gg \) doit s’inscrire explicitement dans le champ métaphysique ...; (2) il doit y assurer une fondation causale de tous les étants communs ...; (3) il doit, pour ce faire, assumer toujours la fonction ...de causa sui...

  57. Echoing the phenomenologists trouble with ‘representation’, as it is linked with ‘objectivization, therefore of the subject’s claim to mastery over the meaning of its experience’ (Ricoeur 2000, p. 127). If, however, this nominalist or rather constructivist view of knowledge is no longer taken for granted, the trouble that representation is inherently linked with ‘mastery’ disappears. See footnote 33 above.

  58. Just so in Marion (1991, p. 80): ‘In fact, to define the ens as an objectum of human understanding seems necessarily to imply it also starting from representation.’ I would say: the scotistic view is not about the human mind but about every intellect whatsoever; it is not about representation, but about ens as ‘non-repugnantia’ connoting the ability or capacity of being real, being existent, see footnote 33 above.

  59. Marion (1991, p. 80): here Marion does not differentiate between Duns, Avicenna and Aquinas. In fact, Aquinas has quite another first object than ens: the forma of sensible objects.

  60. Marion (1991, pp. 190–191). A difficulty with Marion’s own Christology could be, I fear, that it remains difficult to speak of ‘the divine and human nature’ if the divine nature is shrouded in a dark cloud of absolute not-knowing. Compare also the kenotic view in Marion (2001, p. 213).

  61. Meant as a type of faith that rejects the identity of the Redeemer and the Creator.

  62. Adv. haereses V, 2, 1; ‘non aliena in dolo diripiens, sed sua propria juste et benigne assumens’ (http://archive.org/stream/sanctiirenaeiep00harvgoog#page/n326/mode/2up)

References

  • Alston, W. P. (2007). Speaking literally of god. In M. Peterson, W. Hasker, B. Reichenbach, & D. Basinger (Eds.), Philosophy of religion: Selected readings. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ameriks, K. (1992). The critique of metaphysics: Kant and traditional ontology. In G. Paul (Ed.), The Cambridge companion to Kant. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Benjamins, R. (2008). Een en Ander, de traditie van de moderne theologie. Kampen: Kok.

  • Blond, P. (Ed.). (1998). Post-secular philosophy: Between philosophy and theology. London: Routledge.

  • Boulnois, O. (1995). Quand commence l’ontothéologie? Aristote, Thomas d’Aquin et Duns Scot. Revue Thomiste, 95, 85–108.

    Google Scholar 

  • Boulnois, O. (1996). Duns Scot, théoricien de l’analogie de l’être. In L. Honnefelder, R. Wood, & M. Dreyer (Eds.), John Duns Scotus. Metaphysics and ethics (pp. 293–315). Leiden: E.J. Brill.

  • Cross, R. (1999). Duns Scotus. New York: Oxford University Press.

  • Cross, R. (2001). Where angels fear to tread: Duns Scotus and radical orthodoxy. Antonianum Annus LXXVI Fasc. 1 (January–March), 7–41.

  • Cross, R. (2005). Scotus and Suárez at the origins of modernity. In W. J. Hankey & D. Hedley (Eds.), Deconstructing radical orthodoxy (pp. 65–80). Aldershot: Ashgate.

  • Cross, R. (2008). Idolatry and religious language. Faith and Philosophy, 25(2), 190–196.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • De Corte, J. (1996). Henry of Ghent on analogy. In Henry of Ghent: Proceedings of the international colloquium on the occasion of the 700th anniversary of his death (1293), Leuven.

  • De Rijk, L. M. (1981). Middeleeuwse Wijsbegeerte. Assen: Van Gorcum.

  • Dumont, S. D. (1998). Duns Scotus. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 3, 153–170.

    Google Scholar 

  • Heidegger, M. (1916). Die Kategorien- und Bedeutungslehre des Duns Scotus. Tübingen: Mohr.

  • Heidegger, M. (1969). Identity and difference (J. Stambaugh, Trans.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

  • Heidegger, M. (1987). Einführung in die Metaphysik. Tübingen: Niemeyer.

  • Hoeres, W. (1962). Der Wille als reine Vollkommenheit nach Duns Scotus. München: A. Pustet.

  • Honnefelder, L. (1979). Ens inquantum ens, Der Begriff des Seienden als solchen als Gegenstand der Metaphysik nach der Lehre des Johannes Duns Scotus. Münster: Aschendorff.

  • Honnefelder, L. (1990). Scientia transcendens: Die formale Bestimmung der Seiendheit und Realität in der Metaphysik des Mittelalters und der Neuzeit. Hamburg: Meiner.

  • Honnefelder, L. (1996). Metaphysik und Ethik bei Johannes Duns Scotus: Forschungsergebnisse und Perspektiven. Eine Einführung. In L. Honnefelder (Ed.), John Duns Scotus: Metaphysics and ethics (pp. 1–36). Leiden: E.J. Brill.

  • Honnefelder, L., Wood, R., & Dreyer, M. (Eds.) (1996). John Duns Scotus: Metaphysics and ethics Leiden: E.J. Brill.

  • Janicaud, D. (2000). The theological turn of French phenomenology. In D. Janicaud et al. (Eds.), Phenomenology and the ‘Theological turn’, the French debate. New York: Fordham University Press.

  • King, P. (2003). Scotus on metaphysics. In T. Williams (Ed.), The Cambridge companion to Duns Scotus. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Knuutila, S. (1996). Duns Scotus and the foundations of logical modalities. In L. Honnefelder (Ed.), John Duns Scotus: Metaphysics and ethics (pp. 127–144). Leiden: E.J. Brill.

  • Labooy, G. H. (2013). Duns Scotus’ univoke taaltheorie in de Nederlandse barthiaanse context. Kerk en Theologie, 64(3), 240–258.

    Google Scholar 

  • Marion, J.-L. (1982). Une époque de la métaphysique. In C. Goémé (Ed.), Jean Duns-Scot ou la révolution subtile (pp. 87–95). Paris: Fac Éditions.

  • Marion, J.-L. (1991). God without being (T. A. Carlson, Trans.). Chicago: Chicago University Press.

  • Marion, J.-L. (1995). Saint Thomas d’Aquin et l’onto-theologie. Revue Thomiste, 95, 31–66.

    Google Scholar 

  • Marion, J.-L. (2000). The saturated phenomenon. In D. Janicaud et al. (Eds.), Phenomenology and the ‘Theological turn’, the French debate. New York: Fordham University Press.

  • Marion, J.-L. (2001). The idol and distance (T. Carlson, Trans.). New York: Fordham University Press.

  • Miskotte, K. H. (1985). Uit de Dagboeken 1917–1930. Verzameld Werk 4. Kampen: Kok.

  • Muis, J. (2011). Can Christian talk about god be literal? Modern Theology, 27(4), 582–607.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Prosman, A. (2010). Wie komt na de God van de metafysica? Merold Westphal over ontotheologie en transcendentie. Kerk en Theologie, 61, 40–57.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ricoeur, P. (2000). Experience and language in religious discourse. In D. Janicaud (Ed.), Phenomenology and the ‘Theological turn (pp. 127–146). New York: Fordham University Press.

  • Rocca, G. (2004). Speaking the incomprehensible god. Washington: Thomas Aquinas on the Interplay of Positive and Negative Theology.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sarot, M. (2012). Beslisbomen en het BESTAAN van God: een ongelukkige combinatie. Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte, 104(2), 120–122.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schönberger, R. (1996). Negationes non summe amamus. In L. Honnefelder (Ed.), John Duns Scotus: Metaphysics and ethics (pp. 475–498). Leiden: E.J. Brill.

  • Scotus, D. (1950). Opera Omnia, civitas vaticana.

  • Swinburne, R. (1977). The coherence of theism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • Veldhuis, H. (1990). Geen begrip voor de Ander: De kritiek van Emmanuel Levinas op de westerse filosofie, in het bijzonder op het denken van Husserl and Heidegger, Utrecht.

  • Vos, A. (2006). The philosophy of John Duns Scotus. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

  • Williams, T. (2005). The doctrine of univocity is true and salutary. Modern Theology, 21(4), 575–585.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wisse, M. (2011). Trinitarian Theology beyond Participation: Augustine’s De Trinitate and Contemporary Theology? New York: T&T Clark.

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Dutch Protestant Church (PKN), vd Palmstraat 5, 3351 HA , Papendrecht, The Netherlands

    Guus H Labooy

Authors
  1. Guus H Labooy
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Guus H Labooy.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Labooy, G.H. Duns Scotus’ univocity: applied to the debate on phenomenological theology. Int J Philos Relig 76, 53–73 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-014-9443-8

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-014-9443-8

Keywords

Search

Navigation