Abstract
Although there seems to be an agreement on what slurs are, many authors diverge when it comes to classify some words as such. Hence, many debates would benefit from a technical definition of this term that would allow scholars to clearly distinguish what counts as a slur and what not. Although the paper offers different definitions of the term in order to allow the reader to choose her favorite, I claim that ‘slurs’ is the name given to a grammatical category, and I consequently trace a difference in kind between slurs and other kinds of group pejoratives. I rely on a novel approach to slurs that characterizes them based on their membership to a particular kind of register category, an often neglected sociolinguistic notion determining the social contexts in which registered terms are expected, tolerated or unacceptable. The paper also points out to the close link between words registered as [+derogatory] (slurs) and their usage in the context of dominance relations of different kinds between users and recipients of slurs. By pointing out to this link I hope to underscore the political significance of slur usage, as well as to contribute further to the explanation why slurs are so damaging and unacceptable in most social contexts.
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Notes
Hom (2008).
Williamson (2009).
Bach (2018).
See Ashwell (2016) for doubts on the status of these as slurs.
I won’t attempt here to provide a definition of ‘meaning’. I am using the term in opposition of ‘use’ and in this contrast, ‘meaning’ could be as well truth-conditional content, that plus conventional implicature or semantic presuppositions, or that plus an expressive dimension.
Hom (2012).
When it comes to slurs, in many countries, this entitlement to offense can even impact on legislation, allowing individuals to initiate legal actions against speakers using these expressions (Kennedy (2002)). See also the distinction between actual, warranted and rational offense in Bolinger (2017): offense can be rational if hearers are epistemically justified in taking offense, and warranted if the offense is morally justified.
This should be clear by now: this does not prevent speakers form making slurring remarks using these expressions. I am just saying that the words in themselves are not slurs. However, some of these descriptions or expressions can crystallize as slurs after reiterated slurring use. ‘Limey’ first described the habit of British sailors arriving to North America of sucking limes to prevent scurvy, and is now a slur for British in general. [Example by Richard (2008)].
Bach, unpublished.
I thank Ram Neta for this example.
Oxford Dictionary of English.
By ‘literally’ I mean the sense in which Jeshion (2013) uses this term.
I thank the anonymous referee for warning me about this problem.
Graff Fara (2000).
Notice that the reference of the slur is not dependent on the reference on the neutral counterpart; although some authors may push forward the requisite of the existence of a neutral counterpart for a pejorative to count a slur, I believe that the requirement of group neutrality is a clearer anchor for the relation. See Ashwell (2016) for a critique of the requirement of a neutral counterpart. I thank the anonymous referee for pointing me in the direction of a better clarification of this point.
See Haslanger (2012).
Again, in the literal use described by Jeshion (2013).
See Ashwell (2016) for arguments on why this is not a good idea.
See Diaz-Legaspe, Liu, and Stainton (2019) for details.
Notice that register does not dote registered words with the ability to convey an extra content above their truth-conditional content or to express emotions or attitudes.
The expression ‘conversational context’ refers to a situation singled out by social components: conversational parties and their kind of relation, medium, type of interaction, physical setting, previous conversation, etc.
Following Matsuda (1993, pp. 24–26) this would be an expected reaction: the abuse received from Ss (or even from some Ss) cause Gs to treat all Ss with suspicion in the best case, and with retaliative negative emotions in the worst.
I thank the anonymous referee to point to me to this paradigmatic example.
Eidelson (2015).
I thank the anonymous referee for this example.
Online Etymology Dictionary.
For a difference between marginalizing and normalizing slurs see Diaz-Legaspe (2018).
Consider ‘fuck’, apparently rooted in a German word for ‘strike’ or ‘move back and forth’. One of its first appearances goes back to 16th century, in a manuscript of Cicero’s De Oficiis, where an annotation by a monk reads “O d fuckin Abbot”. Most likely, the author of the comment intended to express his extreme dismay, but since using the word ‘damned’ was forbidden due to religious implications, he preferred this other word. The expression got its connotation from its hinted relation to the other that was tabooed back then. (Mohr 2013). Bergen (2016) adds that pejoratives, profanities and expletives are for the most part based on sexual, religious, bodily or social aspects of human life.
Diaz-Legaspe and Stainton, (2018).
There are cases in which the referent of the slur is not part of the conversation: non-Jewish interlocutors that use the term ‘kike’ are surely not placing one another in any inferior position. Instead, they are placing someone else in that role, even if that person/s is not present: whoever they are referring to with the term ‘kike’. This differs significantly from a second person pronoun like ‘Usted’, which is always used to address the recipient within the conversation. I thank the anonymous referee for this observation.
See Popa-Wyatt and Wyatt (2018) for an approach to slur usage as a speech act that alters conversational roles by disbalancing power.
See Bergen (2016).
See Bolinger (2017).
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Acknowledgements
This paper emerges as part of a research project conducted in Western University and partially financed by the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada through grants to R. J. Stainton. It owes much to many people: the people in the slurs reading group of the Philosophy Department in Western University (Rob Stainton, Chang Liu, Jiangtian Li, Mike Korngut and Julia Lei), the Philosophy of Language and Linguistics group of the SADAF institute in Buenos Aires, Argentina (Eleonora Orlando and Andres Saab, Ramiro Caso, Nicolas Lo Guercio, Alfonso Losada, among others). Comments of another paper presented at the DEX VI Conference in UC Davis inspired and helped put the last details on the original ideas. I thank for this Adam Sennet, David Copp, Tina Rulli, Roberta Millstein, Adrian Currie, Ram Neta, and Tyrus Fisher.
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Diaz-Legaspe, J. What is a slur?. Philos Stud 177, 1399–1422 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-019-01259-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-019-01259-3