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Vertical integration of platforms and product prominence

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Abstract 

Meta-search platforms, which enable consumers to compare product prices between different sales channels, are sometimes integrated with certain channels. A case in point is the online hotel booking industry where the major online travel agencies are integrated with meta-search platforms. Studying web-scraped data from the meta-search platform Kayak, we find indications that, for a given hotel, the offers of affiliated online travel agents (like Booking.com) are more visible than those of other online travel agents with the same price. Moreover, hotels appear to be less prominent in Kayak’s search results when the rival online travel agent Expedia has the lowest price.

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  1. See European Commission - Case AT.39740 - Google Search (Shopping), 2017, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1516198535804&uri=CELEX:52018XC0112(01), last accessed April 30, 2022.

  2. See European Commission - Antitrust: Commission sends Statement of Objections to Amazon for the use of non-public independent seller data and opens second investigation into its e-commerce business practices, 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_2077, last accessed April 30, 2022.

  3. See the respective drafts: https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/europe-fit-digital-age/digital-markets-act-ensuring-fair-and-open-digital-markets_enand https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/senate-bill/2992/text, last accessed April 30, 2022.

  4. See, for instance, European Competition Network - Report on the monitoring exercise carried out in the online hotel booking sector, 2016, https://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/hotel_monitoring_report_en.pdf, last accessed April 30, 2022.

  5. See Bundeskartellamt - Sektoruntersuchung Vergleichsportale (Bericht), 2019, pp. 32-33, https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Publikation/DE/Sektoruntersuchungen/Sektoruntersuchung_Vergleichsportale_Bericht.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=7, last accessed April 30, 2022.

  6. See the article by Dennis Schaal (Skift) - Priceline CEO: We won’t bias Kayak search results, 2013, https://skift.com/2013/05/10/priceline-ceo-we-wont-bias-kayak-search-results/, last accessed April 30, 2022.

  7. See ACCC - Trivago misled consumers about hotel room rates, 2020, https://www.accc.gov.au/media-release/trivago-misled-consumers-about-hotel-room-rates, last accessed April 30, 2022.

  8. Our work is also related to the recent theoretical literature on the competitive effects of price parity clauses of intermediaries, such as online travel agents (Edelman and Wright, 2015; Boik & Corts, 2016; Johnson, 2017; Wang & Wright, 2020; Johansen & Vergé, 2017; Ronayne & Taylor, Forthcoming; Wals & Schinkel, 2018; Mantovani et al., 2021; Hunold et al., 2020).

  9. See also Krämer and Schnurr (2018) for an overview.

  10. See HOTREC - European Hotel Distribution Study 2020, 2020, p. 19, https://www.hotrec.eu/european-hotel-distribution-study-2020/, last accessed April 30, 2022.

  11. See, as an example for Kayak, Booking Holdings Inc. - Annual Report on Form 10-K for the Year Ended December 31, 2019, 2019, https://ir.bookingholdings.com/static-files/92c3d5b6-8f42-4686-afc1-f6bd61b94e06, last accessed April 30, 2022.

  12. See p. 33 of Fn. 5.

  13. See p. 39 of Fn. 5.

  14. See, as an example, the bidding overview for Hotel ads on Google: https://support.google.com/google-ads/answer/9244120, last accessed April 30, 2022.

  15. See the article by Sean O’Neill (Skift) - The Surprising Rise of Hotel Spending on Metasearch Advertising, 2019, https://skift.com/2019/07/25/the-surprising-rise-of-hotel-spending-on-metasearch-advertising/, last accessed April 30, 2022.

  16. See, for instance, https://www.myhotelshop.com/, last accessed April 30, 2022.

  17. This fact and the following numbers are taken from p. 32 and p. 33 of Fn. 5.

  18. See Alexa - Global Top 50 Travel Websites, 2017, http://web.archive.org/web/20170804024015/http://www.alexa.com/topsites/category/Top/Recreation/Travel, last accessed April 30, 2022.

  19. See https://www.similarweb.com/*/expedia.fr and https://www.alexa.com/siteinfo/expedia.fr, last accessed April 30, 2022.

  20. See p. 33 in Fn. 5.

  21. See p. 53 in Fn. 10.

  22. See HOTREC - Hotel Distribution Study France, 2020, https://www.hotrec.eu/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Addendum-2020_European_Hotel_Distribution_Survey_France.pdf, last accessed April 30, 2022.

  23. For France, for instance, Tablet is part of the Michelin guide and Splendia is owned by the online platform Voyage-Privé.com.

  24. See the press releases by Booking.com (https://www.phocuswire.com/Priceline-buys-Kayak-for-1-8-billion) and Expedia (https://www.phocuswire.com/Expedia-pays-632-million-for-majority-stake-in-Trivago-let-the-travel-search-games-begin), last accessed April 30, 2022.

  25. See https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1312928/000131292813000005/kayakq4201210-k.htm, last accessed April 30, 2022.

  26. See Fn. 6.

  27. See p. 38 in Fn. 5.

  28. See p. 50 in Fn. 5.

  29. See p. 91 in Fn. 5.

  30. See p. 94 in Fn. 5.

  31. See p. 95 in Fn. 5.

  32. See Fn. 7.

  33. See “How Kayak works,” in the version of December 6, 2018, available at https://web.archive.org/web/20181206023556/https://www.kayak.com/company, last accessed April 30, 2022, Kayak states: “Within a hotel listing, we order our results based on an internal algorithm that balances the prices and our revenue for the results shown. If the cheapest offer is not displayed above the “View Deal” or “Select” button, we highlight it in green in the central section of the listing.” During 2019, another sentence was added stating “Hotels shown on KAYAK are often available to book on several provider sites, each of which will pay for clicks or bookings that they get via KAYAK.”

  34. See “How Kayak works,” in the version of December 6, 2018, available at https://web.archive.org/web/20181206023556/https://www.kayak.com/company, last accessed April 30, 2022, Kayak states: “In the specific case of hotels, the ”Recommended” algorithm is based on a few key factors. The main two rely on the hotel’s guest rating and its popularity (in terms of clicks). Hotels shown on KAYAK are often available to book on several provider sites, each of which will pay for clicks or bookings that they get via KAYAK. We also factor the average revenue potential of each hotel into our recommendations.” This was later shortened to “With hotels, the ”Recommended” algorithm is based on a few key factors. We mainly rely on the price, the hotel’s guest rating and its popularity (measured in clicks). We also factor in the average revenue potential for KAYAK from each hotel result.”

  35. Search results were collected every day from 6am–8am using a web-scraping program from a Windows desktop. IP addresses were randomized in each iteration using a list of French IPs located in the region of Paris. For each iteration, the cache of the browser was cleared of all cookies and historical searches to appear as a new user without any personalization that may affect the Kayak ranking algorithm.

  36. The data set is not balanced since not all existing reservation dates were queried with all possible time horizons. However, 80 percent of reservation dates were queried with at least five distinct time horizons. Other time horizons were collected in order to account for intertemporal price discrimination following revenue management and are kept in the analysis.

  37. Furthermore, hotels with one to three stars have, on average, 62 rooms, while four- and five-star hotels have an average of 104 rooms. This is consistent with French statistics on the hotel industry by INSEE, see https://www.insee.fr/fr/statistiques/1283850, last accessed April 30, 2022.

  38. Observations for hotel offers without TripAdvisor information account for 3.3 percent of the whole sample.

  39. We removed offers with prices above 10,000 € leading to a loss of 28 observations with extreme prices of up to 965,832 €.

  40. The average price is strictly decreasing as the arrival date approaches, from 189€ at six months before the arrival to 182€, 180€, and 178€ respectively for one month, 14, and 4 days before the arrival date. 13 percent of all offers are featured as “Position Leader.” We will get back to this in Section 5.2.

  41. We do not consider some particular offers (8 percent) for which Kayak is mentioned as a sales channel because we do not observe the identity of the sales channel actually mediating the transaction.

  42. Following the French ban of price parity clauses in July 2015, all groups are more often unique price leaders (conditional on availability), suggesting a stronger polarization of price offers.

  43. For instance, the Expedia Group contains highly popular platforms in France, such as Voyages-sncf or Expedia, but also others that are not as popular, such as Venere. Similarly, Booking.com and Agoda are of different popularity as well.

  44. If Kayak values the popularity in the horizontal ranking algorithm, it would make them visible more often compared to a ranking based on the cheapest price. Table 10 in Appendix 1 shows that Booking.com and Expedia.fr are indeed relatively more popular than others. However, this does not hold for Hotels.com.

  45. Using the LPM further allows us to easily correct for heteroskedastic standard errors. Moreover, the LPM has a reduced computation time and enables a straightforward interpretation of the implied marginal effects from our parameter estimates. This is especially relevant when we perform interactions with other variables, such as chain affiliation, to explore effect heterogeneity: the interaction term in nonlinear models generally does not identify the partial cross-derivative, as discussed in Ai and Norton (2003). We have conducted the same analyses also using non-linear models and find similar results, which are available in the Online Appendix.

  46. If we exclude cases from the sample where an online travel agent of Booking Holdings is the price leader, the direct channel is the position leader in 53 percent of the cases compared to 32 percent and 13 percent for the Expedia Group and other online travel agents, respectively.

  47. The results are available upon request.

  48. Analyses using non-linear models yield similar results and are available in of the Online Appendix.

  49. We also conducted the analyses controlling for the position leadership and found qualitatively similar results, which are included in the Online Appendix.

  50. Results are available upon request.

  51. See HOTREC - European Hotel Distribution Study 2020 as cited in Fn. 10.

  52. Although the data collection on Google Hotels stops short of the removal of price parity clauses in France, it does not seem obvious to expect different results as we did not observe systematic changes in the ranking behavior of Kayak following the policy changes.

  53. It seems that on both meta-search platforms Kayak and Google Hotels the price leadership of “Other online travel agents” tends to have a negative effect, as reflected by the negative coefficients in columns (2) and (3). It is important to note that the results of column (4) show that there is not a statistically significant difference between how Kayak or Google rewards hotel offers when other online travel agents are price leaders.

  54. Like the Kayak data, the Google data set is not balanced since not all existing reservation dates were queried with all possible time horizons.

  55. Three additional hotels were identified on both platforms, but there was no overlap regarding the dates of search and travel when the respective hotels on Kayak and Google Hotels were retrieved.

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Acknowledgements

We thank participants of the 14th Digital Economics Conference 2021 at Toulouse, the Online Seminar of the Economics of Platforms, the 19th ZEW ICT Conference as well as participants of internal seminars in Paris and Zurich. In particular, we thank Luis Cabral, Alexandre de Cornière, Marc Ivaldi, Anuj Kumar, Martin Peitz, Greg Taylor, Thibaud Vergé, Julian Wright, the editor and two anonymous referees for helpful comments. The authors alone are responsible for the content. No funds, grants, or other support was received. All authors certify that they had at the time of the submission no affiliations with or involvement in any organization or entity with any financial interest or non-financial interest in the subject matter or materials discussed in this manuscript.

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Correspondence to Ulrich Laitenberger.

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Appendices

Appendix A: Google Trends data

In the Kayak data, we identify 22 online travel agents. For each online travel agent, we download the associated relative search volume on Google (Google Trends) for the “search term” in France per month between 2014 and 2018.

On Google Trends, it is possible to look at searches of these keywords related to the “search term” in general, the respective website, or any other category deemed relevant by Google. As we do not observe the category “website” for all online travel agents, we use the more general query “search term” and adapt the request when necessary (for instance, “Tablet hotels” instead of Tablet).

Besides these 22 online travel agents, we distinguish between the hotel’s direct channel and large hotel chains and websites of independent hotels. We collect data from Google Trends for the nine biggest hotel chains and normalize the value to zero for websites of small independent hotels. For each reservation date, we compute a popularity index (up to 100) by sales channel defined as the current Google Trends value divided by the maximum Google Trends value among the available sales channels for the request. The average popularity is higher for online travel agents than for hotel chains (Table 10), which is mostly driven by some very popular websites like Booking.com and voyages-sncf.fr, the French national railroad ticket booking website.

Table 10 Sales channels’ popularity index

The Google Trends index is subject to considerable variation during the observation period. Figure 4 displays the Google Trends Index for the three main online travel agents. Besides seasonal patterns, there is a general upward trend suggesting main online travel agents are becoming increasingly popular. This is consistent with previous work by Hunold et al. (2018) showing that Booking.com gained in popularity in Europe from 2014 to 2017.

Fig. 4
figure 4

Variation of Google Trends index for main online travel agents

Appendix B: Robustness checks: Chains

Table 11 Hotel chain affiliation
Table 12 Visibility and Position Leadership by chain affiliation
Table 13 Hotel ranking by chain affiliation

Appendix C: Robustness checks: Sales channel

Table 14 Price vs Position leader by sales channel
Table 15 Visibility and Position Leadership at the sales channel-level
Table 16 Hotel ranking at the sales channel level

Appendix D: Google Hotels data

For the analysis conducted in Section 5.4, we obtained additional data from Google Hotels. It covers a period from April, 15, 2015, to September, 22, 2015 (while the data set of Kayak goes from October 2014 to September 2017). In the following paragraphs, we describe the preparation of this data set and how we combined it with the data from Kayak, and we also discuss potential discrepancies.

Data collection

The data from Google Hotels was obtained by a similar procedure as the Kayak data in Larrieu (2019). Search results were collected every day from 6 to 8am using a web scraping program from a Windows desktop. IP addresses were randomized in each iteration using a list of French IPs located in the Paris region. For each iteration, our browser cache was cleared of all cookies and historical searches so as to appear as a new user without any personalization that may affect the Google Hotels ranking algorithm. This lead to 961 search results for 156 distinct reservation dates for one night for two people with different time horizons (mainly 4, 14, 30, and 180 days before arrival).Footnote 54 In total, data for 2,260 different hotel names was collected, which decreased to about 1,100 unique hotels due to different naming across time.

Data merge

Hotels across the two platforms Kayak and Google Hotels were matched by their name similarity and manually. As a result, 1,093 distinct hotels could be matched. Thereby, we cover 61% of the initial sample (1,784 hotels). However, taking into account that we only consider the period from April, 15, 2015, to September, 22, 2015, the coverage increases. Out of the 1,215 hotels present on Kayak for the relevant observation period, we identify 850 hotels also on Google Hotels, yielding a coverage of 69%. This overlap is comparable to the overlap of about 70% of hotels on Booking.com and Expedia in Europe as found in Hunold et al. (2020). The data was then further amended with data from TripAdvisor as before.

Matched vs. non-matched hotels

One might wonder whether the subsample of hotels for our robustness analysis differs from the overall Kayak sample used in the main body of the article. In the following, we provide comparison tables discussing these points. First, we report the statistics of the whole Kayak sample (Panel A) versus the subset of hotels present on Kayak during the observation period of our robustness check (Panel B) in Table 17. Here, we note that while the average number of stars is slightly higher in the “shorter” period, the hotels appear to be smaller in terms of rooms and belong less often to a chain. Second, within the “shorter” time period, we can compare hotels on Kayak which we observe on Google Hotels as well (847, Panel C) and those we do not (365 + 3, Panel D).Footnote 55 It appears that hotels which are present only on Kayak and not on Google Hotels have slightly less stars (3.22 vs. 3.25), a lower number of rooms (49 vs. 62) and are less often part of a hotel chain (21 vs. 24%).

Table 17 Characteristics of hotels in the Kayak data set

These 847 distinct hotels correspond in the matched data to 300 requests, i.e., search results of hotels on both meta-search platforms, reflected in 262,811 hotel positions. The majority of requests (73%) were made for a lead time of 4, 14, 30, or 180 days. In the analyses, we will restrict the sample to the i) hotels which are also available on Kayak, ii) the same dates, iii) the same booking horizon, and iv) the period when all forms of price parity clauses were still allowed, that is, until July 1, 2015.

Effects of data filtering

Finally, we verify that we get qualitatively the same results with the data from Kayak even when restricting the sample in the same dimensions as the Google data set. Table 18 shows the result of the baseline model for the Kayak data until July 1, 2015, using all available hotels, travel dates, and booking horizons. Subsequently, we restrict the sample to the same observation period (column 2), the same set of hotels in both data sets (column 3), and apply both restrictions in column (4). Finally, in column (5) we restrict the Kayak sample further to hotel-travel date observations with the same booking horizon as available in the Google data. One can see that even when imposing these restrictions, results remain qualitatively the same.

Table 18 Kayak hotel ranking - different filters

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Cure, M., Hunold, M., Kesler, R. et al. Vertical integration of platforms and product prominence. Quant Mark Econ 20, 353–395 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11129-022-09255-4

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