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Do corporations manage earnings to meet/exceed analyst forecasts? Evidence from pension plan assumption changes

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Abstract

A significantly larger number of firms increase the expected rate of return on pension plan assets (ERR) to make their reported earnings meet/exceed analyst forecasts than would be expected by chance. In the short run, the stock market reacts positively to these firms’ earnings announcements, suggesting that investors fail to recognize that earnings benchmarks are achieved through ERR manipulation. In the long run, however, firms that employ this earnings management strategy significantly underperform control firms in both stock returns and operating performance.

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Notes

  1. See Degeorge et al. (1999); Bartov et al. (2002); and Kasznik and McNichols (2002). Managerial reputation, favorable compensation contracts, and building credibility with the capital markets are also incentives for managers to report earnings that meet/exceed analyst forecasts (Healy and Wahlen 1999). In addition, previous studies find that pressure on managers to avoid missing analyst forecasts has intensified in recent years (e.g., Barth et al. 1999).

  2. This example is given by Bebchuk and Fried (2004, pp. 125–126). The analyst EPS forecast number for Verizon is obtained from the I/B/E/S file (both the mean and median earnings forecasts for Verizon were $3.01 in 2000).

  3. Another example is IBM. According to Revell (2002), IBM reported $11.5 billion in pretax earnings in 2000, to which its pension plan contributed $1.2 billion, accounting for 10 % of total pretax earnings. Further analysis shows that about $200 million in earnings were due to an increase in ERR (from 9.5 to 10 %). In 2000 IBM’s actual return on plan assets was 3.06 %. In 2001 IBM used 10 % for its ERR and reported $904 million in pension income, representing 13.2 % of total pretax earnings. Given the large size of IBM’s pension plan assets (about $50 billion), a small increase in ERR would have a significant effect on its earnings. For instance, a 10 basis point increase in ERR would raise IBM’s expected pension income by $500 million. Thanks largely to ERR increases, IBM’s reported EPS exceeded analyst forecasts in both 2000 and 2001. This example is also cited by Bergstresser et al. (2006).

  4. We note, however, that several recent studies provide evidence that analyst forecasts do not fully reflect the effect of pension-related information (i.e., Picconi 2006; Coronado et al. 2008). After interviewing analysts about their information-gathering process and physically inspecting 49 analyst spreadsheets, Døskeland and Kinserdal (2010) report that analysts do not incorporate relevant pension information into their valuation models.

  5. “Increasingly, we have become concerned that the motivation to meet Wall Street earnings expectations may be overriding common business practices” (Arthur Levitt, speaking at the New York University Center for Law and Business, September 28, 1998).

  6. According to Bergstresser et al. (2006, p. 7), firms with larger pension assets relative to operating assets are more sensitive to ERR changes. Suppose two firms both have $100 in operating assets, where Firm A has $20 in pension assets and Firm B has $60. Both firms earn a 4 %, or $4, return on their operating assets. If both firms change ERR from 10 to 11 %, Firm A will increase its net income by $0.20, or 5 % ($0.20/$4), and Firm B will increase its net income by $0.60, or 15 % ($0.60/$4).

  7. The Financial Accounting Standards Board’s (FASB) view on the ERR timing issue is vague, if not absent. The following paragraph of SFAS 132 appears to provide a relevant discussion: “The Board observed that disclosures about certain key assumptions would be more useful if those disclosures followed consistent conventions. For example, some entities’ disclosures under Statement 132 indicate that the disclosed key assumptions are as of the latest measurement date even though the expected long-term rate-of-return-on-assets assumption is as of an earlier date used to determine current-period assumed investment earnings” (SFAS 132, p.25, paragraph A36).

  8. We are grateful to the editor and an anonymous referee for pointing out this ERR timing issue. .

  9. For example, according to a report from finance.yahoo, after filing the 2011 annual report, the CEO of McDermott International Inc. said at a conference on February 29, 2012, “we do view the current range of analyst estimates for the full year as reasonable bookends at this time, based on our current 2012 forecast and expected business conditions.”

  10. According to the cash flow statement method (e.g., Collins and Hribar 2002), accruals can be measured as Accruals = EBXI – CFO, where EBXI are earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations, and CFO is net cash flow from operating activities. From the equation above, an increase in the ERR inflates accruals through an increase in firm earnings (as discussed in the “Appendix”). However, the effect of a change in the ERR would not be incorporated into working capital accruals in the balance sheet method (Sloan 1996), because the prepaid/accrued pension cost affected by an ERR change is classified as a long-term asset/liability. If the balance sheet method is to be used, one would have to use an extended definition of accruals that incorporates changes in noncurrent assets/liabilities. We are grateful to the editor for making this point.

  11. Other variables used for scaling the difference between the FVPA and PBO include total assets, operating income, number of employees, and the PBO. See Franzoni and Marín (2006) for the rationale for using the market value of equity as a scalar.

  12. Historically, the I/B/E/S earnings data have been adjusted for stock splits and rounded to the nearest cent. Therefore, using adjusted I/B/E/S data would result in a disproportionate proportion of firms that exactly meet analyst forecasts. For example, an EPS estimate of $0.10 and a reported EPS of $0.11 would both be recorded as $0.02 after a 5-to-1 split. In addition, because firms splitting their stock tend to have good performance, they also have an ex post performance bias. Diether et al. (2002) are the first to identify these issues related to the adjusted I/B/E/S data.

  13. Other pension assumptions, such as the pension liabilities discount rate, could be changed simultaneously with the ERR change. We discuss this issue in Sect. 4.5 on robustness.

  14. The website can be accessed at https://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~jgraham/.

  15. Note that ∆ERR becomes negative for ERR-decreasing firms. Thus the pre-managed EPS is estimated by adding back the ERR earnings impact to the reported EPS.

  16. Panel A of Table 3 reveals that ERR-increasing firms tend to underperform control firms as the event window is extended to 10 to 40 days. This suggests that investors may slowly digest announced earnings and recognize the earnings impact of an ERR increase.

  17. When the four-factor alpha is used as the dependent variable, we do not include Beta, LogMKV, LogBM, or MOM as independent variables.

  18. The information on the managerial decision on the ERR may not be available to analysts until the annual report is released. According to current pension accounting standards, firms are not required to report the ERR information on the quarterly report. However, analysts could infer an ERR change from management earnings guidance. To investigate such a possibility, we checked First Call Management Earning Guidance Database maintained by I/B/E/S. We searched key words such as “pension,” “pension assumption,” “ERR,” “expected rate of return of pension,” and “pension asset return.” We could not find any evidence of management guidance on ERR changes. In addition, we randomly selected 20 ERR-increasing firms from our sample and reviewed the notes of the quarterly report. We did not detect any discussion on ERR changes in the notes. We also used a key word search to see whether managers disclose ERR changes in the earnings conference calls and did not discover any discussion about ERR changes, although managers occasionally discuss the pension funding status and pension liability discount rate. It is still possible, however, that shrewd analysts could infer ERR changes from the publicly available information or obtain the ERR information through other possible channels. Our regression tests using ESurprise do not completely exclude such a possibility.

  19. Monthly returns in the WLS model are weighted by the square root of the number of sample firms included in the monthly portfolio.

  20. We obtain consistent results when using the BHAR method. In particular, we use two groups of control firms to estimate the BHAR: (1) firms that maintain/decrease the ERR and report earnings that marginally miss analyst forecasts and (2) firms that increase the ERR but do not change their missing or exceeding status. For each group of control firms, we construct size-, size/industry-, and size/book-to-market-matched control firms, according to Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995) and Hertzel et al. (2002). We find that ERR-increasing firms earn significantly negative BHARs in the subsequent five years compared to control firms. These results are available from the authors upon request.

  21. There were 369 S&P 500 firms and 627 Fortune 1,000 firms sponsoring DB pension plans at the end of 2005.

  22. This part of the discussion is based on Kieso et al. (2011), Ch. 20.

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Acknowledgments

We thank Thomson Financial Services Inc. for providing earnings per share forecast data, available through the Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S). These data have been provided as part of a broad academic program to encourage earnings expectation research. We are indebted to the editor, Professor Richard Sloan, and the referees for many insightful suggestions and comments. We thank John Graham for sharing the simulated corporate marginal tax rate data and Ken French for making the Fama–French three-factor and momentum data available on his website. We also thank seminar participants of the 2008 American Accounting Association (AAA) conference and the 2008 Financial Management Association International (FMA)–European conference for their comments and suggestions.

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  1. Bryan School of Business and Economics, University of North Carolina Greensboro, Greensboro, NC, 27402, USA

    Heng An

  2. College of Business Administration, University of Rhode Island, Kingston, RI, 02881, USA

    Yul W. Lee

  3. School of Business Administration, University of Dayton, Dayton, OH, 45469, USA

    Ting Zhang

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Appendix: Background of DB pension plans and the impact of an ERR change on corporate earnings

Appendix: Background of DB pension plans and the impact of an ERR change on corporate earnings

This appendix provides an overview of DB pension plans and discusses the pension accounting requirements of ERRs and how firms can overstate earnings by increasing the ERR.

1.1 Overview of DB pension plans

A DB pension plan entitles employees at retirement (or vesting date) to receive predetermined (defined) benefits based primarily on their years of service, age, and salary. Accounting for DB pension plans requires managers to make several assumptions, including the ERR, the discount rate to be used in estimating pension benefits, and employee salary increase rates. The present value of the total amount of employee benefits (after considering future employee salary increase rates) represents a firm’s PBO. Firms are required by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974 to set aside a certain amount of funds to meet their pension obligations. These funds are usually invested in stock and bond markets and should be managed solely for the interest of employees. The market value of these funds is the FVPA. When the FVPA is less than the PBO, a pension plan is underfunded; in such cases, firms need to make extra contributions to bring the pension back to adequate funding levels. These contributions to the pension plan can reduce earnings and capital expenditures and adversely affect firm cash flow (Rauh 2006).

By the end of 2005, 1,729 firms, or 19.5 % of all public firms (8,703), mostly large firms, in Compustat had DB plans.Footnote 21 Contemporaneous with the rising stock market in the late 1990s, about 31 % of firms with DB plans were underfunded in 2000, compared with more than 60 % in 1996. The aggregate funding surplus also increased dramatically starting in 1996, peaking in 2000 with a total amount of $259 billion. However, a combination of a falling stock market and declining interest rates devastated DB plans beginning in 2000 and left firms with $523 billion in pension deficit in 2003. Pension plan funding status deteriorated significantly in the early 2000s, with more than 80 % of firms underfunded in 2003. Even after the market recovered, the aggregate pension funding deficit remained as high as $336 billion at the end of 2005.

1.2 Pension accounting requirements of the ERR

The FASB issued SFAS 87 in 1985 to standardize accounting rules for DB pension plans. This standard, subsequently amended in 1998 by SFAS 132, requires that firms (1) disclose major pension assumptions, including the ERR, discount rate, and employee compensation increase rate, and (2) report annual pension expenses on their income statement. Managers have considerable discretion in setting the ERR, which can depart significantly from the actual returns of pension assets. As stated in SFAS 87,

The ERR shall reflect the average rate of earnings expected on the funds invested or to be invested to provide for the benefits included in the projected benefit obligation. In estimating that rate, appropriate consideration should be given to the returns being earned by the plan assets in the fund and the rates of return expected to be available for reinvestment (Paragraph 45).

In other words, if managers assume that the pension plan can earn a 10 % return but in reality it lost 5 % instead, the assumed 10 % return is still used to compute annual pension expenses, with the difference between the expected and actual returns amortized over a long period, subject to other accounting requirements.

1.3 A3 Impact of ERR change on firm earnings

In recognizing pension expenses on the income statement, firms do not directly record cash contributions to pension plans as expenses. Rather, they report the net periodic pension cost (NPPC).Footnote 22 The NPPC is the net amount of four components: service cost, interest cost, other costs, and expected return on plan assets, as shown below:

Service cost (present value of pension benefits earned by employees over the last year)

+:

Interest cost (growth of PBO over the year due to the passage of time)

+:

Other costs (i.e., actuarial gain and pension amendments)

=:

Annual accrued cost

–:

Expected return on plan assets (= ERR × FVPA)

=:

Net periodic pension cost (pension expenses or NPPC)

Service cost is the present value of pension benefits earned by employees over the last year, which is essentially deferred compensation. Interest cost is growth in projected pension liability over the previous year. Unlike service cost, interest cost reflects the increase in pension obligations due to the passage of time as employees move closer to receiving their pension benefits. Other costs include actuarial gain, the amortization of transition assets and prior service, and plan amendments. The sum of service cost, interest cost, and other costs, sometimes called annual accrued costs, is netted against the expected return on plan assets. The dollar amount of expected return on plan assets is calculated by multiplying the ERR by FVPA at the beginning of the year. According to SFAS 87, when calculating the expected return on plan assets, the ERR on pension assets, not the realized return, is used. Consequently, a higher ERR would lead to a higher expected dollar return on plan assets, which would, in turn, lead to lower pension plan expenses (NPPC) reported on the income statement and thus higher earnings. Table 6 summarizes the effect of ERR change on corporate earnings, assuming other components of pension expense remain constant.

Table 6 Impact of ERR change on firm earnings
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An, H., Lee, Y.W. & Zhang, T. Do corporations manage earnings to meet/exceed analyst forecasts? Evidence from pension plan assumption changes. Rev Account Stud 19, 698–735 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11142-013-9261-8

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