Abstract
Rinard (Philos Stud 176(7):1923–1950, 2019) brings to our attention the fact that, typically, the questions What should I believe? and What should I do? are treated differently. A typical answer to the first question is Believe according to the evidence, and a typical answer to the second question is Do what is right. But Rinard rejects this dichotomy. In its place, she argues for a view which she calls “Equal Treatment” in which one should believe according to the same considerations that govern what one should do. Christensen (Philos Phenomenol Res. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12712, 2020) aptly situates Equal Treatment as a limit case of a recent movement towards taking pragmatic factors as partly determining what one should believe, in that Equal Treatment is a purely pragmatic view. Does Rinard’s case for a purely pragmatic view succeed? This paper argues that the answer is no. Three objections that target key parts of Rinard’s case for Equal Treatment are presented. The upshot is that the dichotomy between the answers to What should I believe? and What should I do? seems robust against strong attempts to dismantle it.
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References
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For helpful comments and discussion, the author thanks Andrew Dennis Bassford, Ray Buchanan, SinanDogramaci, Emma McDonald, Miriam Schoenfield, and anonymous referees.
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Avni, R. Problems with purely pragmatic belief. Philos Stud 178, 4151–4163 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-021-01641-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-021-01641-0